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Introduction: 
Miklos Horthy and the Second World War: 
Some Historiographical Perspectives 
N.F. Dreisziger 
Admiral Miklos Horthy, Hungary's head of state from 1919 to 1944, is probably 
the most controversial statesmen in modern Hungarian history. His name has 
been linked to the White Terror of 1919, an outburst of anti-Communism and 
anti-Semitism that overtook Hungary in the wake of the left-wing revolutions of 
1918-1919. He is also widely reputed to have been the main architect of the 
"semi-feudal" system of aristocratic privilege and authoritarianism that was 
introduced, some would say restored, in Hungary in 1919-1920. But it is 
Horthy's actions or omissions in the Second World War that have made him, and 
to a lesser extent also his family, forever a subject of controversy. 
In the eyes of his detractors, Horthy's greatest crime was Hungary's 
wartime involvement on the side of the Axis which resulted in great suffering 
and enormous losses for the Hungarian nation by the autumn of 1944, when 
Horthy's rule came to an end as he was removed by the Germans and incarcer-
ated in the Third Reich. In the half-century since the end of World War II 
Horthy's responsibility for Hungary's fate has been assessed in very different 
ways. 
Hungary's wartime leadership!, and, above all, Horthy himself, were 
almost invariably condemned by commentators in the lands of the Allies. We 
need not dwell on these opinions, and it should suffice to cite, by way of 
example, British historian A.J.P. Taylor, who during the war denounced Horthy 
and his entourage as being the "principal promoters of German imperialism" in 
East Central Europe.' Assessments of Horthy's wartime policies remained 
negative after the war as well. This was so especially in Hungary where by the 
late 1940s the country's communist transformation was well on its way. The 
anti-Horthy rhetoric was particularly virulent in the Stalin era, during the regime 
of Matyas Rakosi, the Soviet dictator's quisling in Hungary for much of the 
period between 1948 and 1956. Such negative views of Horthy persisted well 
into the 1970s and 1980s,2 when the intellectual thaw in Hungarian life occasion-
ally allowed more moderate assessments of him to surface. 
Outside Hungary opinions were divided. In the Soviet Union itself, 
views were invariably anti-Horthy.3 In the Western Allied countries, the kind of 
views expressed by Taylor near the end of the war persisted after 1945, but 
there were exceptions. In a book published in 1947, John F. Montgomery, a 
former American minister to Hungary, defended Horthy's record and condemned, 
instead, the Allied treatment of Hungary from the post-World War I peace 
treaties to the early Second World War years.4 Later British historian C.A. 
Macartney wrote on the subject of Hungarian foreign policy during the late 
1930s and the first half of the 1940s. In effect, he concluded that Hungary's 
"doom" was "dictated" not so much by the acts or omissions of her leaders, but 
by "forces far exceeding" those of Hungary.5 Macartney documented this 
judgement in a monumental study: October Fifteenth: A History of Modern 
Hungary, 1929-J9446 
Differences of opinion also existed in the works of historians who were 
born in Hungary and later became academics in the West. In his book, The 
Green Shirts and the Others, Nicholas Nagy-Talavera suggests that Horthy was 
lacking both caution and statesmanlike wisdom in 1941. By February of the 
following year, however, the regent's attitude began "maturing." Nagy-Talavera 
maintains that "Horthy never desired or believed in German victory although he 
was sometimes carried away... but the entrance of the United States into the war 
dissipated the slightest doubt in his mind about the [war's] outcome."7 Mario 
Fenyo, another Hungarian-born American academic, rendered a somewhat more 
critical judgement of Horthy in his study, Hitler, Horthy, and Hungary: German-
Hungarian Relations, 1941-1944;8 while the writer of this introduction saw 
Horthy in a less negative light in his Hungary's Way to World War II.9 
While historians both in the West and the East were rendering their 
judgements about Horthy from the 1950s to the 1980s, they were reluctant to 
undertake a biography of him. The first exception to this was Peter Gosztony 
(originally Peter Gosztonyi) a Hungarian-born historian who has lived in Swit-
zerland since the late 1950s. In 1973 Gosztony published the book Miklds von 
Horthy: Admiral und Reichsverweser.l0 Nearly two decades later, after the 
collapse of communism in Hungary, it became possible for Gosztony to release 
this book in Hungary (in Hungarian) as well." Though this work belongs more 
in the genre of popular rather than scholarly biography, it might be worth 
examining in detail, especially as it relates to the Second World War period. 
Gosztony explores both Horthy's life as a naval officer and his post-1920 
career as a statesman. He points out how on more than one occasion Horthy 
was in the "right place at the right time" to receive boosts in his ascent to 
prominence. On one of these occasions, in early 1918, Horthy was appointed 
commander of the Austro-Hungarian Navy. In this promotion nearly fifty 
officers with more seniority were passed over. Another such occasion happened 
less than two years later, during the period of communist rule in Budapest, when 
Hungarian politicians in exile looked to Admiral Horthy as the next Minister of 
War, mainly because the army generals in their midst would not tolerate the 
appointment of anyone of their own to this high position. As he was the only 
senior admiral available for a prominent role, fate made sure that Horthy would 
not be doomed to the obscurity to which many senior Habsburg officers had 
been condemned with the collapse of Austria-Hungary. 
Gosztony tells us that Horthy was a conscientious officer who cared for his 
men and valued loyalty and tradition. When fate thrust a great deal of power 
into his hands, Horthy refused to use it merely to enhance his personal influence. 
Horthy expected respect from others, but it was never his wish to become a 
dictator of his country. Gosztony argues that Horthy deliberately refused to take 
the path of some of his contemporaries, such as Italy's Benito Mussolini or even 
Poland's Jozef Pitsudski. In some of his moves Horthy demonstrated consider-
able political acumen. But Gosztony agrees with most of those who have 
studied Horthy that his conservative upbringing and outlook prevented him from 
accepting many of the new ideas and ideals of the twentieth century. The regent 
was suspicious of all radicalisms and hated communism with a particular 
vehemence. Horthy's sympathy for the Hungarian peasant did not extend to 
Hungary's masses of agrarian labourers, or to her workingmen. While he did not 
initiate the White Terror that became widespread in parts of Hungary after the 
collapse of Bela Kun's Commune, Horthy was slow to curb it and reluctant to 
bring its perpetrators to account. On the controversial question of Horthy's anti-
Semitism, Gosztony comes to the conclusion that the admiral was not a hater of 
Jews, but no philo-Semite either. Horthy's feelings toward Jews was what one 
might call "armchair anti-Semitism," quite different from the anti-Semitism of 
people such as Adolf Hitler. 
Throughout most of the 1920s Horthy was content to leave the administra-
tion of Hungary to his prime ministers, in particular to Istvan Bethlen. In the 
1930s, with the Great Depression, the increased influence of right-radical 
ideologies, and growing international instability, Horthy found himself involved 
in high-level decision making on several occasions. Gosztony rarely finds 
grounds for criticizing Horthy for the stands he took on those occasions. Many 
historians, and even memoir writers, have condemned Horthy for not doing more 
to prevent Hungary's complicity in the German attack on Yugoslavia in April of 
1941, but Gosztony does not. He argues that in light of Hungary's past record of 
friendship toward Germany, a denial of Hitler's request for passage through 
Hungary would have been provocative and therefore not possible. Nor does 
Gosztony blame Horthy for Hungary's declaration of war on the Soviet Union 
and the United States. For this Gosztony places the blame squarely on the 
shoulders of the then prime minister, Laszlo Bardossy. 
In his sympathetic treatment of Horthy, Gosztony goes so far as to say 
that Horthy realized, long before other Axis statesmen, that Hitler would not 
have a quick victory in Russia, and Horthy began to guide Hungary's fate 
accordingly. His first act was to dismiss the chief-of-staff, the pro-German 
Henrik Werth, in the fall of 1941. In early 1942 he continued his efforts and 
replaced Prime Minister Bardossy with Miklos Kallay, under whose leadership 
parliamentary government, respect for human rights, freedom of the press, and 
protection for refugees from Axis lands were the order of the day — to a greater 
extent than in any other Axis country. Many German demands were denied by 
Kallay, and contacts were made with Allied agents to prepare for Hungary's 
defection from the German camp. These contacts had only limited success, 
however, as Hungary's defection hinged on British and American troops reaching 
her borders. 
Gosztony explicitly approves Horthy's choice of Kallay as Hungary's leader 
in those difficult times, and he even acquits the regent for some of his own 
actions during this period. Gosztony refutes the charges, made by the regent's 
contemporary and latter-day critics, that Horthy intended to set up a "Horthy 
dynasty" when he arranged that his son be made deputy regent. This act, 
according to Gosztony, was designed to make sure that if the elder Horthy was 
prevented from performing his duties as head of state — by illness, death, or 
abduction — Hungary would have a leader who would have the respect of her 
people and whose sympathies were squarely with the English and the Americans. 
Gosztony also disagrees completely with those detractors of the regent 
who have suggested that when in March of 1944 Hitler threatened to occupy 
Hungary, Horthy should have resigned. By staying on, Gosztony argues, the 
regent made the best choice in a very difficult situation. 
The occupation of Hungary by the Wehrmacht in March of 1944 was a 
watershed in the country's wartime history. In its wake the full burden of total 
war was to be visited on the country's people. Hitler insisted on the appointment 
of a pro-Nazi government, on Hungary's full support for the Axis war effort, and 
on the "solution" of Hungary's "Jewish question." Starting with the spring of 
1944, Hungary lost her immunity from Allied bombing raids, while opposition 
elements were dealt with by the Gestapo who often acted as if they operated in 
occupied enemy territory. Furthermore, the deportation of Hungary's Jews started 
under the supervision of the Gestapo's "Jewish Evacuation" expert, Adolf 
Eichmann. 
For a while Horthy watched these developments as if he were in exile, 
but in June 1944 he began to take steps to try to ameliorate Hungary's sad 
situation. He appealed to Hitler to stop the Germans' worst excesses. Horthy 
also consulted with his most trusted soldiers on the matter of armed resistance to 
German rule and he then replaced the government the Germans had insisted on 
in March, and appointed a military cabinet whose task it was to prepare Hun-
gary's exit f rom the war. Earlier, he had stopped the deportations of Jews from 
Hungary, just before these were to be extended to the large Jewish community of 
Budapest. It is only in this connection that Gosztony expresses regret that the 
regent had not acted sooner. 
By the summer of 1944 Horthy's days as regent of Hungary were 
numbered. He was determined to end Hungary's involvement in the war, and 
persisted even after he was told by the Allies that he would have to surrender 
unconditionally to the Soviets. Gosztony concludes that Hungary's attempt to 
leave the war failed mainly for two reasons. The Germans found out about it 
and took timely counter-measures (such as abducting Miklos Horthy Jr., who 
was by then Horthy's only child still alive), and pro-German elements of 
Hungary's officer corps deserted Horthy and his few loyal generals in the hour of 
their greatest need. His coup having failed, Horthy was forced to resign and was 
taken into German custody, while his son was interned in Mauthausen. 
Gosztony explains why Horthy was not treated as a war criminal after the 
war. Marshall Tito's efforts to put Horthy on trial were resisted by the British 
and the Americans, while the similar designs of Hungary's communists were 
discouraged by Stalin who apparently saw no need to try the "old man." So, in 
1948 Horthy was allowed to start his exile in Portugal. To save him from 
destitution, some of his sympathizers established a fund for him. Among those 
who were responsible for this was the above-mentioned John Montgomery, as 
well as a handful of Hungarian Jews, In exile, Horthy stayed away from emigre 
politics, but remained a keen observer of world events and of developments in 
Hungary. The crushing of the Hungarian Revolution by the Soviets late in 1956 
dealt a great blow to his morale. He died early in the next year at the ripe old 
age of 88. 
In North America Horthy found a biographer in an American academic, 
Professor Thomas Sakmyster of the University of Cincinnati. His preliminary 
study of Horthy appeared in 1989 in a volume of essays on twentieth-century 
Hungarian statesmen.13 In the introductory paragraphs Sakmyster pointed out 
that, though Horthy had no experience as a diplomat, he was one of the few 
statesmen who was "able to hold his own against Adolf Hitler." In regards to 
the regent's alleged anti-Semitism, Sakmyster reminds his readers that this 
"notorious" anti-Semite is "often credited with saving" the Jewish community of 
Budapest in 1944. Yet, Sakmyster admits, Horthy was hardly suited by his 
training and intellect to lead a nation in wartime. His linguistic abilities notwith-
standing (Horthy spoke several languages), the regent's intellectual capacity can 
be described as "modest at best," and his perspective on politics as "narrow and 
unsophisticated." All in all, Sakmyster suggests, Horthy would have been more 
at home in eighteenth-century society than in the world of the twentieth. 
The controversial subject of Horthy's relationship with Hitler is explored 
by Sakmyster in some detail. Horthy had misgivings about the German leader 
because of the latter's vulgarity and predilection for theatrics. The regent, 
however, was impressed by Hitler's success in destroying the Versailles settle-
ment, and was attracted by his hostility to communism and Czechoslovakia. Yet 
in August of 1938, when Hitler told Horthy that he wanted to move against the 
Czechs, Horthy responded by refusing to promise his country's cooperation in 
such a venture and by warning the Fiihrer that in a European war England 
would prevail. Events of the next two years, however, did much to erode 
Horthy's distaste for collaboration with Germany. The collapse of France, and 
the regaining of lost Hungarian territories with the help of Germany, made 
Horthy more prone to going along with the Germans. Not surprisingly, in the 
crises of the spring of 1941, Horthy failed to prevent Hungary's involvement in 
the war on Germany's side, first against Yugoslavia, and then against Soviet 
Russia. 
No sooner had the decision to join Germany been made than second 
thoughts began to develop in the minds of the leaders in Hungary. Already in 
September, 1941, Horthy was warned of a "long and bloody war" in which 
Hungary could gain nothing.. The defeat of the German armies at Stalingrad, and 
of the Hungarian 2nd Army at Voronezh, gave further impetus to Hungarian 
efforts to leave the war. Despite secret negotiations with the Allies to this end, 
Hungary could not get out of the tentacles of the German alliance. If anything, 
evidence of Hungary's duplicity stiffened Hitler's resolve to occupy the country. 
At home Horthy resisted calls for ending the pluralistic political system 
that had prevailed in Hungary since the 1920s. The socialist and liberal opposi-
tion continued to be tolerated and Jews were protected, despite demands from 
Berlin — and from radical right-wing elements in Hungary — to the contrary. 
All this ended in 1944. In March Hungary was occupied by the Wehrmacht, and 
after the ill-fated attempt of October 15th to sign an armistice with Russia, 
Horthy was removed from power. 
In the final analysis, Sakmyster absolves Horthy of the worst charges of 
his detractors. He reminds us that in Horthy's prisons communist leaders 
survived, while many of their colleagues were slaughtered in Stalin's Russia. In 
early 1944, Sakmyster adds, "Hungary was the only country in Hitler's Europe to 
preserve a semblance of the rule of law and a pluralistic society." He suggests 
that Horthy should be "regarded as the last of the Hungarian kings." He had 
carried out his responsibilities as head-of-state "in a dignified and dutiful 
manner. Like many successful monarchs, he became a symbol of authority and 
a link with a more glorious national past." Horthy could have used this authority 
to establish a dictatorship, Sakmyster argues, but he did not do this because he 
believed that inhumanity was not a "Hungarian quality," and because he had a 
"fundamental respect for Hungarian political traditions." Thus, Horthy became 
the victim of circumstances far beyond his ability to control. 
Half a decade after the appearance of his preliminary study, Sakmyster's 
biography of Horthy was published: Hungary's Admiral on Horseback: Miklos 
Horthy, 1918-1944. As it is reviewed in this volume, and Sakmyster's overall 
conclusions have been outlined above, we will not dwell on this work in detail, 
though it certainly deserves more attention than it has received so far.14 
Nevertheless, the assessment of Sakmyster's book by one of North America's 
foremost experts on modern Hungarian history might be worth examining. The 
expert is Istvan Deak of Columbia University, and his views appeared in a recent 
issue of The Hungarian Quarterly,15 Deak has deemed Sakmyster's political 
biography "accurate" and "strongly critical" whenever necessary, yet "not lacking 
in sympathy for Hungary and its Regent."16 Deak goes on: 
What readers will be intrigued to discover is the intellectual mediocrity 
of a man who rose,... to become Austria-Hungary's only successful 
naval commander during the Great War.... Further, by 1920 Horthy had 
made himself the uncontested leader of his country.... Although both 
his courtiers and he himself vastly overestimated his popularity, he 
seems to have been hated only by the political far Right and the far 
Left. Moreover,... Horthy, the anti-Semite,... was seen by most Jews as 
their ultimate protector against fascism and Hitler. Interestingly, Horthy 
was not very different, in respect to intellect, from other successful 
conservative strong men who dominated Europe in that period, the 
closest comparison being Generalissimo Francisco Franco. The Spanish 
leader was duller and, if possible, even less insightful than Horthy, but 
won a bloody civil war, then imposed his will on a turbulent nation, and 
finally handed over a prosperous country to a democratically minded 
king and political parties. Horthy, of course, was not so lucky as to 
rule in isolated Spain.17 
And, at the end of his article Deak concludes: 
Miklos Horthy himself was neither better nor worse than most other 
military men who emerged as political leaders in the interwar years. He 
was neither a fascist nor a liberal... He was no democrat but never tried 
to be a dictator. He claimed to have been a lifelong anti-Semite; still, 
under his reign and despite the deportations, more Jews survived the 
Nazi terror than in any other country within Hitler's Europe. He was no 
more unintelligent than Marshal Petain or Generalissimo Franco, and he 
was certainly less cruel than General Antonescu of Romania....18 
The last word in this historiographical overview of Horthy should go to 
Professor Sakmyster as the author of the first truly scholarly biography of 
Hungary's regent from 1920 to 1944: 
It was largely through [Horthy's] influence that in early 1944 Hungary 
was... an anomaly: an island in the heart of Hitler's Europe where a 
semblance of the rule of law and a pluralistic society had been pre-
served.... And this was the basis of Horthy's most important legacy.... 
Though for the most part he did not share their views or approve their 
objectives, Horthy made it possible for the adherents of democratization, 
liberalism, parliamentary government, and social reform to maintain a 
precarious foothold in Hungarian society, so that when the totalitarian 
tide eventually receded from Hungary, they would be on hand to take 
part in the rebuilding of the country.19 
* * * 
Miklos Horthy has been the subject of many studies. His son Istvan Horthy, 
however, has not attracted the attention of historians or, where he has, what was 
written about him was part of a commentary on his father. In books on the elder 
Horthy, Istvan might receive a few paragraphs,20 while in papers on Miklos 
Horthy, Istvan might get a footnote. Quoting from one of these, written by 
Istvan Deak, should suffice as an illustration of the more scholarly assessments 
of the son: "Istvan Horthy was a liberal and a friend of the Jews and he hated 
the Nazis. His accidental death at the front as a combat pilot, in August 1942, 
was a tragedy for Hungary."21 
In 1992 a collection of documents and other contemporary writings about 
Istvan Horthy was published as a result of the efforts of his widow. It appeared 
under the title Horthy Istvan repiilo fohadnagy tragikus haldla [The Tragic Death 
of Flight Lieutenant Istvan Horthy].22 In the introduction, Istvan Horthy's widow 
argues that the documents effectively refute the then contemporary rumour — 
spread no doubt by her husband's detractors — that Istvan Horthy had a hang-
over the day he went on his fateful mission on the Russian front. She also 
suggests that nothing in the documents reduces the then contemporary suspicions 
— whispered no doubt by anti-German elements — that the young Horthy's 
plane might have been sabotaged by the Nazis or agents working for them.23 
The collection of papers and documentary articles presented in this volume aims 
to add to the picture we have of Miklos Horthy, his eldest son, and Hungary 
during the Second World War. 
Historian Rita Pentek's study of the election of Istvan Horthy as deputy 
regent in early 1942 places that event into its wider historical and political, 
domestic as well as international, context. Pentek begins with an examination of 
the long-term and immediate origins of these developments. The long-term had 
to do with the desire of the elder Horthy, as well as many others in Hungary, for 
arrangements that would assure a smooth transition of power in case of Miklos 
Horthy's death. The immediate roots of Istvan Horthy's election Pentek finds 
mainly in the regent's illness in the autumn of 1941. This created fears, both in 
Horthy and those around him, that his incapacity or death might be used by 
Hungary's radical right to grab power. To Horthy and his associates, the best 
man for succeeding him was Istvan Horthy. His "credentials for the post, they 
maintained, were undisputable: he was a man of absolute integrity and unmistak-
ably an Anglophile; his person would be a bulwark against the far right, and 
against the growing German pressure. A further consideration in Istvan Horthy's 
favour was that the Regent was the only person in the country who enjoyed the 
nation's unqualified esteem; this esteem would be perpetuated in his son." 
Regarding the question of possible ulterior motives for Istvan Horthy's 
election as deputy regent, that is, the paving of the way for the establishment of 
a "Horthy dynasty," Pentek gives no categorial answer. She concludes: "It seems 
that Horthy was not the one to originate the notion... but once the idea of 
electing his son as vice-regent came up, he did not discourage it." 
In the rest of this comprehensive study, Pentek examines the process that 
led to Istvan Horthy's election, noting the attitudes of the various elements of 
Hungary's body politic to the issue, the national debate about it, as well as 
domestic and international reactions to the election once it had taken place. 
In the following article veteran commentator on wartime Hungarian 
affairs, Pal Pritz, examines Miklos Horthy's — and Hungary's — relations with 
the Germans during and immediately after mid-March of 1944, when the Nazis 
occupied Hungary and Edmund Veesenmayer became Hitler's personal represen-
tative there. Pritz offers some glimpses of Horthy's statesmanship in this very 
difficult period of his political career, when he had to start sharing power with a 
foreigner, "commissioner plenipotentiary" Veesenmayer. At this juncture Horthy 
had to use, more than perhaps ever before, his political skills and wisdom — and 
Pritz credits Horthy with more of these than do some other historians — to start 
managing the affairs of his nation under increasingly trying circumstances. 
Most of the limitations on Horthy's ability to act after March 19, 1944, 
are familiar to everyone. The most obvious of these was the fact of German 
occupation which, though not complete — the Wehrmacht did not occupy all 
regions of the country — was effective. But another of the factors limiting 
Horthy's influence has not been emphasized before in this introductory essay, yet 
it ought to be mentioned. In any case, Dr. Pritz — quite correctly — considers 
it important: 
Horthy's capacity for decision-making was increasingly impeded by his 
age. He had completed his 75th year at the time and given his eventful 
course of life, he had long deserved some relaxation and rest. Under 
normal conditions, Horthy could certainly have been able to perform all 
the duties incumbent on a head of state. However, under the actual 
circumstances, ominous as they were, Horthy ought to have had not 
only a greater talent for statesmanship, but also the energy of his 
younger days. 
This seventy-five-year-old man, constantly under threat of further actions 
against him and his nation by the occupying power, had to start facing the 
energetic, young (Veesenmayer was 40), and fairly knowledgeable German 
"commissioner" for Hungary, who had the backing of his powerful masters in 
Berlin. The beginning of this uneven relationship constitutes — along with other 
topics such as the background to the German occupation of Hungary — the 
subject of Pritz's article. Its postscript-like conclusions are worth quoting: 
After the German occupation of March 19, 1944, the fates of Miklos 
Horthy and Edmund Veesenmayer became intertwined for a few 
months. Those months, however, were decisive, fateful ones. The 
respective roles of these two men came to an end after the abortive 
Hungarian attempt at getting out of war in mid-October. From that 
time on, their lives took different courses. Horthy faced incarceration in 
a German concentration camp which was followed after the end of the 
war by permanent exile from his homeland. In the meantime, in the 
months after October 15th, Veesenmayer undoubtedly worked even 
more effectively than before; in fact, the German official's career 
reached its zenith in that particular period. 
The third article is a documentary study aimed at shedding additional 
light on the ideas and experiences of Veesenmayer and his attitudes to the 
Hungary of 1944 and her leader. Its focus is an American intelligence docu-
ment, more precisely, a written deposition that Veesenmayer made with Ameri-
can military intelligence officers soon after the war's end. This is followed by 
another documentary article which presents letters written by Horthy, who was in 
American captivity at the time, to U.S. President Harry Truman in May of 1945, 
and to British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin in April of 1946. These letters 
had no impact on the evolution of Hungary or probably not even on the subse-
quent treatment of Horthy; Sakmyster suspects that they were probably not even 
read by the people they had been addressed to. The letters' contents suggest how 
little Horthy's views of international politics and Hungary's role in them had 
changed over the previous two decades. They also indicate how much Horthy 
was out of touch with political attitudes at the time in the West. 
These articles are followed by the already-mentioned review of Professor 
Sakmyster's political biography of Horthy. 
* * * 
It is hoped that the articles and documents in this volume will add to the 
knowledge that we have of Regent Miklos Horthy, his son Istvan, and the 
controversies that have surrounded them particularly concerning the era of the 
Second World War. It is not expected however that the appearance of this 
special issue will reduce controversies much. The name Miklos Horthy will long 
continue to stir up emotions in Hungarians as well as non-Hungarians. Indica-
tive of this is the animated debate that accompanied Horthy's reburial in his 
native Kenderes in September of 1993. Although transferring his earthly 
remains from the British cemetery in Lisbon, Portugal, to the one in Kenderes 
was only the implementation of Horthy's deathbed wish, there was an outpouring 
of opposition to the idea both inside and outside Hungary. Participants in the 
debate over the reburial even included people who had never lived under 
Horthy.24 There can be little doubt that Horthy will remain a controversial figure 
in Hungarian history, as well as Hungarian historiography, for years to come. 
NOTES 
'A.J.P. Taylor, in Eduard Benes: Essays and Reflections, J. Opocensky ed. 
(London: Allen and Unvvin, 1944), p. 164. 
2A massive two-volume history of Hungary was completed in 1964 under the 
direction of the country's more prominent historians. It assigns Horthy the lion's share 
of responsibility for involvement in Hitler's campaigns against Yugoslavia and the 
U.S.S.R. See volume 2 of Magyarorszdg tortenete [Hungary's History], Erik Molnar, 
Ervin Palmenyi, and Gyorgy Szekely, eds. (Budapest: Gondolat Konyvkiado, 1964), pp. 
435-37. Among the authors of this volume were I.T. Berend, Peter Hanak, Gyorgy 
R<inki. One could cite the similar views of other noted historians in Hungary of the 
1960s, as for example those of Magda Ad£m and Gyula Juhasz. See Adam's paper, 
"From the History of Hungarian-Czechoslovak Relations on the Eve of the Second 
World War" (in Russian), in Voprosy Istorii, 1960, p. 91; and Juhasz's A Teleki-kormany 
kiilpolitikaja, 1939-1941 [The Foreign Policies of the Teleki Government, 1939-1941] 
(Budapest: Akademiai kiado, 1964), p. 11. 
'See, for example, A.T. Pushkash, Vengriia vo Vtoroi Mirovoi Voine [Hungary 
in the Second World War] (Moscow: Institute for International Affairs, 1963). Push-
kash, in particular, was very critical of C.A. Macartney's interpretation of Hungarian 
wartime history and called him "an apologist of the Horthy regime," pp. 9f. 
4John F. Montgomery, Hungary, the Unwilling Satellite (New York: Devin-
Adair, 1947), re-printed by Vista Books, Morristown, NJ, 1993. 
''C.A. Macartney, Hungary: A Short History (Chicago: Aldine, 1962), p. 226. 
6Macartney's study appeared in the U.K., in Edinburgh (Edinburgh University 
Press, 1957, 2nd edition, 1961, 2 vols). It was also published in the United States as /I 
History of Hungary, 1929-1944 (New York: Praeger, 1957), 2 vols. Similar views were 
expressed in C.A. Macartney and A.W. Palmer, Independent Eastern Europe: A Histoiy 
(London: Macmillan, 1962). 
7Nicholas Nagy-Talavera, The Green Shirts and the Others: A History of 
Fascism in Hungary and Rumania (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 
173 and 180f. 
hMario Fenyo, Hitler, Horthy, and Hungary: German-Hungarian Relations, 
]94}.1944 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972). 
9N.F. Dreisziger, Hungary's Way to World War II (Toronto: Hungarian Helicon 
Society, 1968). This work was based on a research paper produced in fulfilment of the 
requirements of the Diploma in Russian and East European Studies at the newly 
established Centre for Russian and East European Studies (CREES) at the University of 
Toronto. 
10Peter Gosztony, Miklos von Horthy: Admiral und Reichsverweser (Gottingen: 
Musterschmidt, 1973). 
"Peter Gosztonyi, A kormanyzo, Horthy Miklos [The Regent, Miklos Horthy] 
(Budapest: Teka, 1990). 
l2Horthy's years of exile receive more detailed treatment in Gosztonyi's A 
kormdnyzo Horthy Miklos es az emigracio [Regent M.H. and the Emigres] (Budapest: 
Szdzszorszep Kiado, 1992). 
13In Paul Body, ed., Hungarian Statesmen of Destiny, 1860-1960 (Highland 
Lakes, NJ: Atlantic Research and Publications, 1989). Social Sciences Monograph 
series (Boulder, CO). Distributed by Columbia University Press. 
HTo the knowledge of this writer, no review of the book has appeared in the 
American Historical Review. 
15Istvan Deak, "Admiral and Regent Miklos Horthy: Some Thoughts on a Cont-
roversial Statesman," The Hungarian Quarterly, vol. XXXVII, no. 143 (Autumn 1996), 
pp. 78-89. 
16Deak also finds the book "enjoyable reading." Ibid., p. 79. 
11
 Ibid. 
18Ibid. p. 89. 
''Sakmyster, Hungary's Admiral, p. 400. 
20For the most recent of such treatments see ibid., pp. 279-281 and 289-290. 
These pages deal with the events surrounding Istvan Horthy's election as vice-regent and 
his death respectively. 
JIDe£k, "Admiral and Regent," p. 89, n. 5. 
22Mrs. Istvan Horthy, compiler, Horthy Istvan repiilo fohadnagy tragikus haldla 
[The Tragic Death of Fight Lieutenant Istvan Horthy] (Budapest: Auktor konyvkiado, 
1992). The translation of Hungarian military ranks into English is difficult as the 
designation of ranks varies from time to time, and among Great Britain, the United 
States, and Canada. 
23Mrs. Istvcin Horthy, "Amit el kell mondani" [What must be told], an introduc-
tion to her above-mentioned volume, pp. lOf. 
24As pointed out by Deik, "Admiral and Regent," pp. 78f. 
Hungarian Studies Review, Vol. XXIII, No. 1 (Spring, 1996) 
Istvan Horthy's Election as Vice-Regent in 1942 
Rita Pentek 
When Vice-Admiral Miklos Horthy was elected regent of the Kingdom of 
Hungary by that country's National Assembly on March 1, 1920, no one envis-
aged a regency that would endure for nearly twenty-five years. Act I of 1920 
regulated the powers of the regent;1 it did not, however, touch on the question of 
who would fill the empty Hungarian throne. The expectation was that the 
Entente's unequivocal opposition notwithstanding, Charles IV of the House of 
Habsburg, would, in time, be restored. The powers vested in the regent by the 
National Assembly were strictly circumscribed and resembled more those of a 
weak president than those of a constitutional monarch. 
The Regent, however, was voted wider powers that very year.2 Over the 
years, a number of bills would be introduced with the dual aim of giving Horthy 
further powers still, and of settling the issue of succession. The real reason why 
all this was so important was never specified.3 
Horthy himself wanted to solve the question of succession by nominating 
two or three candidates for the regency in his political testament. In 1937, he 
called on the government to work out a bill providing for this contingency.4 
The first draft of the bill on succession stipulated that Parliament (the 
bicameral system had been restored in Hungary in 1926) vote on the Regent's 
nominees in an open ballot. Legally, thus, Parliament was free to contravene 
Horthy's will; within the given political constellation, however, the open ballot 
provision was tantamount to curtailing the Parliament's authority, as the liberal 
Karoly Rassay, president of the Civil Liberty Party (Polgari Szabadsagpart), 
pointed out in the House of Representatives.5 
The politically well-informed claimed to know for a fact that the sole 
purpose of the new bill was to allow the Regent to name his own son to be his 
successor. The assumption was borne out by the circumstance that Act XXII of 
1926 already contained provisions for the election of the new regent in case of 
Horthy's incapacity or death. The new bill seemed to be superfluous and 
unwarranted, and Rassay was not the only one to say so. In the face of this 
resistance, in mid-June, Horthy revoked his permission for Prime Minister 
Kalman Daranyi to present the bill in the Lower House.6 
A few weeks later, the Prime Minister presented a revised version of the 
bill, one that spoke only of the Regent's right to make recommendations as to the 
person of his successor. The Social Democrats and the liberal democratic 
National Kossuth Party (Orszagos Kossuth Part) rejected even this proposal, 
arguing that a new franchise bill — one that would abolish the restrictions on the 
franchise and introduce the secret ballot nation wide — should have been given 
priority. They also wanted to see limitations placed on the Regent's tenure in 
office. The far-rightist Popular Will Party (Nepakarat Part) likewise opposed the 
bill on the grounds that passing it would do away with the temporary nature of 
the regency. 
The Civil Liberty Party, on the other hand, endorsed the bill as one which 
gave the Regent no more than the right to recommend a successor. As such, it 
had propitiously reconciled the nation's esteem for the Regent with securing the 
expression of the nation's sovereign will through Parliament. The Smallholders' 
Party (Orszagos Kisgazdapart) also supported the bill, as did Sandor Ernszt, a 
conservative Catholic delegate, who praised it as a measure which, by perpetuat-
ing the interregnum, served to uphold the monarchy, that "natural deterrent" to 
"the vogue of dictatorship."7 
The law that was passed allowed the Regent to name three nominees to 
succeed him. Both houses of Parliament sitting together had then to vote in a 
secret ballot on whether or not they wished to consider also candidates other 
than those nominated by Horthy. If not, they were to choose one of Horthy's 
nominees in a secret ballot. At least three-fifths of the members of both houses 
had to be present for the election of the new regent to be valid. A National 
Council was to function as head of state until the new regent was sworn in.8 By 
the terms of the succession bill passed in 1937, thus, the Regent's nomination 
carried at most a moral weight, for Parliament was free to veto his nominees, 
and elect its own candidate instead. The bill, however, made no provisions for a 
proxy should the Regent be incapacitated by illness or in any other way. 
In keeping with the provisions of the bill, Horthy nominated three ex-
prime ministers as his possible successors: Kalman Daranyi, Count Gyula 
Karolyi, Sr., and Count Istvan Bethlen. By 1941, however, Daranyi was dead; 
the other two nominees were practically the same age as Horthy, who turned 
seventy-three that year.9 
In autumn of 1941, Horthy was taken seriously ill. In a letter written to 
Prime Minister Laszlo Bardossy in late November, he urged that the matter of 
succession be conclusively settled in his lifetime. Act XIX of 1937, he main-
tained, did not really solve the problem; what was needed was a law that did 
away with the interregnum between the death of one regent and the swearing in 
of his successor. He also took the opportunity to criticize the bill on the grounds 
that his own recommendations were of no real consequence. He asked that 
Parliament choose a vice-regent who would automatically succeed to the regency 
in the event of his resignation. He did not, however, wish to nominate anyone 
for the post of vice-regent.10 
Horthy's concern appeared justified. There could be no doubt that the far 
right would be the first to take advantage of the Regent's incapacity or sudden 
death, and install its own candidate as regent. Chances were that the Germans, 
too, would have used their influence to this effect." 
As General Gyula Kad&r recalled it, the notion that Istvan Horthy, the 
Regent's elder son, be elected vice-regent was first formulated at the home of 
Bela Somogyi, a member of the Upper House.12 Istvan Horthy, for his part, 
turned down the suggestion point-blank.13 The far-rightist ex-prime minister, 
Bela Imredy, the head of the Party of Hungarian Revival (Magyar Megujulas 
Partja), immediately found a willing "alternative," the Habsburg Archduke 
Albrecht, a man of overweening ambition and, as an adult male member of the 
House of Habsburg, automatically a member of the Upper House of Hungary's 
Parliament. 
The idea of instituting the vice-regency and getting Istvan Horthy to fill 
the position had been broached by Horthy's immediate circle as early as 1939-40. 
Making the regency hereditary, so the argument went, would dispense with all 
the turmoil that electing a new regent would involve; it was a way of guarantee-
ing political continuity and stability. During the Regent's lifetime, the vice-
regent would have "the role of a counsellor with no authority and no responsibil-
ities." Istvan Horthy's credentials for the post, they maintained, were undisputa-
ble: he was a man of absolute integrity and unmistakably an Anglophile; his 
person would be a bulwark against the far right, and against the growing German 
pressure. A further consideration in Istvan Horthy's favour was that the Regent 
was the only person in the country who enjoyed the nation's unqualified esteem; 
this esteem would be perpetuated in his son. Finally, Istvan Horthy's election as 
vice-regent would be a significant step toward the establishment of the Horthy 
dynasty.14 
Did Horthy really have dynastic ambitions? An unequivocal answer is 
hard to come by, given the paucity and contradictory nature of the available 
sources. What we do know for sure is that Horthy, in his letter to Bardossy, 
asked that the vice-regent (whose name he did not specify) be invested with the 
right of succession. Obviously, he welcomed the idea that his son should be his 
proxy, for he was a man with whom he could cooperate unreservedly. As 
Horthy tells it in his memoirs, he did not want to be accused of nepotism; on the 
other hand, he could not be indifferent to his son's "personal future".15 The 
Prince Primate, Jusztinian Seredi, recalled him saying: "Everyone who has a 
house wants his son to inherit it when he dies;... that's how he is with the 
regency, which he wants his son to inherit".16 Mrs. Istvan Horthy, the Regent's 
daughter-in-law, was of a very different opinion. Unlike Seredi, she believed 
that Horthy wanted to see a vice-regent elected because of his own advanced 
age. Istvan Horthy's antipathy to the Nazis, his foreign contacts, and the fact 
that he was Horthy's own son made him the most attractive choice, for he was 
someone whom the Regent could trust implicitly. Mrs. Istvan Horthy expressly 
made a point of the fact that the family never entertained the notion of founding 
a dynasty.17 To answer our own question: It seems that Horthy was not the one 
to originate the notion of founding a dynasty, but once the idea of electing his 
son as vice-regent came up, he did not discourage it. 
There was no doubt in Bardossy's mind that Parliament would never 
consent to automatic succession for the vice-regent, given that one would be 
elected at all. Several of Horthy's own advisers — Istvan Bethlen, for one — 
were also against the proposal.18 The Roman Catholic Church also opposed it,19 
as did the liberal opposition, and many members of the Party of Hungarian Life 
(Magyar Elet Partja), the government party. The most vehement opposition 
came from the far right. 
On the matter of the vice-regency as such, the parties were pretty well 
divided. Bela Imredy and the far right backed Archduke Albrecht, a political 
extremist unlikely to have been a good choice. Nor would the British and 
French governments have approved of the election of a Habsburg. Much to his 
surprise, Albrecht got no support from Germany either; Hitler simply refused to 
receive him. Imredy and his party, however, started campaigning for him in 
December of 1941. Imredy had his own personal reason for wanting to thwart 
whatever plans Horthy might have had for his son: he never did forgive the 
Regent for dismissing him from the prime minister's post in 1939. 
The Archduke took particular pains to win the backing of the Arrow-
Cross Party (Nyilaskeresztes Part).20 Ferenc Szalasi, the party's leader, had 
decided against supporting him in the summer of 1941 already, and declared: 
"Sz. [Szalasi] has always known and shall always know who his head of state 
is." On the other hand, Jeno Ruszkay — whom Szalasi would later expel from 
the party — supported Albrecht f rom the start, and consulted on a number of 
occasions with Bela Imredy, the pro-German General Jeno Ratz, and the 
Germans. Though he could not get Szalasi and the party to endorse Albrecht, 
Ruszkay wanted them to at least start a campaign of defamation against Istvan 
Horthy. Szalasi, however, was unwilling to go even this far, hoping to win 
Horthy's favour by backing his son. He sent Gabor Vajna to try to set up a 
meeting with Istvan Horthy, who, however, would have nothing to do with him. 
At this point, Szalasi made a complete volte-face; the party was free to engage 
in a campaign of defamation against Istvan Horthy.21 Fliers flooded the cities 
castigating him as "a thoroughly debased drunkard and an immoral, degenerate 
womanizer", "an Anglophile traitor," and "a dandy with Jewish morals, wallow-
ing delirious in the delights of depravity."22 
The main objective of this campaign, as far as the Arrow-Cross Party was 
concerned, was to curry favour with Nazi Germany. Hitler, however, opted to 
stay on good terms with Horthy. The fliers succeeded only in fuelling Horthy's 
antipathy to Szalasi and his party, and in rallying the Smallholders' and the 
Social Democrats' parties which otherwise would probably have opposed the 
establishment of the institution — to support the concept of the vice-regency.21 
Even Imredy and his faithful denounced the Szalasi party's campaign. 
The government party itself was far from united on the question of just 
who the vice-regent should be. They did not trust Albrecht; but Istvan Horthy 
was suspect as harbouring dynastic ambitions, and a small group within the 
government party took exception to his Anglophile leanings. 
The Catholic Church — headed by the Prince Primate, Jusztinian Seredi 
— also had reservations. Seredi and Horthy had started out on the wrong foot in 
1927, when the Vatican appointed Seredi Prince Primate, and not the Hungarian 
government's and Horthy's candidate, Lajos Smrecsdnyi, Archbishop of Eger. 
Seredi, as sometimes happens with people who unexpectedly find themselves 
appointed to positions of power, uncritically followed the Vatican's bidding, and 
saw Horthy as a Protestant in the first place, and only secondarily as a head of 
state.24 Furthermore, Seredi was a legitimist, and feared that Istvan Horthy's 
election as vice-regent would put an end to the interregnum character of the 
regency, and an end also to the possibility of a Habsburg restoration. As Seredi 
saw it, Istvan Horthy was not particularly popular, and the Catholics of the 
country would have preferred a Catholic vice-regent. Still, if electing Istvan 
Horthy vice-regent was the price to be paid for domestic peace and non-interfer-
ence from Germany, he was willing to pay it: for rejecting Istvan Horthy would 
boil down to a vote of non-confidence for the Regent.25 
The Reformed (Calvinist) Church, particularly Bishop Laszlo Ravasz, 
supported Istvan Horthy's candidacy wholeheartedly. All the leading Reformed 
churchmen signed the paper endorsing the Regent's son as vice-regent. 
The bill concerning the vice-regency was discussed in principle at a 
conclave held on January 20, 1942. Laszlo Bardossy, Minister of the Interior 
Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer, Justice Minister Laszlo Radocsay, Gyula Karolyi, 
Moric Eszterhazy, and Ivan Rakovszky were all who were present. Istvan 
Bethlen had been invited to attend, but his car broke down on the way to the 
meeting (not accidentally, chances are); thus, they consulted with him later on. 
At this closed meeting, the decision was reached to endorse the election of 
Istvan Horthy as vice-regent, but not cum jure successionis.26 
Prime Minister Bardossy summarized the final draft of the bill at the 
cabinet meeting held on January 27. He pointed out that the earlier bills dealing 
with the powers of the regent did not make adequate provision for the Regent's 
proxy. It was a matter that needed to be dealt with without delay, particularly 
since the country was at war. The new bill would be in keeping with Hungarian 
constitutional practice, for until 1867, the Palatine had functioned as the King's 
institutional proxy. The institution of the vice-regency would relieve the Regent 
of the more mundane of his tasks. The cabinet resolved to submit the bill to 
Parliament after having shown it to the Regent.27 
The bill on the vice-regency was framed to guarantee that Horthy's own 
candidate would, in fact, be appointed. It gave him the right to recommend up 
to three people for the post; if he recommended only one person, Parliament 
would have to "elect" him. Horthy's recommendation of even one candidate 
meant that only that one person was in the running, for Parliament could propose 
a candidate only if the Regent submitted no candidate of his own. In that case, 
an endorsement signed by one hundred and fifty MPs qualified one as a candi-
date for the vice-regency. If there was only one candidate, and he had been 
endorsed by over two-thirds of the members present at the opening of that 
particular sitting, no vote was to be taken: he would simply be declared vice-
regent by the Speaker. 
The government party had a clear majority in the House of Representa-
tives, and had been busy winning outside supporters as well. Istvan Horthy 
would have no trouble getting the required two-thirds majority. There was also 
a further safeguard that guaranteed Horthy the last word: the election was valid 
only if the Regent confirmed the results. The powers of the vice-regent, 
however, were rather restricted: his appointment could be rescinded at any time, 
and he would not automatically succeed to the regency. The election of the 
regent was reserved to Parliament, and the vice-regency was to be terminated by 
the inauguration of the new regent. 
The Prime Minister called an inter-party conference on February 6, which 
continued on February 9. Bardossy — aware that there was little popular 
support for setting up the vice-regency — outlined the bill, and asked the parties' 
representatives to vote on the bill without a debate, and to treat its passage as a 
matter of highest priority. Bela Imredy protested against the haste; in his 
opinion a constitutional matter of such weight called for careful consideration, 
and his party definitely wanted to address the issue in the House. He also had 
doubts as to the need for a vice-regency in the first place: the Regent needed a 
proxy only in case of unexpected incapacitation (by an illness, for instance); in 
that case, however, the prime minister could very well take over for him on an 
interim basis. In Germany, too, Imredy argued, the head of state and the head of 
government were one and the same person. Nor did he approve of the vice-
regent's being vested with the powers of commander-in-chief; it was hard to see 
how two people could both exercise supreme command. Andor Jaross, a 
member of Imredy's party, agreed: "The nation, at the moment, is not so united 
in spirit that we could decide an issue of such significance." His reservations 
were shared by the Arrow-Cross representatives who urged that public opinion 
be duly considered in debating the vice-regency bill. 
Support for the urgent passage of the bill came from the Smallholders 
and the Civil Liberty Party, whose spokesmen maintained that passing the bill 
would help to achieve the very unity whose absence Jaross had deplored, and 
that it would add immeasurably to the citizens' sense of security. The Social 
Democrats took no stand at this meeting. Bardossy declared himself ready for 
further consultation with the various party leaders, but reiterated the need for the 
bill's urgent passage. It was resolved to continue discussions on February 10.28 
That very day yet, Bardossy submitted the bill to the House, where it was slated 
for debate without delay.29 
The next day, it was agreed that only the Party of Hungarian Revival and 
the Arrow-Cross Party would address the House apropos the bill, with one 
speaker each. The bourgeois opposition parties and the Social Democrats had 
decided to support the bill. It was a demonstrative stand against the German 
threat, and for the sovereignty of Hungary.30 Horthy and his "conservative 
liberals" were still a deal better, from the Social Democrats' point of view, than 
the far right, and could do with their support. There would be time enough after 
the war, once the far right was eliminated, to join with the Smallholders and the 
democratic liberals to topple the system as a whole.31 
The parliamentary debate on the vice-regency bill took place on February 
10, after the inter-party conference. As soon as the bill had been presented, Bela 
Imredy asked to speak; it was his moral obligation to do so, he said. The 
government, he charged, had presented the parties with a fait accompli; the 
procedure was not exactly what one could call constitutional. In fact, the bill 
before the House was without constitutional precedent, not just in Hungarian 
history,32 but in the history of other nations as well. As Imredy saw it, the vice-
regency bill was, in effect, the duplication of the regent's powers, though he 
conceded that as concerned the letter of the law, the bill contained measures 
aimed at avoiding just this sort of duplication. The Arrow-Cross speaker joined 
Imredy in censuring the bill, and castigated Istvan Horthy, who was "no friend" 
of Germany and, therefor, was unfit for the post of vice-regent. Since no one 
else rose to speak, the House voted to accept the bill in principle,33 
Bardossy replied to the critics at the next sitting of the House, on 
February 12. He declared that the parties had not been faced with a fait accom-
pli:; the inter-party conferences had been their opportunity to discuss the bill. 
Imredy, he charged, had not kept to the agreement reached at the inter-party 
conference; his address had destroyed the solemnity of the occasion. The House 
then voted to pass the bill point by point,34 but that was still not the end of the 
debate as far as Imredy and his party were concerned. Andor Jaross read out his 
statement, and decried the fact that it had only appeared in the National Socialist 
papers, though he had asked for an objective press coverage at the inter-party 
conference. Imredy rose to take exception to the "personal insult" he had 
suffered from Bardossy, and there followed a heated verbal altercation between 
them. Bardossy concluded by noting that the government would see to it that 
the speeches of the Hungarian Revival and the Arrow-Cross Party spokesmen 
would be reported objectively in the press.33 
The Upper House discussed the bill on February 14, and passed it both in 
principle and in points of detail. Horthy's rescript renouncing his right of 
nomination in favour of Parliament was read to the House of Representatives at 
its February 16 sitting.36 Ostensibly, the move was motivated by his respect for 
the sovereignty of the Parliament; in fact, he did not want to nominate his son 
himself. 
Istvan Horthy was elected Vice-Regent on February 19, at a joint sitting 
of Parliament, with two hundred and eighty members of the House of Represen-
tatives and two hundred and three members of the Upper House present. Two-
thirds of them gave Istvan Horthy their written endorsement. Archduke Albrecht 
and other members of the House of Habsburg, Imredy and his party, and most of 
the Arrow-Cross representatives were demonstratively absent. 
The session was opened by Bertalan Szechenyi, the Speaker of the Upper 
House, who proclaimed that the Regent had renounced his right of nomination, 
and that Parliament was free to name its own nominees. At that point Istvan 
Kolcsey called out: "Long live Istvan Horthy!"37 The assembled resolved to 
forego the balloting procedure, and the Speaker declared that Istvan Horthy had 
been elected Vice-Regent by acclamation. The election was confirmed by the 
Regent, and Istvan Horthy was sworn in. 
The following day the Arrow-Cross Party resumed its campaign against 
Istvan Horthy. The far rightist Pesti Ujsdg had a picture of the Vice-Regent, and 
under it the caption "Not welcome", the abbreviated form of "Jewish advertise-
ment not welcome", a notice regularly published in the paper.3" The message 
was unmistakable, but there were no real repercussions; the paper's license was 
suspended only for two weeks. But the Vice-Regent's election also led to a rift 
within the Arrow-Cross Party: Szalasi expelled Ruszkay and Kalman Hubay, and 
all the representatives who had attended the joint session at which the Vice-
Regent had been elected.39 
The Nemzetor (Guardian of the Nation), the official paper of the Party of 
Hungarian Revival, reported on the election without much enthusiasm.40 In a 
letter dated February 20, the party's own "favorite", Archduke Albrecht, told 
Horthy that he thoroughly disapproved of his son's election. 
The other parties swallowed whatever reservations they might have had, 
and accepted Istvan Horthy as Vice-Regent. 
The Kis Ujsag (Little Paper), the Nepszava (The People's Word), the 
Magyar Nemzet (Hungarian Nation), the Esti Kurir (Evening Courier), the 
Fuggetlenseg (Independence), and the Pesti Hirlap (Journal of Pest) all ex-
pressed their high esteem of the Vice-Regent. The Nepszava and the Esti Kurir 
emphasized that Horthy was a mechanical engineer, and as such, had worked 
alongside the working class; he knew their problems, and was sensitive to their 
needs. He was also a fine soldier, something particularly important for a deputy 
head of state in times of war.41 The Fiiggetlenseg expressed its hope that the 
"glorious edifice" begun by the Father would be continued and brought to 
"glorious completion" by the Son.42 There was no question that Istvan Horthy 
was seen as the future Regent. The Magyar Nemzet published a list of those 
who had endorsed Istvan Horthy's election. Ferenc Chorin and Samuel Gold-
berger, the two Jewish members of the Upper House, however, were left out, as 
were some of the major opposition politicians: Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, Karoly 
Rassay, Zoltan Tildy, and Istvan Vasary. It could hardly have been a coinci-
dence.43 
There was no great enthusiasm for the new Vice-Regent among the 
military. General Ferenc Szombathelyi, who had been appointed Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Istvan Horthy's recommendation, supported him, 
obviously; but most of the officer corps was indifferent. The rightists among 
them were wont to be of the same mind as Imredy and the Arrow-Cross.44 One 
of the reasons Istvan Horthy would have to go to the front was to win the 
respect of the army. 
The Axis powers reacted to the Vice-Regent's election pretty much as 
could be expected. The German press simply reported the event with cool 
detachment. Andor Hencke, the member of the German Foreign Ministry's 
political department stationed in Budapest, wrote two reports on Istvan Horthy 
on February 21. He emphasized that everyone, save for "the Jews and the 
aristocrats," was upset with young Horthy's election, for he was known to be an 
Anglophile. As Dietrich Jagow, Germany's ambassador to Budapest, reported to 
the German Foreign Ministry, Horthy's former English contacts were good 
reason to suppose that he still sympathized with the British. At the same time, 
he was sure that as a responsible Hungarian statesman, Istvan Horthy would 
back the Bardossy government's Germanophile policies.45 
Though there was no official German reaction, Goebbels, the German 
Minister of Propaganda, reflected candidly on Istvan Horthy in his diary. The 
Hungarian Regent's elder son was a "Jew-lover," an Anglophile to the bone, 
uncultured and politically ignorant; in short, he was a man the Nazis would have 
trouble with, if ever he succeeded to the regency. Wartime, however, was not 
the time to deal with matters of this sort; they'd have to make the best even of a 
Vice-Regent so little to their liking, and put off any action that might need to be 
taken until after the war.46 
The Italian press reported on the Vice-Regent's election in a much more 
favourable light. It pointed out that Hungarians had always set great store by 
tradition and continuity. They could hardly have found a better man than Istvan 
Horthy, who was a modern man to his fingertips 47 Count Ciano's diary, on the 
other hand, paints a less enthusiastic picture. Istvan Horthy, Ciano wrote, was 
totally unsuited to the role of Vice-Regent. But in electing him, the Italian 
Foreign Minister noted, Hungary was taking an anti-German stand of sorts.48 
The Allies did not attach any particular importance to the event. Great 
Britain considered itself at war with Hungary since December of 1941, and The 
Times carried only a brief article on the election.49 
Shortly after he was elected Vice-Regent, Istvan Horthy, a Lieutenant in 
the Hungarian Air Force, asked to be sent to the Russian front. He wanted to 
get some first-hand experience of the situation there. He hoped that as Vice-
Regent, he might be in the position to influence an eventual armistice or peace 
treaty, and did not want to lay himself open to the charge of having had no 
experience of military affairs.50 He died in action on August 20 when his plane 
crashed near Aleksejevo-Lozovskoje. His hopes — and the hopes attached to 
him — died with him. 
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Miklos Horthy and Edmund Veesenmayer: 
Hungarian-German relations after March 1944 
Pal Pritz 
However we may approach the problem, one thing remains certain: Miklos 
Horthy, Regent of Hungary, and Edmund Veesenmayer, commissioner plenipo-
tentiary of the Third Reich to Hungary, were the key figures of the Hungarian-
German relationship after 19 March 1944. Not that this relationship had"been 
based on equal footing either formally or in its content; it was one in which the 
Hungarian party's room for manoeuvring became dramatically limited as time 
passed. Nevertheless, Horthy and Veesenmayer were the main protagonists; 
therefore, it is worthwhile to take a closer look at these two personalities. 
While Miklos Horthy was the head of a state, Veesenmayer was only an 
agent of another head-of-state, plenipotentiary (invested with the power to make 
decisions on his own) though. Miklos Horthy's position as head-of-state was 
greatly limited by many factors. Most serious among them was the presence of 
the German army in Hungary which, however, abstained from occupying the 
whole country; thus, for example, the German troops had not penetrated into the 
region lying east of the Tisza River. They also did not occupy the capital city in 
a systematic manner, though they did not fail to put the strategically important 
points of Budapest under their control. Although the Hungarian army was not 
formally disarmed by the German forces, yet the confinement of Magyar troops 
to the barracks was humiliating enough in itself. To put up any resistance — no 
notable effort had been made by the leaders in charge of the Hungarian military 
to this effect — was out of the question. 
Despite its incomplete occupation of Hungary, the German occupying 
force, however, was fully adequate for the Nazi leaders to achieve their political 
objectives. For example, when the German efforts to form a new Hungarian 
government seemed to have met with failure due to Horthy's repeated objections, 
then — despite the fact that Berlin had started to withdraw some of its occupy-
ing forces from Hungary soon after the occupation owing to the deteriorating 
situation on the fronts — on Veesenmayer's advice the German leaders did not 
hesitate to intimidate Horthy by threatening to send fresh troops to Hungary.1 
Horthy was also hamstrung by the internal political circumstances of 
Hungary. Though before he travelled to Klessheim to meet Hitler, Horthy had 
vowed that he would not part from his dearest immediate political associates, 
from Prime Minister Miklos Kallay in the first place, whom he had resolved not 
to dismiss under any German pressure, yet following the dramatically heated 
discussions held in the baroque palace near Salzburg, he could not but admit to 
himself that he would be unable to keep his word. He must have been smitten 
with strong remorse for his forced perfidy — he who was always so particular 
about a gentleman's given word. 
Horthy was not a statesman in the proper sense of the word, but he was 
a clever man, because he refused to assume any role which he was — and he 
knew he was — unsuited for. It was on this account that he had essentially 
retired from the everyday politics back in the early 1920s, virtually coinciding 
with the appointment of Count Istvan Bethlen as prime minister in 1921. Over 
the previous period, almost quarter of a century, he had worked with several 
prime ministers, with each of whom his personal and working relations had been 
different, but he was used to one thing, and this probably gave him a great deal 
of satisfaction, namely that — with the exception of Kalman Daranyi — they 
were all men of character and stature. 
At the time, after the depressingly hard days following the mid-March 
turn and the nerve-racking negotiations concerning the composition of the would-
be government, Horthy simply had to realize that he should rest content with the 
prime ministerial nomination of Dome Sztojay, the Hungarian ambassador to 
Berlin, a colourless and ineffective diplomat with a rather sketchy knowledge of 
the country's internal circumstances. From the country's point of view, he could 
by no means have expected any better result than that, because it was precisely 
he who had brought up Sztojay's name as candidate during the negotiations on 
March 20. Horthy's suggestion may have been motivated by several consider-
ations. Perhaps he may have thought that Sztojay's activity for almost a decade 
in Berlin, which had been flawless from the Germans' point of view, would curry 
favour with the Nazis. He may also have considered Sztojay's nomination as an 
implicit message to "the other side" to make it clear that he was acting under 
pressure. By choosing a bureaucrat rather than a politician, he may have hoped 
to extract some "moral capital" for the country. Last but not least, Horthy may 
have thought of Sztojay's original vocation too; he had been a military officer, 
and the Regent might have assumed that the ex-soldier, imbued with military 
spirit and discipline, would obey him more readily than a civilian. 
Horthy's capacity for decision-making was increasingly impeded by his 
age. He had completed his 75th year at the time and given his eventful course 
of life, he had long deserved some relaxation and rest. Under normal conditions, 
Horthy could certainly have been able to perform all the duties incumbent on a 
head-of-state. However, under the actual circumstances, ominous as they were, 
Horthy ought to have had not only a greater talent for statesmanship, but also the 
energy of his younger days. 
In turning to a discussion of Veesenmayer, what appears at first sight is 
the fact that this German official — euphemized by his superiors as a diplomat 
— with his energy, extensive experience, comparatively wide knowledge, and his 
relatively youthful age (40), had been in the better position of the two from the 
outset. Reading his numerous reports, it also emerges that Veesenmayer was a 
clever and sharp-witted man. By 1943 his knowledge of the Hungarian situation 
— and of Hungarian history in general — had reached a certain stage which, in 
his view, enabled him to form judgements which appeared (at least to him) to be 
well-founded and authentic. At the same time, he failed to recognize the 
countless embarrassing contradictions hidden in the details, but it was these gaps 
in his knowledge that enabled him to form his opinions very rapidly and not get 
lost in the details or to let his actions to be slowed down. It should also be 
added that Veesenmayer was an outright fascist in his political thinking, to the 
extent that the idea of the superiority of the German nation over other peoples 
came quite natural to him. Being convinced of his own intellectual superiority 
as well, he also tended to select the available information in a way as to prove 
what he had conceived beforehand. 
This is well shown by his voluminous report, prepared in December 
1943, in which he propounded his opinion both of Hungarian history and of the 
concrete situation at the time.2 As it appears f rom this document, Veesenmayer 
could form nothing but a disparaging opinion of anything that was Hungarian. 
In his judgment, since the defeat of the Hungarians by the Turks at Mohacs in 
1526,3 Hungary "has never had the necessary popular strength and revolutionary 
swing to fight its way to the status of a fully independent state. Therefore," he 
went on, "the Rakoczy-led revolution of 1703-1711 was essentially a revolt, 
rather than a real revolution."4 With his deep-seated feeling of the German 
superiority, he even went so far as to stain the memory of the Hungarian 
Revolution and War of Independence of 1848-1849. "The participation of 
Hungary in the events of 1848-1849 was made possible only by Vienna that had 
showed the way."5 Nor did he refrain from twisting the real meaning of the 
Kossuth-song,6 claiming that the whole tragedy and the basically passive 
demeanour of Hungary and the Hungarians were implicitly expressed by this 
song. Because — he suggested — Kossuth himself had to send his message 
twice to achieve some result; "if he sends his this message once more, we all 
have to go [to war] ..."7 Apparently, Veesenmayer did not draw on his own 
original sources when he listed the "facts" which he held to be suitable to 
dispute the historical accomplishments of Hungarians. Those alleged "facts" and 
various statements had been — and would be — so often formulated before and 
after him. Not knowing anything of the formation process of national identity, 
these views tended to attach an exaggerated significance to the mere facts of 
ethnic origin. Adopting these views, it was easy for Veesenmayer to enter into 
such explanations as "the Hungarian national anthem was composed by Erkel, a 
native of Cologne, almost all buildings of Budapest, including the bridges, were 
constructed by Germans. The most famous Hungarian painter [M. Munkacsy] 
was also a German (Bavarian by origin), while [Hungary's] most outstanding 
poets were Slovaks." Giving credence to the propaganda slogans and false 
rumours spread by the Hungarian Nazi Arrow-Cross Men, Veesenmayer wrote 
that "until 1925, the Regent himself spoke only a somewhat halting Hungarian..., 
even now, when his temper runs away with him, he will speak German much 
sooner than Hungarian."8 
Having formed such an image of Hungarians in general, Veesenmayer did 
not give better grades to the national resistance either. In his view, "what they 
(the Hungarians) call 'national resistance' is in fact a passive resistance to every-
one, last but not least, to themselves." On the other hand, he termed the passive 
resistance as a resistance without risk, which the Hungarians tend to "cover with 
highfalutin words, taking maximum advantage of the higher capacity and better 
endowments of other ethnic elements." Completely ignoring the Hungarian war 
losses, especially the casualties of battles near Voronezh and generally the 
country's economic efforts during the war, Veesenmayer came to the summary 
conclusion that Hungary "cannot stand the tests" of the burdens of war. What he 
regarded as a "basic trait" of Hungarians was fear ("to say nothing of cowardice" 
— he wrote in a deliberately affected fashion, trying to make the impression on 
his readers in Berlin that what he put down in his reports were not some superfi-
cial generalizations, but the most precisely formulated statements). In his 
opinion, fear is a basic trait "which is characteristic of the responsible Hungarian 
politicians as well as of a good part of the Hungarian civilian masses".9 
In regards to the Hungarian Jewry, Veesenmayer regarded the whole 
country — and tried to make it appear — as a great centre of sabotage. "The 
1.1 million Jews," he wrote, — generously adding some 300,000 to their actual 
number — "mean as many saboteurs [of the Axis war effort], and at least the 
same, if not twice as much, is the number of Hungarians who as henchman of 
Jews are ready to help them to carry out their ambitious plans aimed at sabotage 
and espionage, and to camouflage those plans."10 
After Veesenmayer had disparaged everything Hungarian on the one 
hand, and had strongly exaggerated Hungarian resistance to the Germans, on the 
other, it came quite logical to him to call for an energetic and prompt interven-
tion in Hungary. The Reich cannot afford "the luxury," he wrote, "of leaving 
such a sabotage centre intact." After making many superficial and one-dimen-
sional statements and uttering partial truths, however, Veesenmayer came to a 
conclusion which would be proved right by the subsequent events: "...it would be 
a constrained, though rewarding political task, if the Reich handled and clarified 
this problem. All the more so as this problem is not a military, but almost 
exclusively a political one. If the adversary is overcome with fear and coward-
ice, it will suffice to utter a clear word, a hard demand, supported by a reference 
to the German divisions and war-planes."11 
What explains the fact that, after so many erroneous findings and state-
ments, Veesenmayer finally came to a sound conclusion? Presumably, the right 
answer to this question can be found in the contemporary structure of Hungarian 
society and in the country's tragically difficult situation in the foreign policy 
field. Since the related problems are all widely known, it will suffice here only 
to refer to the stagnation of social progress in Hungary, to the unsound distribu-
tion of land, to the parasitic way of life and anti-innovation attitude of the upper 
classes, or to the crisis of the middle class, incapable of any renewal. It is 
misleading to state that it was difficult if not impossible to sustain the country's 
independence between the contemporary bolshevik Soviet Union and the racist 
German Reich. From the aspect of home affairs, it was not the equal rejection 
of fascism and bolshevism which caused the main problem. Because the fact is 
that contemporary Hungarian society showed much less aversion to racism than 
to bolshevism. On the other hand, in connection with bolshevism, it should also 
be emphasized that the regime was disinclined to open up not only in the 
direction of bolshevism, but also in that of anything which had to do with the 
political left or with the common people in general. Nor was it inclined to 
accept and adopt anything meritorious from the program of political democratiza-
tion. 
Regarding the foreign policy aspect of the problem, it may well be stated 
that the contemporary Soviet Union was not a real threat to Hungary. The 
country's difficulties in the foreign policy field arose from the lingering effects 
of the antecedents as well as from the consequences of the Trianon Peace Treaty. 
To substantiate all what he had reported, Veesenmayer thus summarized this 
problem: "In my opinion, this" — i.e. what he wrote earlier in the document — 
"will suffice to contain the adversary, because all along its borders Hungary has 
got not a single friend, but [only]... embittered enemies."12 
It seems justifiable to suggest that what Veesenmayer first saw in 
Hungary were basically such phenomena as the lack of social progress, the 
unsolved social problems, and the absence of moral firmness of the social and 
political actors. As to the latter, he could often experience it himself, since his 
Hungarian informers did not refrain from revealing to him practically every 
secret of Hungarian political life. In addition, this free-flowing information was 
all interwoven with the informers' endeavours to denounce their own political 
adversaries or other disfavoured actors of public life. Thus was it that being 
informed of many — often too many — details, Veesenmayer could follow with 
close attention the entire public life in Hungary. All this encouraged him even 
more to accept as indisputable facts all the commonplaces which had formerly 
been widely disseminated throughout the Old and the New World by the anti-
Hungarian propaganda of the Habsburgs, by the leaders of the nationalities living 
in Hungary, and later by the publicists and ideologists of the Little Entente 
powers. 
This notion of Hungary, however, was not the only one in the Reich; it 
was rivalled by another conception, the beholders of which thought more of the 
country's military capacity. This was aptly illustrated by the diary notes which 
Fieldmarshal Baron Maximilien von Weichs had put down for his own use. As 
is known, Weichs became the commander-in-chief of the German troops who 
marched into Hungary on March 19, 1944.13 
Some ten days before the occupation, having been already charged with 
the operation, Weichs envisaged two possible solutions to the Hungarian 
problem. The first — the desired one — would have been political in nature. 
Weichs, who had immediately linked up this political version with the name of 
Prime Minister Bela Imredy, set forth his proposals from a positive and from a 
negative standpoint. While Luftwaffe commander Hermann Goring was for the 
former, General Cuno H. Futterer, the German air-attache to Budapest, was for 
the latter. 
Since in Weichs' conception the political version was definitely tied up 
with Imredy's person, neither Goring's, nor Fiitterer's view can be interpreted 
accurately. Namely, it is not clear whether or not Goring's positive answer was 
prompted by his relatively thorough knowledge of the Hungarian situation, which 
prompted him to believe that a military solution could be avoided. On the other 
hand, it is also conceivable that the similarly well-informed Fiitterer's negative 
answer was not meant to reject the political solution, but he only wanted to 
question the feasibility of a solution which was so strongly bound to Imredy's 
person. In this respect Futterer was right as he was well aware of Regent 
Horthy's highly unfavourable opinion of Imredy. 
"If this endeavour happens to fail, or will not take place at all, then we 
shall march in and attempt to subdue the country by force" — as Weichs worded 
his opinion of the military version (italics mine - P.P.). It is worthwhile taking 
a closer look at this wording. The words italicized by me show aptly how intact 
Weichs believed Hungarian society and policy to be. It also appears that he had 
serious doubts about the possibility of the — otherwise desired — political 
solution, but he was also sceptical as to the success of the military version. This 
scepticism becomes rather manifest in his using the words "we shall... attempt" 
and by the tone of this wording. 
As regards the second, i.e. the military version of Weichs's proposal, he 
visualised two possibilities: 
"a) If the stronger part of the Hungarian army as well as part of the 
population joined us as it seems to be presumed in high quarters," the operation 
could be carried out rapidly and without casualties (italics mine — P.P.). 
Apparently, Weichs handled this possibility with a marked reservation: he 
seemingly did not attach a high probability to it, and the consideration of this 
possibility was dictated to him by the strict rules of a logical thinking process, 
and, of course, by his knowledge of the importance and high priority the "high 
quarters" were inclined to attach to this scenario. What Weichs covertly thought 
of the views in "high quarters," emerges from the tone of the above cited 
passage as well as from the whole context of this diary notes. 
Weichs's reservations are explained by what he wrote in connection with 
the second possibility: 
"b) This will not happen so. As I doubt myself the feasibility of a 
solution of the a) type. In this case, however, we must reckon with the great 
national pride of the (Hungarian) people." Von Weichs also knew well the 
wartime performance of Hungarians, along with the limits of their capacity. But 
is was not this, but the historically deep roots of the Hungarian people's strength 
that he really wanted to call attention to. Therefore, he immediately added: "... 
the failure of our troops along the Eastern front line should not mislead us. In 
other words, we think that we shall get into the same situation with the Hungari-
ans as with the Italians." Weichs believed the traditions of the Hungarian War 
of Independence of 1848-49 to be still alive, and it was these living traditions 
that he considered as a decisive factor. "They (the Hungarians) will also fight 
for their country's independence to the very last. We must remember" — he 
warned himself as he made these notes for himself only — "those uprisings 
which the then strong Austrians were never able to suppress once and for all."14 
The rest of the diary convincingly illustrates the sceptical thoughts of the 
general charged with the military leadership of the occupation: 
We must reckon with a general uprising (in Hungary) following a very 
short-lived state of shock, in which the Jews and various communist-
inspired elements will play a major role. This will be an immense 
drawback to us, because we shall be forced to suppress the resistance, 
and later, by the time of the occupation, major forces will have to be 
engaged for a longer time, which, under the circumstances, is not 
desirable at all. 
Having been stationed in Belgrade until then, Weichs flew to Vienna on 
March 13 to direct the preparations for the German advance into Hungary. He 
was annoyed by the rumours leaked out, and by the "gossips whispered through-
out Vienna", which spread to such an extent that even the chambermaids in his 
hotel talked about them. So his uneasiness about what he was afraid might 
happen could not ease off. Thus, when the die had been cast, he had to act, and 
in a manner that his actions should be as effective as possible. "If we did not 
act," he recorded in his diary on March 14, "the surprise effect of our action 
would be made questionable." He continued to fear the expected successful 
Hungarian counteractions: "it seems increasingly possible that (the Hungarians) 
will take counteractions, which we want to avert."15 
The following day, on March 15, Weichs jotted it down in his diary that 
rumours about the occupation of Hungary were spreading "like an avalanche." 
From the time of Horthy's trip to Klessheim, scheduled for March 18, he inferred 
that "this 'issue' is likely to be settled by political means." Moreover, having 
received some new information, he came to the conclusion that "the Hungarian 
issue" was supposed to have been, from the very start, to be settled within the 
domain of politics. Hencc he remarked that "they [the top political leaders] 
played a double game" with the soldiers. "They kept the whole thing from us, 
thus pressing us to take the preparations seriously." Weichs was correct again 
when he assumed that this double game was also meant to soften up the 
Hungarians. "First: the great secrecy and camouflage. Secondly: showing only 
part of the cards to the Hungarians, spreading, at the same time, rumours about 
their impending occupation. Obviously, this is the way we can bring pressure on 
the Hungarians. Our marching in Hungary is the last trump in their intimidation. 
In other words: a repeated use of the Hacha-recipe.16 At the Fiihrer's headquar-
ters, Horthy will be pressed to reshuffle his government and to give orders to the 
effect that no resistance [to us] be put up. Accordingly, our action should be 
prepared so that it could be called off even at the last minute."17 
It really happened so. After the heated discussions in Klessheim, which 
were very successful from Hitler's viewpoint, when the Regent's train left to 
return to Hungary, the Ftihrer cancelled his order for war planes to fly over 
Budapest, for the occupation of the Buda Castle, and the disarming of the 
Hungarian army. All this meant that the size of the occupying force could be 
reduced. The division of German rangers assembled around Belgrade could stay 
there, the deployment of the armoured division transferred f rom the Western 
front became unnecessary, and Hitler could also send back to their bases his 
special corps originally stationed in Denmark.18 
Much has been written about the reasons underlying the repeated success 
of the Hacha-recipe. This solution proved to be even more favourable from 
Berlin's point of view than had been imagined by the Nazi leadership originally. 
The fact is that, simultaneously with the "friendly" occupation of Hungary, the 
Czech-Moravian state ceased to exist: it was transformed into a protectorate in 
the Third Reich. In turn, this development made it possible for exiled Czech 
leader Eduard Benes and his entourage to declare an outright resistance to 
German rule. Thus it came about that occupied Czechoslovakia became an "in-
dependent" state as a belligerent party fighting on the side of the anti-fascist 
Allied Powers. Meanwhile the occupied Czech lands could live their everyday 
life relatively undisturbed, though their economic capacity was fully utilized to 
serve the German war machine. Hungary, in turn, could retain so much — and 
only so much — of its independence as enabled it just to keep the state appara-
tus together and to be differentiated from the Czech-Moravian Protectorate. 
However, this entailed almost exclusively negative consequences — at least f rom 
the Hungarian point of view. To wit, the anti-fascist powers were not mislead 
by these developments, were not beguiled by mere appearances. They invariably 
regarded the Hungary as a satellite of the Germans, the potential of which 
benefited only the Germans. As Veesenmayer accurately formulated it in his 
report: "Every Hungarian peasant, worker or soldier whose deployment will ease 
our burdens, will also add to the Fiihrer's reserves within the Reich."19 
This raises the question of why the Hungarian leaders were so much 
beguiled by an illusion? Much has been written on this problem as well. Yet 
hardly any work treated the problem as one deeply seated in the contemporary 
Hungarian historico-political thought. In this context it is worthwhile recalling a 
story about a theatrical performance in the Vigszinhaz (a leading theatre in 
Budapest) in late February 1944. It was the first night of Aranyszarnyak 
(Golden Wings), a drama by Ferenc Herczeg, the highly popular writer and 
playwright who at the age of 80 was regarded as the doyen of Hungarian writers. 
(Besides, this was the last premiere of the author's dramatic works in his life.) 
Trying hard to galvanize some life into this historical drama were such eminent 
actors and actresses as Pal Javor (acting as Imre Thokoly), Artur Somlay (as 
Emperor Leopold of Habsburg) or Maria Lazar (as Ilona Znnyi). But even their 
great talent failed to moderate the bombastic phrases of the drama. This 
colourless historical play only served to prompt the sociographer Zoltan Szabo, a 
harsh critic of Herczeg's work, to express his devastating opinion on the drama 
in the newspaper Magyar Nemzet (Hungarian Nation), passing, at the same time, 
a severe judgement on the stereotyped view of history held by a part — in fact, 
the major part — of the Hungarian middle class.20 
Herczeg's dramatic work was so anachronistic in its spirit that the writer 
Istvan Orley, who accompanied his mother to the performance, was able to 
follow the play for only 20 minutes, after which he suddenly left his balcony 
box and went to the corridor where he could give free vent to his laughter. This 
premiere was a remarkable social event, everyone who really counted in 
Hungary at the time was there: the Regent, the Prime Minister, as well as the 
other members of the government. After the performance, uncomprehending the 
situation, Prime Minister Kallay asked Istvan Orley why he had left his box. 
When Orley gave him the unusually frank answer, the astonished Premier 
expressed his consternation: "How dare you laugh at a historical drama that 
brings tears to the Prime Minister's eyes?"21 
This story has been told here only to reveal Kallay's outburst. It seems to 
be a statement of key importance which casts light upon the view of history 
which doomed to failure those politicians who — full of good will and true 
determination — made efforts to steer the country's ship to safer and stiller 
waters. However, with such obsolete views it was impossible to organize a 
resistance to the impending German occupation, what they could achieve at best 
was a mere survival. Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer, Minister of the Interior, was 
unable to achieve even that much. His sense of reality and danger failed him 
and he did not go into hiding — unlike former Prime Minister Istvan Bethlen. 
Keresztes-Fischer was aroused from his bed and was arrested by German 
security men on March 19. His lot was later shared by many others. 
Continuity with pre-March 19 days was symbolized by Miklos Horthy 
alone. This continuity — as has been referred to above in another context — 
was meaningless under the circumstances, considering that the regime was 
unable to turn to the political left for support. Horthy and his followers rejected 
the criticism offered in connection with the "Golden Wings" in the same way 
Kallay did. Their only response to Orley's critique of Herczeg's play was that 
the following day Horthy's Cabinet Office cancelled its subscription to the 
Magyar Nemzet?2 
After Kallay resigned, the Regent could hardly meet the challenges 
presented to him by the new circumstances. This situation was described by 
Veesenmayer in his brusque manner: "Horthy lies beyond measure on the one 
hand, and is physically incapable of performing his duties on the other. He 
keeps repeating himself within a few sentences, often contradicts himself, and 
occasionally his speech fails him."23 
When the new government had been formed, Horthy retired to the Buda 
Castle for months.24 Obviously, he needed some rest, but what was more to the 
point, he wanted to demonstrate his keeping aloof from the new situation. 
Though in Klessheim the Germans had promised certain "guarantees" for the 
country's independence, but their style of negotiating and their persecution of the 
Hungarian opposition politicians left little doubt as to the real situation. It was 
also a meaningful sign of the times that when Dietrich von Jagow, who until 
then had been the German Ambassador to Budapest, informed the Hungarian 
government of his release from his duty, he did so through the Regent's Cabinet 
Office, rather than through the Foreign Ministry.25 With this, von Jagow wanted 
to stress the fact that the occupation had been much more than a political action. 
It was generally known at the time that the diplomatic relations of independent 
states were maintained and managed through the foreign ministries and not 
through the offices of the heads-of-state. 
There were indications that Veesenmayer had modified, to some extent, 
his opinion formed in December 1943, and began to think more of the potential 
of the Hungarian passive resistance. Of course, he did so in awareness of the 
successes of actions which had been taken largely on his initiatives. Barely a 
week after the occupation, considering the possible future course of the Hungar-
ian army, he held it more practical to lay special emphasis on the spirit of 
Kameradschaft and Waffenbruderschaft, i.e. the tactics he thought should be used 
was not to disarm but to win over the Hungarian forces, because in the reverse 
case — he wrote: 
there is the danger that: 
a) the government and the Regent retreat, 
b) a unified opposition, ranging from the left to the right, is 
formed, 
c) a passive resistance is developed, in which the Hungarians are 
highly experienced, 
d) it (the resistance) changes into a general strike, 
e) while the resistance is not expected to be strong, it will still 
engage German troops, thus instead of reducing the number of the 
occupying troops... even more troops would have to be withdrawn f rom 
the front.26 
The marked change in Veesenmayer's former train of thought appears 
conspicuously in point c), even more so in point d), but in point e) he is 
noticeably reserved again. Though the commissioner plenipotentiary somewhat 
moderated the severeness of his judgements, he was disinclined to change his 
ruthless attitude and his harsh style, in fact, his successes made him even more 
arrogant in his ways. 
In early May Veesenmayer introduced Otto Winkelmann, commander-
in-chief of the German police forces in Hungary, and Gruppenfiihrer Wilhelm 
Keppler, his assistant, to Horthy. In his brief report on the 40-minute reception 
— according to which the conversation was going on exclusively between the 
Regent and the Reichs commissioner — Veesenmayer thus summarized the 
event: "I did not fail to make proper reply to any point raised, and I supplied 
him so exact data and information that he (Horthy) finally found it more 
appropriate to talk about the weather."27 
Veesenmayer was an outright fascist, but the fascist ideology could not 
prevent him from looking at things quite rationally. He knew that no preference 
should be given to ideological expectations in the hard political practice. 
Therefore, holding sway over the internal affairs of Hungary, he never used his 
great influence to help to form a major, unified fascist party, in fact, he preferred 
to incite conflicts among the forces of opposition. Though he would have 
welcomed Bela Imredy as prime minister, and made every effort to have him 
appointed, when he perceived Horthy's strong aversion to Imredy, and realized 
that his own efforts to this effect would certainly fail, he tended to play off 
against each other, rather than unite those political forces which were acceptable 
from the viewpoint of the Third Reich. He regarded this behaviour as the most 
effective and promising one under the circumstances. Besides, he also took it 
into consideration that Regent Horthy, however much he might underrate him, 
still remained a central factor in the country's life whose removal could only lead 
to a chaos which could hardly be overcome by political means. So what 
remained to solve the problem was brute force, though it was utterly disadvanta-
geous to the Reich being under the greatest military pressure at the time. 
Curiously enough, we know it from Veesenmayer himself that Horthy 
also recognized the essence of these tactics, so much so that in late April he 
began to make inquiries about the possibility of creating a right-wing and 
extreme right-wing union, by which he hoped to put some limits on the power of 
the commissioner plenipotentiary. Veesenmayer, in turn, tended to play off 
against one another those turning to him for support, and he also abstained from 
promoting any negotiations aimed at a fusion of those political forces.28 
Though Veesenmayer was a clever politician from the viewpoint of the 
Third Reich, it was still the actual circumstances of the contemporary Hungarian 
society that really backed up his political line. The stereotyped, empty and 
ranting phrases that characterized the historico-political thought at the time have 
already been referred to in this paper. Reference has also be made to the 
problem of the regime's inability to come to terms either with the democratic or 
with the popular opposition; the latter manifested itself, first of all, in the 
activities of the popular, peasant-oriented writers engaged also in the sociological 
study of village life. Hungarian society was not really conscious of the existing 
danger: if it had been, it would not have cherished such illusions as had been 
expressed by the populist writer Laszlo Nemeth in his speech at the Balaton-
szarszo Conference of these writers and other progressive intellectuals in 1943, 
envisaging the coming end of the war.29 The missing awareness of danger also 
manifested itself in the complete lack of resistance to the German occupation. 
Historiography and historical publicism have often referred to the heroism of 
Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky's solitary act of resistance. Here, however, it seems 
appropriate to call attention also to the fact that this heroic politician was not 
arrested in secret, but was carried off quite openly, in full view of a number of 
bystanders staring in silence in St. John's square. This raises the painful 
question of what the wounded politician might have felt when, having been 
seized by the Germans, he hailed aloud an independent Hungary, and his 
exclamation found no response at all among the onlookers. 
Even if this society was not really conscious of the danger, it was 
conscious of its fears. One of these fears originated in the first appearance of 
bolshevism in Hungary in 1919, when the short-lived Republic of Councils 
offered the Hungarian society a good opportunity to gain some experience. In 
the same way, the memory of the "White Terror" which was born in retaliation 
to the former, was also still alive in social consciousness. And now, as the 
front-line was drawing near, the fear of a "red" revenge was also growing.30 
Ultimately, it was again the Germans who benefited from all this, because the 
state apparatus had long been paralysed by the same fears, and failed to save the 
nation from the catastrophe, though it was still able to work smoothly when the 
German interests were concerned. Otherwise it could hardly have been possible 
to conclude the German-Hungarian economic agreement on June 24 1944, which 
almost resulted in the complete fleecing of the country of essential supplies and 
resources. 
As regards the Jewish issue, the mechanism of fear worked much in the 
same way.31 The three anti-Jewish acts, which had been adopted earlier, 
continued to undermine the country's social cohesion. At the same time, it 
forced those responsible for those acts, to keep together and to side with the 
Germans. Thus it came about that there were many in Hungary who became 
losers and there were also many who benefited from this situation. The stakes 
were sometimes bigger, sometimes smaller, but those who benefited the most 
were undoubtedly the Germans again, otherwise it would had been inconceivable 
that the tragedy of masses of Jews could ensue within an very short time. In 
this context, it will suffice to mention that SS leader Adolf Eichman and his 
small group of "experts" would been reduced to a state in which they would 
have been incapable of action without the cooperation of the major part of 
Hungarian bureaucracy and the effective and often brutal assistance of the 
Hungarian gendarmerie, though in this respect the attitudes and activities of the 
Jewish Council should not be left unmentioned either. 
*** 
After the German occupation of March 19 1944, the fates of Miklos Horthy and 
Edmund Veesenmayer became intertwined for a few months. Those months, 
however, were decisive, fateful ones. The respective roles of these two men 
came to an end after the abortive Hungarian attempt at getting out of war in 
mid-October. From that time on, their lives took different courses. Horthy 
faced incarceration in a German concentration camp which was followed after 
the end of the war by permanent exile from his homeland. In the meantime, in 
the months after October 15th, Veesenmayer undoubtedly worked even more 
effectively than before; in fact, the German official's career reached its zenith in 
that particular period. 
The Hungarian Regent's fate had been spectacularly intertwined with his 
country's life for a full quarter of a century, but the months between March and 
October 1944 constituted the most unsuccessful period of his entire political 
career. The role he and Veesenmayer played in the period discussed in this 
paper — or, rather, only touched upon in several respects — may be appraised 
not only from the point of view of effectiveness, but also from that of the 
consequences. And, considering their efforts in the latter respect, Veesenmayer's 
activity should be deemed to have been even more negative than it appeared at 
first glance, because he had helped to prolong the sufferings of not only the 
Hungarian, but also of the German people. 
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Edmund Veesenmayer on Horthy and Hungary: 
An American Intelligence Report 
N.F. Dreisziger 
"As Minister to Hungary, Veesenmayer had something 
more than the normal duties of a Minister." 
(The Veesenmayer Interrogation Report, p. 21) 
"... it was a good thing if [Veesenmayer] did not 
always know everything that was going on 
(i.e. the Gestapo was doing) [in Hungary]." 
(SS leader Heinrich Himmler, cited ibid., p. 22) 
The role Edmund Veesenmayer played in twentieth century Hungarian history is 
almost without parallel. He was, to all intents and purposes, a Gauleiter, a kind 
of a modern satrap, in the country for the last year of the war. Hungary would 
have her share of quislings during the post-war communist era, but they would 
not be complete foreigners: the Matyas Rakosis, the Erno Geros, the Ferenc 
Mtinnichs, the Janos Kadars, and the Farkases (Mihaly and Vladimir) had 
connections to Hungary, however tenuous in some cases.1 Veesenmayer had no 
familial, ethnic or cultural ties to Hungary, he was simply an agent of a foreign 
power appointed to make sure that power's interests and wishes prevailed in the 
country. The closest parallel one finds to him in the post-war period is Marshal 
Klementy E. Voroshilov, the member of the Soviet leadership who was ap-
pointed as head of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary at the end of the 
war. Though Voroshilov's position most resembled Veesenmayer's, it is doubtful 
whether the Soviet General was as often involved in meddling in Hungarian 
affairs as was the energetic German commissioner and his SS cohorts. Not in 
vain did pundits in Hungary refer to Veesenmayer as "Reichsverwesenmayer" 
which is a play on words on his name and the German term for Regent: "Reichs-
verweser."2 
Edmund Veesenmayer was born in 1904 in Bad Kissingen, Bavaria. He 
attended the University of Munich and received a doctorate in economics in 
1928. Subsequently, he taught economics at another institution of higher 
learning in the same city. In 1932 Veesenmayer joined the Nazi Party and soon 
thereafter became an assistant of Wilhelm Keppler, one of Hitler's economic 
advisers and the founder of an organization of industrialists and businessmen 
who provided support for SS boss Heinrich Himmler. When Keppler was 
appointed Hitler's special agent in Austria in 1937, Veesenmayer accompanied 
him. Not long thereafter he became an economic expert in Vienna advising the 
German Foreign Office. From the summer of 1938 to early 1939 Veesenmayer 
was back in Berlin working with Keppler on Germany's Four-Year Plan. There-
after he became the Third Reich's principal troubleshooter in Eastern and South-
Eastern Europe. March of 1939 found him in Bratislava, assisting the prepara-
tions for the declaration of Slovak independence under German aegis. In August 
of the same year, just before the Nazi invasion of Poland, he would be in 
Danzig. In April of 1941, just before the German invasion of Yugoslavia, he 
would be in Zagreb. Other missions would follow, including trips to occupied 
Belgrade, a trip to Rome, and another visit to Zagreb (in 1942). In 1943 he 
returned to Berlin and was given the task of coordinating Axis (more precisely, 
German-Italian and Japanese) propaganda activities. Soon, however, more 
urgent tasks were found for him, these included resumed visits abroad, this time 
to Budapest, to study the attitudes to the war and the prosecution of the war 
effort by the Hungarian leadership and society. It is with this stage of his 
remarkable career that our document picks up the story. But before we begin to 
read about his activities in Budapest, it might be useful to examine Veesen-
mayer's political and, especially, economic ideas. In this connection it might be 
most useful to offer a precis of the first part of the document the second part of 
which we reproduce below in full detail. 
Veesenmayer had joined the Nazi Party (NSDAP) because he believed 
that the party's economic program promised progress and prosperity for Ger-
many. He also hoped that such progress would save the country from commu-
nism. His own theories of economics were shaped by Adolf Weber of the 
University of Munich and Wilhelm Keppler with whom he would cooperate 
almost to the very end of the Nazi era. While Veesenmayer was enthusiastic 
about the NSDAP's economic platform, he had some doubts about the totalitarian 
system introduced in Germany as well as that country's involvement in global 
conflict. These doubts, however, were not strong enough for him to abandon the 
Nazi cause. He was also disappointed in the lackadaisical attitude the Nazi 
leaders, especially Hitler, had toward the science of economics. In the fall of 
1945 he explained one of the weaknesses of the Nazi system by saying that the 
German genius for "organization" "organized not only what it should[,J but 
everything that it could."3 Veesenmayer had probably come to this conclusion 
late during the war, or after its conclusion. In his interrogation he admitted 
having been a stalwart Nazi in his younger years (he had reached the honourary 
rank of Brigadefiihrer in the SS) but, after the war, he proclaimed complete 
disillusionment in Nazi ideas and the Nazi system. He suggested to his Ameri-
can captors that a major program of reeducation should be undertaken in post-
war Germany and, as a part of this, intelligent, young Germans should be sent to 
the United States to be trained for the task of German reconstruction.4 
The interrogations of Veesenmayer had taken place over several days 
during the third week of September, 1945. They took place in the headquarters 
of the American Military Intelligence Center in Oberursel. His chief interrogator 
was Harry N. Howard. The process was transacted in English and the report on 
the interrogations was produced from extensive notes taken, as well as from 
corroborative evidence, such as the interrogation reports of other German and 
Hungarian officials, including those of Regent Horthy (12 Sept. 1945) and Prime 
Minister Laszlo Bardossy (9 Sept. 1945). The report was signed by DeWitt C. 
Poole, the head of the State Department Special Interrogation Mission.5 
Like all other documents of this type, the Veesenmayer interrogation 
report by itself is useful mainly for persons with an extensive knowledge of the 
events and personalities concerned. As Veesenmayer was evidently not in 
possession of his notes and other relevant documents at the time of his interroga-
tion, he had to rely on his memory, which might not have served him evenly and 
effectively. He might have also forgotten some developments or refrained from 
mentioning them for a number of reasons. No doubt, he also tried to show his 
own role in Hungary in as favourable light as he thought was possible under the 
circumstances — his comments on the "Jewish problem" are especially ill-
informed or disingenuous. Furthermore, it is also possible that the transcript of 
the interrogation, or more precisely, the report based on it, having been written 
by American intelligence officers who probably did not have a thorough knowl-
edge of the subject, was not a completely accurate reflection on what Veesen-
mayer had said in the interviews of September, 1995. Because of all these 
factors, it should be emphasized that those readers who are not intimately 
familiar with the subject, should read this report in conjunction with reliable 
works on this topic, and in particular, along with Dr. Pritz's paper in this 
volume.6 
Despite these limitations of the Veesenmayer report of 1945, it offers 
much that is interesting to students of Hungarian wartime history, and is also 
useful to historians of the period who seek not so much new knowledge, but 
information that could confirm one or another of the historical interpretations of 
this period. In particular, the document not only reveals much about Veesen-
mayer's views about Horthy and his country (views which are not always 
perceptive), but gives glimpses of other matters as well, including — interest-
ingly enough — other Hungarian leaders' assessments of Horthy, as told to, and 
later reported by, Veesenmayer. The report also contains information on 
Hungary's other leading personalities, on the country's politics, and, above all, on 
the nature of German rule in the country. In this latter connection the interroga-
tion report time and again reveals that there were serious differences of view as 
well as of approaches among the Nazi leaders concerned with the running of 
Hungary's affairs. There was also duplication in responsibilities as well as 
overlaps in the authority of the people involved. All this lead to friction among 
the people and agencies concerned. Despite the vast powers that had been 
delegated to him by Hitler through the German Foreign Office (FO), Veesen-
mayer had no say in certain important matters since these were the responsibility 
of Nazi German agencies other than the FO. In these matters, Veesenmayer 
shared power with other Nazi officials assigned to Hungary. These included 
General Hans Greiffenberg who was in charge of military matters, and SS-
Obergruppenfiihrer Otto Winkelmann who oversaw German security interests in 
Hungary and whose Gestapo units and "Jewish evacuation" experts apparently 
operated without the approval — or even the knowledge — of either of Veesen-
mayer's off ice (so he claimed in 1945), or of the Hungarian authorities. 
The document partially reproduced below can be found in the Records of 
the Office of Strategic Services (Record Group 266), the 1944-45 series, Box 
312. Its document no. is XL 22552. It was declassified in 1973. It is deposited 
in the National Archives of the United States. I am indebted to the Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Arts Research 
Program of the Department of National Defence of Canada for having made it 
possible for me to do research at the NAUS and other American and Canadian 
archives over the years. As is our custom, the document below is reproduced 
very much as it had been written, which means inter alia that diacritical marks 
on Hungarian names are not given. A few editorial comments or corrections are 
offered in square brackets. Misspelled names — and there are a lot of them, e.g. 
the name of Dome Sztojay is misspelled [Sztojai] throughout — are corrected 
only the first time they occur. Misspelled names that might be unrecognizable to 
the reader, or are comical — General Ratz is written as "Rats"— however, are 
corrected each time. Those parts of the document that contained very irrelevant 
information or were confusing, were omitted. 
NOTES 
'Most of Hungary's communist leaders hailed from the country's religious or ethnic 
minorities — Kddar's mother was Slovak, many of the other top communists were of Jewish 
origin. Moreover, some of them had strong Soviet links — including, in some cases, Russian 
spouses, Soviet citizenship, and official membership in Soviet Russian military and/or intelligence 
organizations. They at least, spoke Hungarian. 
2Thomas Sakmyster, Hungary's Admiral on Horseback: Miklos Horthy, 1918-1944 
(Boulder, Colorado: East European Monographs, 1994), p. 337. The letter "v" in Hungarian is 
pronounced very much like the "w" in German. 
3The report of the interrogation of Veesenmayer, 5 Oct. 1945, p. 3. 
4Ibid., pp. 3f. 
5DeWitt C. Poole was a highly qualified American academic who had had a great deal 
of interest in the lands of the former Habsburg Empire and who had headed the Foreign 
Nationalities Branch of the Off ice of Strategic Services from 1942 to 1945.. 
6Under "reliable works" on the subject we have in mind Professor Sakmyster's biography 
of Horthy mentioned above, and such treatments as C.A. Macartney, October Fifteenth: A History 
of Modern Hungary, 1929-1945 (Edinburgh, 1957, 2nd edn, 1961, 2 vols.), and Peter Goszto-
nyi, A magyar honvedseg a masodik vilaghaboruban [The Hungarian Army in the Second World 
War] (Roma, 1986). 
Appendix 
Part II of the Interrogation Report on Veesenmayer: 
Hungary 
Mission to Budapest, March 1943 
From now on Veesenmayer's activities and attention were almost entirely 
centred on the Hungarian problem. At the beginning of March 1943 he was sent 
on a mission to Budapest for about three weeks. The purpose was to view the 
whole situation, especially in Budapest, in the interest of the prosecution of the 
war effort. He was also to find out the ideas of the different Hungarian parties, 
both within the Government and the Opposition. 
The "Party of Hungarian Life" — the Government Party — included 
various elements and tendencies which were not always unified in a program, he 
found. There was a young people's organization, similar in nature to the 
Hitlerjugend, but its only program was one of national aggrandizement. It had 
no special and economic program worth serious consideration. 
Veesenmayer met [party leader] Bela Imredy [Bela Imredy] a number of 
time's during this period. Imredy, Premier in 1939, had made a number of 
proposals for land reform, and was not in good favor with Horthy. Veesenmayer 
had not yet met Horthy, but considered him merely a "function" of the landlords, 
as the Government was dominated by this element. The Church was included 
among the big landlords, and Cardinal Seredi [Justinian Seredi] was one the 
greatest land-holders of the country. Veesenmayer thought Hungary a hundred 
years behind the times. All political power was concentrated in Budapest, the 
rest of the country not counting for anything in a political sense. The landlords 
dominated the situation — they spent the summer and autumn on their estates, 
and then lived in Budapest in the winter, spending their money and using their 
influence against reform. Horthy would stand for no land reform, and it was 
impossible to change the situation. Later on, Veesenmayer remarked, Horthy 
would never allow him even to mention land reform! 
Veesenmayer did not recall the details of his conversations with Imredy 
while engaged in this "intelligence" work, beyond remarking that they spoke of 
how the war was going for the Axis. Some groups in the Government party 
were showing independence; this did not make for good relations with the 
German Government. Veesenmayer felt that the atmosphere was not trending 
[sic, i.e. unfolding] favorably, and that there must be a "sharper" control of the 
situation in Hungary, so that there would be no "surprises" in the future. 
As long as the war developed favorably, things went well in Hungary and 
the country was "safe" for the Axis. But with the news f rom Stalingrad and 
North Africa, this was no longer true. At the same time economic developments 
were disappointing. Hungary had been important for Germany in the matter of 
agriculture, oil and bauxite. While production had only been about 100,000 tons 
in the first years of the war, by 1944 Hungary was producing about 800,000 tons 
of oil per year. The bauxite development was also new, and Germany had 
supplied about one third of the invested capital. Nevertheless, it was felt that 
Hungary could do more in the war effort, and German-Hungarian commercial 
relations could be improved, if proper "clearing" facilities were provided. It was 
for these reasons, primarily, that Veesenmayer had been sent to the country. 
Veesenmayer said that the Szent Gyorgy incident had nothing to do with 
his visit, since he had heard of this only a year later. He did say that the 
German Government and he, personally, despite Horthy's repeated denials, had 
the feeling that Professor Szent Gyorgy [Albert Szent-Gyorgyi, biochemist, 
Nobel laureate (1937)], in his journey to Turkey during March 1943, had some 
official connection, although he may not have been an "official" agent. Veesen-
mayer then compared the Szent Gyorgy visit to Turkey with his own to Hungary 
at this time. 
During this visit to Hungary, Veesenmayer said he had had no contact at 
all with Major Szalasi [Ferenc Szalasi], the leader of the Arrow Cross Party. 
This was on instructions from the Foreign Office, which did not want to muddy 
the waters in its contacts with the Hungarian Government. This same was also 
true in November 1943. 
He did see Col. Gen. Ruskay [Jeno Ruszkay], retired, however, who was 
somewhat of a politician, and a strong nationalist. Ruskay had contacts with the 
Archduke Albrecht, although Veesenmayer did not see the latter because Hitler 
did not like him. Albrecht hated Horthy, and the sentiment was reciprocated. 
He saw Raynics [Ferenc Rajnics], the well-known Hungarian journalist, M.P., 
and member of the opposition, who was of the Imredy party, although he 
pursued an independent course, too. Another person whom he met was Mes-
ser[?], who later on was Szalasi 's Minister in Berlin. Messer was President of 
the German-Hungarian Chamber of Commerce. Veesenmayer had no contact 
with the Small Farmer's Party of Tibor Eckhardt, since he thought it of no con-
sequence. Neither did he get into touch with the Social Democrats, since they 
were not powerful and were more interested in internal affairs than in foreign 
politics. Veesenmayer did talk with General Rats [Jeno Ratz], who was later the 
second man in the Sztojai Government [the government of Dome Sztojay], 
Formerly on the General Staff, Horthy had fired him because he had criticized 
Hungary's limited participation in the war. [Ratz] was a fanatical nationalist, 
who, like all Hungarian leaders, hated the Rumanians. Veesenmayer also talked 
with industrialists and financiers. 
On his return to Berlin, Veesenmayer made a report to the Foreign 
Office, which went to Ribbentrop. He said that there was no doubt that Kallay 
[Prime Minster Miklos Kallay] was disloyal to Germany, and was not whole-
heartedly supporting the war; on the contrary, he would try to get out of the war 
at the first opportunity. He also described the position of the various opposition 
groups. Veesenmayer thought that there were latent dangers in the political 
situation in Hungary if the war went unfavorably, especially in economic 
questions, and particularly in connection with raw materials, food and oil. He 
reported on the importance of Horthy and his entourage, expressing his convic-
tion that any change could only come with the cooperation of Horthy, since 
Horthy was a vital part of the landlord-dominated government. The change must 
come through German influence with Horthy, not against him. 
Veesenmayer was also convinced that improved relations must be 
generated between Hungary and its neighbours — Slovakia, Rumania, Croatia, 
and Serbia — if the war were to be fought to a successful conclusion in South-
eastern Europe. Hungary had never had good relations with its neighbours, 
because Hungarian nationalists always wanted everything, and this situation 
could not be allowed to continue. In particular he cited the Hungarian demands 
as to Siebenbuergen, the Banat [Banat] and Prekomurje. The Germans continued 
to occupy the Banat, and had decided to give it to Hungary only after the war so 
that they could continue to get the goods out free of difficulty with Hungarian 
"clearing". 
Veesenmayer's report was sent to Ribbentrop, who was interested, and 
told Hitler of it, but nothing was heard after that. Meanwhile the situation 
became worse in Hungary. 
Mission to Budapest. November 1943 
At the beginning of November 1943, Veesenmayer was sent on a similar 
mission to Hungary and remained there for three or four weeks. The situation 
was now getting worse. Italy had surrendered. Andor Henke, of the Foreign 
Office, thought that Veesenmayer should return for further study of conditions in 
Hungary. 
On this trip Veesenmayer saw Count Bethlen [former Prime Minister 
Istvan Bethlen], whom he found "correct", but anti-German as well as anti-
Soviet. Bethlen wanted to get out of the war. Veesenmayer also saw Imredy and 
talked over the situation with him. Another was Jurcek [Bela lurcsek], under-
secretary in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, who was very important for 
German-Hungarian economic relations. 
Imredy felt that the situation was very grave, and thought the Govern-
ment must be changed to include members of the opposition, but he was not 
very active at this time. Veesenmayer was much impressed with Imredy's 
intelligence, character, and integrity, and felt that he would be an excellent man 
to lead Hungary. He neither drank nor smoked, although Veesenmayer thought 
that perhaps Imredy, like Hitler, might have benefited by such vices! 
Veesenmayer also had a long talk with Laszlo de Bardossy [Laszlo 
Bardossy], former Minister to Great Britain, and former Premier of Hungary 
(1941-1942). Ribbentrop had asked Veesenmayer to see Bardossy, since he had 
a very favourable impression of the latter in London. Bardossy impressed 
Veesenmayer. With Messer, he considered him as one of the most intelligent 
man he had seen in Hungary. He had an excellent "dialectic", looked well, had 
temperament, a winning personality, and was altogether agreeable. He saw 
problems from a higher point of view than that of mere personal advantage. 
Bardossy was, however, really a sick man and not active politically. He 
was especially opposed to Horthy, whom he held responsible for the failure to 
make social reforms in Hungary. He also felt that if all the forces of the country 
were really concentrated, Hungary could make a far greater contribution to the 
war effort of the Axis. Bardossy told him that Horthy was the real heart and 
centre of the secret Hungarian opposition to the war. He expressed himself with 
some reserve, but one could read between the lines without difficulty. Bardossy 
was against the Russians, since he felt that the Russians had no real culture and 
he was a man of great culture. Veesenmayer asked Bardossy who might be a 
good man to lead a Hungarian government in the desired direction, and was told 
that Imredy was the best man, since he was a friend of Germany, a man of 
integrity, who had been a soldier in two wars. Moreover, he was a good econo-
mist. 
Veesenmayer made a report similar to the one he had made following his 
March visit to Budapest. He indicated that there was now great danger, that 
Kallay was going his o&n way. All in all he thought that in one more year, 
Hungary would be out of the war. He saw that the greater part of the govern-
ment party was moving toward the right [i.e. right-wing] opposition groups. The 
reason for this was that it was now becoming clear that a country could not fight 
the Soviet Union and still remain friendly with Great Britain and the United 
States. It had to be all or nothing. This was especially true after the Moscow 
Conference. There was no chance now of help from the Anglo-Americans. 
Even the landlords, many of whom did not "like" the war, were now willing to 
throw in their weight against the Soviet Union, well knowing that if the Russians 
were victorious, it meant the loss of their estates and position in Hungary. But 
all this was very complex, and Veesenmayer thought that it was often difficult to 
tell which was " lef t" and which "right" in Hungarian politics. He felt that the 
politicians in Budapest spent most of their time with the "do-nothings" in the 
cafe night life — which was, however, a pleasant pastime. 
Veesenmayer also felt that Major Szalasi, whom he had not seen, was 
sincere about land reform, although Horthy hated him for precisely this reason. 
The radicalism of Szalasi and the Arrow Cross Party was a necessity for 
Hungary. General Goemboes [former Prime Minister Gyula Gombos] had seen 
the political future of Szalasi years ago, when the latter had reported that in 
order to make a strong, popular army, the Government would have to carry 
through necessary political and economic reforms. In Veesenmayer's mind 
Szalasi was a man of character and integrity, and denied that he had ever taken 
a single pengo [pengo, the basic unit of Hungarian currency at the time] from 
Germany. 
Veesenmayer was back in Berlin in December. He was called promptly 
to Ribbentrop's headquarters to discuss the situation in Hungary, but Ribbentrop 
upbraided him for criticizing the Fuehrer's policy in Hungary! Ribbentrop did 
not like Veesenmayer's report at all, and sent it back to Berlin. Veesenmayer 
remarked in this connection that in order to understand Germany and German 
policy one had to know the personalities of Ribbentrop and Hitler, neither of 
whom would accept an objective analysis of a situation. They did not want the 
truth and people were afraid to tell them anything which they did not want to 
hear. It was the kind of thing which rendered intelligent work in the Foreign 
Office well-high impossible. 
The Fuehrer's Headquarter, February 8 - March 19,1944 
Veesenmayer remained in Berlin for some time, but in the early part of 
February he was called back to the Fuehrer's headquarters in East Prussia, near 
Rastenburg. Horthy had written the Fuehrer a letter saying that he wanted the 
Hungarian divisions on the German-Russian front withdrawn. Hitler, thereupon, 
sent for Veesenmayer, who remained at headquarters, largely doing nothing, for 
about six weeks. The last three weeks, however, were spent at Salzburg. 
When Hitler asked Veesenmayer about Hungary, Veesenmayer suggested 
that it would be wise to have Horthy come for conference with Hitler. Hitler, 
however, remained silent on this suggestion. Hitler, incidentally, did not appear 
to be acting naturally at this time, Veesenmayer thought, although he could not 
specify anything in particular. Veesenmayer knew, he said, that Horthy did not 
like either Hitler personally or the Germans in general, and wanted to get out of 
the war, but felt that this was impossible for Horthy. 
Veesenmayer thought it would have been wise for Hitler to have met his 
allies more often in conference,... Among other things, Veesenmayer thought — 
but did not tell Hitler — that he should let his allies know what the German 
post-war program for Europe was. In any case, Hitler might be able to explain 
things to Horthy in a conference. 
Within about three weeks the group went to Salzburg, Veesenmayer 
staying at the Oesterreichshof, Ribbentrop at Fuschl and Hitler at Schloss 
Klessheim. 
The Horthy Visit, March 17. 18. 19. 1944 
Ribbentrop also endorsed the visit of Horthy, and the latter ultimately 
came to Schloss Klessheim, spending one night there. Veesenmayer took no part 
in the discussions at Schloss Klessheim, although he presumed that they were 
primarily concerned with military matters, since the military problem was 
uppermost, and in any case Hitler was not interested in anything else. 
Until the last moment Veesenmayer could not be sure that he was going 
to be appointed Minister to Hungary, for both [SS chief Heinrich] Himmler and 
Martin Bormann, who considered him too moderate and independent, were 
opposed to him. They wanted to appoint an old Party man, Dr. Jury, the 
Gauleiter for Lower Austria. Jury was an M.D., an SS/Obergruppenfuehrer, and 
a true servant of Himmler, [Ernst] Kaltenbrunner and Bormann[;] while Veesen-
mayer was somewhat younger in years and in Party service. In the end, Hitler 
himself decided in favor of Veesenmayer, and Ribbentrop acquiesced, because of 
Veesenmayer's earlier correct analysis of the Hungarian situation. 
The trip back to Budapest was made with two parties, one Hungarian and 
the other German, on March 18-19. Veesenmayer asserted that Horthy was a 
free man on the trip and not [in] the custody of Kaltenbrunner. The train left 
about 8 o'clock, as Veesenmayer recalled, stopping by pre-arrangement about 4 
a.m., March 19, so that he and Kaltenbrunner could telephone Budapest. This 
time had been fixed for the entry of German troops into Hungary. He had heard 
about the German invasion plans three or four days prior to this, although he 
presumed that some plans, including all alternative possibilities, had been made 
at least two weeks before. The code word was Margherita, named after the 
island in the Danube at Budapest. Veesenmayer gave information to General 
von Greiffenberg, the German commander, that everything was all right, and all 
were returning to Budapest. Greiffenberg, in turn, was to advise von Kallay and 
have him come to the station to welcome the party. There would be no resis-
tance on the part of the Hungarian troops. 
At about 10 o'clock on the morning of March 19 the Ministers to 
Hungary' were changed. [Obergruppenfiihrer Dietrich] von Jagow went into 
Horthy's compartment on the train about 9.30 to present his letters of recall and 
Veesenmayer came in somewhat later to present his credentials. Horthy then 
asked Veesenmayer whom he proposed as von Kallay's successor; Veesenmayer 
suggesting Bela Imredy, Horthy indicated that this was impossible because of 
Imredy's Jewish blood, and expressed his surprise that he should be proposed by 
a Nazi. Veesenmayer added that Kaltenbrunner was also opposed to Imredy, 
along with the SD [Sicherheitsdienst, the Nazi Party's intelligence and security 
organ]. Dr. Hoettl, in addition, had written an attack on Imredy, and had 
proposed Count Palffy [Fidel Palffy], of the Hungarian National Socialist Party. 
The train arrived in Budapest about 11 o'clock, and von Jagow and 
Veesenmayer went to the German Legation together, while Horthy went to the 
castle. Horthy was a free man, Veesenmayer averred, although there were 
German "honor guards" posted at the castle. Horthy called a Crown Council in 
mid-afternoon, and arranged for the resignation of the Kallay government. 
Veesenmayer went' to work immediately, and during the next hour talked 
with a number of Hungarian leaders. Imredy came to the Legation, as did 
[Ratz], Raynics, Jurcek, and Ruskay. He sent a message to Bardossy as well. 
The next day Sztojai came, sent by Horthy, to ask if the German Government 
would agree to his appointment as Prime Minister. Veesenmayer telegraphed an 
inquiry to the Foreign Office, which answered it agreed, but would want to see 
the list of ministers, Sztojai met with the opposition leaders, made a list and 
showed it to Veesenmayer, who also proposed [Ratz] and suggested Jurcek. 
Horthy concurred. 
Although Horthy told Veesenmayer that he liked German troops and did 
not object to the honor guard, the German military understood differently, and 
they were withdrawn. Moreover, within three to six days, Veesenmayer said, he 
obtained withdrawal of the German divisions. He said that he was not fearful at 
all of Hungarian resistance, since the people liked German soldiers and got along 
with them. From the OKW, however, came orders that Hungarian troops were 
to surrender their arms and remain in their posts. Veesenmayer protested this 
order and it was rescinded [editor: not entirely]. He exercised no pressure on the 
Government, he said — only "influence" — except where he had direct orders to 
the contrary and had to threaten people with the consequences if they did not 
obey. He always believed in the English "style" of government, i.e.: acting 
through the forms of Hungarian sovereignty, if not the substance. 
In the course of an interrogation at Nuremberg September 10, 1945, Rib-
bentrop said he remembered clearly that two men were in Hungary when it was 
occupied. One was Veesenmayer; the other a man from Himmler [police com-
mander SS Obergruppenfiihrer Otto Winkelmann], It was the latter who took a 
severe attitude, particularly about the Jews. Veesenmayer was "attacked because 
of his moderating influence". Veesenmayer would deal with officials in an 
official capacity, whereas Himmler 's man would by-pass diplomatic channels. 
That created great difficulties for Veesenmayer, Ribbentrop related. 
The German Legation in Budapest 
Veesenmayer was now in full command of the German Legation in 
Budapest, and he had a number of able assistants. 
Among these was Kurt Haller, about 32 years of age, who had studied 
law before the war, and had been a member of the Abwehr [the military intelli-
gence organization of Admiral Canaris]. Veesenmayer had known him in 
connection with his own work on the Irish problem. Not satisfied with the 
Abwehr, Haller had obtained employment in the German Foreign Office, and 
worked for Keppler, breaking all connections with the Abwehr, although he kept 
his friends and contacts in that organization. Veesenmayer took him to Budapest 
on March 19, 1944, because he knew his abilities, although Haller had never 
been there before. He served as Veesenmayer's intelligence officer and had 
contacts with all parties and groups, and especially with Major Szalasi. Haller 
was very able and objective in analyzing a situation, but had an appendectomy at 
the end of October 1944, and was last seen about April 29, 1945. He had good 
relations with Baron Kemeny [Gabor Kemeny], Szalasi's Foreign Minister and 
tried to get into touch with Count Bethlen but failed. 
It was through Haller that Veesenmayer first came into contact with Carl 
Berthold Franz Rekowski, his personal Referent in Budapest, who also had had 
connections with the Abwehr during the early part of the war. Rekowski was a 
business man who had lived in New York and Mexico City, and had done 
especially well in the paper and oil business in Mexico. Rekowski did not like 
the war and was not a politician, but was a "one hundred percent money-maker". 
He was never a member of the party. Rekowski had had charge of the welfare 
of the Grand Mufti and Rashid Ali Gailani, and his wife had received a medal 
for her domestic services in this connection. Rekowski had entered the Foreign 
Office as a war service, and was a very good man, efficient and agreeable. 
Veesenmayer had called him to Salzburg in March 1944 and had taken him 
along to Budapest, having met him four or five times before. 
Sometimes when Veesenmayer was "desperate" in Budapest, in view of 
the unfavorable development of the war, he would go to Rekowski's apartment, 
and on one occasion Rekowski expressed his bitterness with those who had got 
Germany into the war and brought on disaster. Veesenmayer had agreed with 
these sentiments. Rekowski 's only ambition was to get it over with and leave 
Germany for ever. As his personal secretary and "right hand man", Rekowski 
had his office just outside that of Veesenmayer, and was in charge of passport 
matters as consul in Budapest; but his primary work was with Veesenmayer. 
Rekowski was also Veesenmayer's contact with Winkelmann, who was not so 
"agreeable" to Veesenmayer. 
Gerhard Feine, about fifty years old, was a Geheimrat in the Foreign 
Office, and had the usual duties pertaining to that office. A career diplomat, 
Feine had first met Veesenmayer in the Belgrade Legation in 1940. 
Adamovic, Referent for legal problems, was ill most of the time, and was 
succeeded by Grell, but there was very little for either to do in war time. 
Bruenhof was Referent for Press Relations between Germany and 
Hungary. He did not really control the Hungarian press, but did influence it. 
The Hungarian Government had its own controls, but most of the world news 
came through [the German news service] DNB. Bruenhof kept in touch with the 
Hungarian Press Office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and also with the press 
office in the Ministry-Presidency of the Council. Bruenhof did not have to 
exercise much pressure since the Hungarian papers seldom got out of line. 
Niebelschuetz was Radio attache and his problems were similar to those 
of the press Referent. There were very few difficulties in influencing the radio. 
The monitoring service was good, and Veesenmayer received daily reports. 
Dr. Boden and Herr Englert were economic experts. Dr. Boden had been 
on the Board of Directors of the AEG and also of Standard and Veesenmayer 
had brought him to Hungary because of his expert economic judgment. 
Katschinka was the Propagandareferent, but was not very active. He did, 
however, at times influence the press, radio, and the cinema through the use of 
money. Triska was Kulturreferent. but there was not much for this officer to do 
in wartime. Likewise, Meckel, Volksdeutscher Referent, was not very active, 
and was to boot ill with tuberculosis. He was not an important official, although 
Veesenmayer indicated that there were 1,000,000 Volksdeutsche in Hungary. 
General [Hans] von Greiffenberg was the military attache in Budapest 
and Lt. General [Kuno Heribert] Fruettener the Air Attache. However both had 
active commands and in that capacity could and did pursue an independent 
course. In general, however, both officers were loyal to Veesenmayer, especially 
von Greiffenberg. 
There were also consulates in Budapest (Rekowski), Kaschau [Kassa, 
today Kosice] (Count Matuschka), Debre[c]en (Kampf), Klausenburg [Kolozsvar, 
today Cluj] (Strak), and Szeged (Lurtz). Telephone, telegraph and railway 
communications with the consulates, however, were extremely difficult, and [the 
consulates] were closed up one by one as the Russian front advanced. 
Veesenmayer had a peculiar relationship with SS/Obergruppenfuehrer 
Otto Winkelmann, who was also Lt. Gen. of Police, since Winkelmann, was 
directly responsible to Himmler, not to Veesenmayer, and took his orders only 
from Himmler. Winkelmann had charge of matters pertaining to the Volks-
deutsche, for example, since Himmler was in direct charge of the Volksdeutsche, 
Winkelmann also had direct orders from Himmler as to political and economic 
matters, and was independent of Veesenmayer in this respect. He was also 
independent in police matters, and the legation had no police attache, which was 
usual in other legations, for control of passports, criminals, etc. Because 
Himmler was the most important man in Germany after Hitler himself, people 
like Winkelmann often acted very independently. Veesenmayer had many 
difficulties with Winkelmann, although he did not dislike him personally. 
Especially outstanding were difficulties over the Mannfried [Manfred] Weiss 
Case, the problem of Imredy, and the Jewish question. [Editor's note: these cases 
are discussed below, under separate headings.] 
The Auslandsorganisation TAOI 
The AO made its own policy in the Balkans, and sought its own informa-
tion through its own sources. Veesenmayer had no connection with the AO. 
There were only about 1,000 Reichsdeutsche in Hungary, and the AO was not 
concerned with the Volksdeutsche. All in all, Veesenmayer felt that the AO was 
much overrated, and really played a very insignificant role in all Southeastern 
Europe, although Neuhausen, an AO representative, was active in Belgrade. On 
the whole, the influence of the AO on foreign policy was bad, Veesenmayer 
thought, since such matters should have been a function of the legations, and 
"too many cooks spoil the broth". Veesenmayer said that it was a cardinal point 
with him that party politics should be left at home, and should not be mixed 
with foreign policy. 
Many foreign countries had considered the AO a "fifth column", but 
Veesenmayer thought it actually rather ineffective and it certainly did more harm 
that good. Bohle, the leader of the AO was too young, and too ambitious, and 
too much of a "know-it-all". Veesenmayer had "reckoned" with Bohle in 
Wiesbaden on the Bodenstadtstrasse, and had met him for the first time there. 
The one thing on which Veesenmayer agreed with Ribbentrop was with respect 
to Bohle and the AO, and he thought the entire Foreign Office was agreed as to 
that. On the other hand, the AO did very well in caring for wounded soldiers, 
giving them coffee and drinks, etc. 
The Volksdeutsche 
Few broad problems concerning the Hungarian Volksdeutsche arose 
during the war, although these Hungarians of German ethnic origin, through Dr. 
[Franz] Basch, their leader, made demands on the Hungarian Government for an 
enlargement of their rights. The primary question ("ninety percent of the 
problem") in wartime was concerned with luring young Volksdeutsche into the 
Waffen SS organization, since they could not enter the German army. Under an 
agreement between Winkelmann and the Hungarian War Minister in the Sztojai 
government, provision was made for their entry into the Waffen SS. This was 
supplemented by another agreement. Veesenmayer had nothing to do with these 
arrangements beyond that of formal approval and submission to Berlin. Before 
1944 there were about 40,000 Volksdeutsche who had gone into the Waffen SS 
and about 30-40,000 in 1944. The 10th and 19th divisions were made up of 
Volksdeutsche, but few of them actually saw combat. 
Veesenmayer's Instructions as Minister in Hungary 
As Minister to Hungary, Veesenmayer had something more than the 
normal duties of a Minister. He was to form new government with men who 
favored German influence in Hungary, he was to coordinate the German and 
Hungarian efforts in the war, and to help Hungarian matters of communication 
(railroads, dams, etc.). His mission, however, did not include 1) military matters 
which were referred to General von Greiffenberg, 2) police questions, including 
the Jewish problem, which were in the province of Winkelmann, who was 
directly responsible to Himmler, and 3) the problem of the Volksdeutsche, which 
was also within Winkelmann's independent province. Veesenmayer was in 
charge of economic problems, generally, but the Foreign Office had sent him Dr. 
Boden [economic] attache, who had been AEG Director in Berlin. Under Dr. 
Boden was also the DIKO (Deutsche Industrie Kommission), whose task it was 
to coordinate German-Hungarian industry. 
The Sztojai Government, March 19 - end of August 1944 
Veesenmayer had excellent relation with Sztojai, who had been Hungar-
ian Minister to Berlin, throughout his period in office as Prime Minister of 
Hungary. Sztojai was a pleasant man, although frequently ill, having come to 
Budapest from a sanatorium; he had to take frequent rests. Veesenmayer also 
had few protests from Horthy during this period, and Horthy once told him that 
he was a "correct", good man. Horthy did not like the SD or the SS, however, 
but there were no sharp conflicts. 
Sztojai tried to found a single party, since he did not like party conflicts, 
but Veesenmayer felt that such a fusion of parties was impossible. Sztojai 
finally resigned because of illness. It was also true that he was not an able 
politician; moreover, Sztojai knew that the entourage around Horthy had been 
working against him, and this constituted another reason for his resignation. 
[Ratz] had resigned of his own accord in May. He could have been a man of 
influence, but liked the easy life too well to exert himself in this direction. 
The Case of the Mannfried [Manfredl Weiss Works 
One of the serious problems which arose during the period of the Sztojai 
government was that of the Mannfried Weiss Works, the largest concern in 
Hungary, employing about 20,000 people. This plant was situated on the Island 
of [Csepel] in the Danube, and was owned by some Jews who were in the hands 
of Himmler 's SS near Vienna. When Sztojai came to power, the Government, in 
its law concerning Jewish possessions had decreed that Jewish plants were to go 
to the Government; moreover, Jews were forbidden to dispose of their property 
in ways which would avoid seizure or purchase by the government. 
The case broke during the latter part of May or the early part of June 
1944. Without the knowledge of the Hungarian Government or of Veesenmayer, 
a special representative of Himmler, Bechler made an agreement with the Jewish 
owners, ([Ferenc] Chorin, [Samuel? Leo?] Goldberger, and Mannfried [Manfred] 
Weiss [Jr.?]) to purchase their shares in behalf of the SS. In return, these men 
and their families, about thirty people in all, were to be transported in two 
airplanes to Lisbon. [Editor's note: Leo Goldberger refused to leave the country 
with his relatives. He died of malnutrition soon after he was liberated from Nazi 
concentration camp in March, 1945.] Some millions of marks and jewellery 
were involved. When the Hungarian Government heard of it there were protests, 
and Imredy was incensed about the matter. Veesenmayer told them that he had 
known nothing about the matter. 
Finally, Winkclmann came to see Veesenmayer and informed him that 
the Weiss Works had been purchased on the orders of Himmler and that 
Veesenmayer would have to help obtain the consent of the Hungarian Govern-
ment. This he refused to do, and reporting to the Foreign Office, elaborated on 
the repercussions this action would have in Hungarian-German relations. 
About June 6-7, Sztojai went to Salzburg to see Hitler. One day before 
Veesenmayer had been called to Salzburg, and had told Ribbentrop about the 
problem, but Ribbentrop could do nothing and advised Veesenmayer to see 
Himmler. Veesenmayer then saw Himmler during the night, but was told he was 
a weakling and neither a fitting representative of Germany in Hungary nor of the 
SS (in which Veesenmayer held the honorary rank of Brigade fuehrer). Himmler 
indicated that if Veesenmayer did not cease to protest, he would advise the 
Fuehrer, who had agreed as to the purchase, and Veesenmayer would then be 
opposing the will of the Fuehrer. Himmler also remarked that he felt it was a 
good thing if the minister did not always know everything that was going on in 
the country to which he was assigned. 
Veesenmayer at this point remarked that he had never been a member of 
the SD, and was only an honorary member of the SS, and was in no way 
responsible to Himmler, Later, at a meeting of his legation staff, he had told the 
members that he would take nothing from the Jews and that they must not. He 
further remarked that he had offered his resignation to Ribbentrop, saying that he 
could not return to Hungary after what had happened, but that Ribbentrop had 
refused to accept his resignation and had ordered him to return to Budapest. 
Moreover, he was ordered not to speak of the case again, the alternative being 
the concentration camp. 
The Imredy Case 
A second serious problem developed in the case of Bela Imredy. 
Veesenmayer originally had wanted Imredy as Minister President of Hungary. 
Later, however, he suggested that Sztojai name him as Minister for Economic 
Affairs, a post that would embody not only the usual functions of this ministry, 
but those of the ministries of communications, agriculture, and exports and 
imports. Imredy would act in this capacity as a sort of "coordinator" for 
economic affairs. Imredy visited Horthy about the beginning of May, and 
Sztojai spoke to him about the matter. Jarross and Kundei [sic, Antal Kundcr?], 
of Imredy's party, were already in the government, and Sztojai proposed Imre-
dy's name to the Regent, who agreed to accept him. Veesenmayer thought that 
this appointment would be a tremendous help to Dr. Boden, the economist of the 
Legation. 
Nevertheless, Veesenmayer felt the opposition of SS Leader Kalten-
brunner and SS/Obergruppenfuehrer Winkelmann. Although Kaltenbrunner 
visited Budapest often during this period, Veesenmayer did not see him. At the 
end of July or the beginning of August, Winkelmann gave an interview denounc-
ing Imredy because of his Jewish descent. Suddenly there was a whispering 
campaign. Imredy, Jarross and Kundefr] protested to Veesenmayer; Imredy 
could not understand how one German agency could favour him and another 
denounce him. Veesenmayer indicated that he had known nothing of the attack 
— and naturally could not work against himself! He reported the matter to the 
Foreign Office, and offered for the second time to resign because of these SS 
activities, over which he had 110 control at all. But it was now too late, for 
Winkelmann complained to Neubacher about divided responsibilities and 
policies, but Neubacher reminded him that in other countries the Germans had 
"two, three, four or six" people who made policy in as many different directions. 
The Jewish Problem 
A third problem which took form and substance during the period of the 
Sztojai Government was the Jewish question. The problem began to develop 
first in the provinces and then spread to Budapest. The Sztojai regime [sic, the 
Imredy government in 1939] was the first to promulgate anti-Semitic regulations 
with respect to property and other matters, and later governments added to them. 
There were several hundred thousand Jews in Budapest. The Jews, inimical both 
to the government and the Germans, struck against working on fortifications. 
The reports from the foreign press about the Jewish question added fuel to the 
fire; Horthy, moreover, had received communications both from the Pope and 
from the King of Sweden about the middle of September concerning this matter. 
In May 1944, Sztojai had made an agreement with Germany as to 
sending Jews to Germany for work, and a commission had gone to Berlin to 
look into the problem and make arrangements. [SS Obersturmbannfiihrer Adolf] 
Eichmann, a special representative of Himmler on Jewish problems, Winkelmann 
and Himmler himself were primarily involved. But the movement of Jews to 
Germany had been halted when [General Geza] Lakatos succeeded Sztojai, 
because the Hungarian Government wanted them to work on fortifications 
around Budapest. About 50,000 were involved in this work, including men and 
women. Some had already been sent to Austria to construct underground war 
plants. There had been no protests about the matter from the Hungarian 
Government, although Horthy showed some concern about food, clothing and 
shelter for these Jews. 
The main difference between the Sztojai and Lakatos regimes in the 
matter of the Jewish problem, in Veesenmayer's opinion, was that the latter 
wanted the Jews to work in Hungary, while Sztojai was in favour of transporting 
them to Germany for labour. Altogether, Veesenmayer thought, from 500,000 to 
400,000 Jews had been sent from Hungary to Germany. Although he had sent 
some telegrams to the Foreign Office concerning the transportation of these 
Jews, Eichmann and Winkelmann were primarily responsible, especially the 
former. 
Asked if he had received any instructions or communications from the 
Foreign Office in this respect, Veesenmayer said that in March 1944, Ribbentrop 
had asked him what to do about the Jewish problem, and in the course of the 
talk had suggested that the Jews might be sent to America! But the Hungarian 
Jewish problem, Veesenmayer reiterated, was not in his hands. 
During the Szalasi regime, however, Veesenmayer had protested, he said, 
about the treatment of the Jews who were working on the Ostwall on the Austro-
Hungarian frontier. There were no trains, and food and shelter against the cold 
were very poor. Not many more Jews had been sent out at this time, however, 
most of them were concentrated in Budapest. 
Horthy himself was bitterly anti-Semitic. He had fought against the Bela 
Kun regime and often accused Jews of being Communist in sympathy. During 
the period under discussion Horthy had condemned many Jews to death. He 
hated the Jews as few did, and once referred to Imredy as a Jew. [Editor's note: 
on this subject see the pertinent parts of the introductory essay to this volume.] 
Veesenmayer said that he thought the great shame of Germany was the 
handling of the Jewish problem. Germany had once had a great name in the arts 
and sciences, now, because of the Hitler regime, the German name had been 
dragged in the mire. Once he had been proud to be a German, but now he 
wondered if a German could lift up his head again. The crime of the people like 
him was to have served such a regime, he thought, even if they had not always 
known what was going on, as he said he had not. He first learned of conditions 
in concentration camps, he remarked, when he was brought to a prison camp and 
shown pictures. 
The Lakatos Government, End of August - October 15, 1944 
The military situation dominated the entire picture in Hungary during the 
period of the Lakatos Government, and the position of Hungary, as well as that 
of the Government, became increasingly grave. The members of the opposition 
who were in the Cabinet protested against the weakness of Lakatos, and a 
movement had begun to concentrate all the opposition elements into a National 
bloc. This movement consisted of the leaders of the Nationalist parties and the 
President of the Parliament, together with members of the Hungarian House of 
Lords. The leader of the so-called Ostfrontkaempferbund was also involved, and 
telegrams were sent to all members of Parliament and the Government. For the 
first time Szalasi took part in such a movement, since he felt that the national 
interest demanded political unity. A committee of ten to twelve members of the 
group out of 150, including General [Ratz], went to Lakatos and urged maximum 
protection of the war against Russia. Veesenmayer sympathized with them, but 
did not take an active part in the movement. 
Another factor which contributed to the ultimate resignation of Lakatos 
was concerned with the journey of Col. General Miklos [Bela Miklos], together 
with his secretary, to the Russians with proposals for terms. Horthy was a party 
to this move, although Lakatos knew nothing about it at the time.... 
The Arrest of Horthy's Son. October 15, 1944 
The SD had information that Admiral Horthy's son, at this time, was in 
contact with the Russians and also with the British and the Americans, and had 
been so for about a year. This had been reported to Kaltenbrunner, Himmler and 
Hitler. Veesenmayer had also heard that an English officer was supposed to be 
in Budapest, but there were many rumours and he did not believe many of them, 
although the SD was well informed. Veesenmayer learned, too, about an 
American mission, composed of three officers, which had arrived in Budapest in 
March [editor's note: the OSS' Mission Sparrow], before his advent as Minister. 
This mission had got into touch with some officers of the War Ministry. Horthy 
was in Salzburg at the time, and, at the instance [sic, insistence?] of General 
Buettere, they were turned over to the Germans. There was also an unknown 
plane, with unknown occupants, which had flown to Italy. 
When Horthy's son was interrogated by the Germans later on, it was 
learned that Horthy himself had been informed of all these moves. There had 
been no earlier proof as to the matter, however, as the Hungarian police under 
Lakatos were not very helpful in such problems. Lakatos himself was very 
poorly informed and not often au courant as to the activities of Horthy and his 
entourage. Indeed, the weakness of the Lakatos government was apparent to 
everybody. 
Until the last moment, Lakatos worked closely with Veesenmayer, and 
did what he could during the hours of October 15-16 to avoid any armed conflict 
with the Germans. He told Veesenmayer that if he had known of Horthy's 
intrigues he would have resigned much earlier. 
October 15, 1944 fell on Sunday. On this day there was a plot, organized 
by [Otto] Skorzeny, the "rescuer" of Mussolini, to get Horthy's son into custody 
by telling him that an agent of Marshall Tito wanted to see him. He was then 
approached [sic, captured] by the SD and taken to Vienna for interrogation. 
The Abdication of the Regent. October 15-16. 1944 
About noon on October 15, Veesenmayer went to Horthy, who protested 
against the arrest of this son and threatened to hold Veesenmayer as hostage. 
The entire Hungarian cabinet was also present at the castle by this time. Horthy 
reported to them on his contacts with the Allies, and said that he had decided to 
ask the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States for terms, although not 
unconditional terms. Veesenmayer protested that he would have to inform his 
government, since he saw in such a move a definite break in Hungarian-German 
friendship. Meanwhile, the Foreign Office had sent Ambassador [Rudolf] Rahn 
(Italy) to Budapest to help Veesenmayer, since Ribbentrop was not sure that 
Veesenmayer could handle the situation alone. 
Veesenmayer was only able to leave the castle grounds, strongly guarded 
by Hungarian troops, after he had protested for about fifteen minutes. Rahn then 
talked with Horthy for about forty-five minutes, at the end of which Horthy 
agreed not to come to terms with the enemy. At the same time, however, the 
Budapest radio was announcing his request for terms. 
From that moment, in view of his perfidy, it was decided to have nothing 
further to do with Horthy. Many Hungarian leaders now came to see Veesen-
mayer and said that the time had come for Germany to intervene in the Hungar-
ian situation. So German movements, prepared well in advance by the military 
and police, were begun under General von Greiffenberg and SS/Obergruppen-
fuehrer Winkelmann. The order for action was given at 6 A.M. on October 16. 
Only the radio was seized on October 15, in order to prevent any further 
demoralization of the Hungarian people and troops. 
On the evening of October 15, about 8 P.M., Lakatos telephoned 
Veesenmayer saying that he and Foreign Minister Henyey [Gusztav Hennyey] 
would come to see him within half an hour. Lakatos had been surprised at 
Horthy's statement, and promised to do everything to avoid trouble. Veesen-
mayer, still hoping to avoid conflict, nevertheless had little confidence in the 
ability of Lakatos to avert it. During the meeting, moreover, he had word from 
the military that the streets of the Castle had been mined, and that he was 
therefore virtually a prisoner in the Legation. Lakatos was sceptical, but found 
the information to be correct. 
Veesenmayer then sent a message to General von Greiffenberg, who was 
just outside Budapest, to take action. About midnight two German officers 
arrived, and soon after Lakatos telephoned Veesenmayer requesting that he come 
to the Prime Minister's residence, which he refused to do in view of the mined 
streets. When the mines were moved from one of the streets, he sent Geheimrat 
Feine to Lakatos, and was informed that Horthy had agreed to resign under the 
seal and protection of the German Government, together with his family and 
some friends. 
It was now about four o'clock in the morning of October 16. Veesen-
mayer tried to reach the German Foreign Office, but could not get an answer to 
his urgent message right away, in view of the hour. He wanted a reply as to 
Horthy's terms, since military action against the Castle was to start at 6 A.M., 
and he desired to avoid bloodshed. He then got into touch with SS Ober-
gruppenfuehrer Bach [presumably Eric von dem Bach-Zelewski, a "crisis 
specialist"], who had been sent down especially for the job, and who outranked 
both von Greiffenberg and Winkelmann. Veesenmayer said that there should be 
no shooting, in view of Horthy's offer, and Bach stated that if the Hungarians 
offered no resistance, there would be no shooting. Whereupon Veesenmayer 
(about 5.30 A.M.) Informed Lakatos of the situation, and asked him, in order to 
prevent bloodshed, to give the Hungarian commander the order not to resist. 
About 5.40 A.M. Ribbentrop's reply, accepting the Horthy offer to resign, 
arrived. Bloodshed would now be avoided, and Veesenmayer showed that he 
was proud of his part in preventing it. When he had the Foreign Off ice ' s 
agreement, Veesenmayer sent Geheimrat Feine again to Lakatos to bring him 
back so that he could inform Horthy. Lakatos arrived about 6.50 A.M., in full 
uniform. Veesenmayer got into his car, and with another car following, drove 
standing through the streets to the castle, past the Hungarian fortifications and 
lines of troops, and entered the last barricades on foot. He found Horthy in full 
uniform, as if he had been waiting for him. 
Horthy was not in good "constitution" at this time, yet not entirely 
"broken". He was polite, though not friendly. Veesenmayer announced that he 
had come to place Horthy under German "protection" and to take him and his 
family to Germany. Horthy was placed in a small house under German guard, 
and the troops were advised not to molest him in any way. Lakatos accompa-
nied him. Horthy, now primarily concerned about his family, inquired about his 
wife, his daughter-in-law and small grandson. Veesenmayer later found that 
Horthy's wife was in the establishment of the Papal Nuncio, and sent Feine to 
[look] after her. Following this episode, Veesenmayer went to the home of 
Lakatos, through streets lined with German troops and "Tiger" tanks. He 
ordered the house locked up to protect it. His first great task of the day was 
now accomplished. 
Back at the legation, somewhat after seven o'clock, Veesenmayer found 
the house full of people, for the day before he had given help to some members 
of the Opposition who were anxious about their personal safety. Altogether 
there were about twenty or thirty people present, among them Imredy, Szalasi 
and Bardossy. Veesenmayer's wife provided coffee and cakes for them. Rahn 
had brought Szalasi there in Rekowski's diplomatic uniform, since they were 
afraid that he might be "spotted". 
After breakfast, about ten o'clock, Veesenmayer went to see Horthy again 
in order to take Lakatos to talk with him. He said there was now no way to go 
back and Horthy would have to resign. Horthy admitted to him that he had been 
at fault in his contacts with the enemy. Horthy also agreed that Lakatos should 
resign and that Szalasi should become Premier, but on the condition that his son 
should be allowed to join his family on the way to Germany. Veesenmayer 
agreed to this, but said he would have to report it to the Foreign Office. He left 
Horthy about 11 A.M. 
Back in the Legation, Veesenmayer saw Rahn and asked him to inquire 
by telephone whether Ribbentrop would agree to send Horthy's son with the 
family. Rahn obtained Ribbentrop's consent. Veesenmayer then told Horthy in 
the presence of Rahn and Lakatos that when the situation had cleared up, 
I-Iorthy's son would be allowed to join his family. Veesenmayer had carried this 
through as a point of honour. 
Yet when all was over and Horthy had been brought to Waldbichel near 
Munich, the son had not yet joined the family. Learning of this about fifteen 
days later, Veesenmayer telegraphed Ribbentrop, pointing out that this placed 
him in an impossible position. He received no reply, so he wrote a letter to the 
Fuehrer, but heard in November from Doemberg that the Fuehrer had learned 
that the son had been implicated in the negotiations with the Allies, and refused 
to release him. That closed the matter. [Editor's note: Miklos Horthy Jr. was 
reunited with his father and family only after the war.] 
The Szalasi Government, October 16 - May 1945 
Szalasi visited Horthy in the morning of October 16, but had a rather 
unhappy interview, in view of Horthy's hatred of the man. Later in the morning, 
however, Horthy signed a statement in the presence of Veesenmayer and 
Lakatos, stipulating that he had resigned as Regent without force, and had agreed 
that Szalasi should be the new Premier of Hungary. He remarked that Szalasi 
was not his man, but he knew of no other who would take the responsibility at 
that time. But Horthy was now thinking only of his family and their safety, 
without any real thought for the country, according to Veesenmayer, who had 
lost all respect for the old man. 
About five or six o'clock in the evening of October 16, Rahn and Veesen-
mayer began a series of meetings with Szalasi, Jurcek, Raynics, Imredy and 
Pallfy, together with other leaders of the Nationalist bloc, to discuss the forma-
tion for a new government which Veesenmayer wanted to [be] constituted as 
soon as possible in order to put a stop to the confusion and looting which had 
been prevalent for the last two days. Veesenmayer's aim was to avoid a 100% 
Szalasi government, in the end the new regime was made up of about one-half 
Szalasi men and one-half men from the Nationalist bloc. The government was 
formally constituted on the morning of October 17, with Szalasi as Premier. 
Horthy and his family were sent off in the company of Geheimrat Feine to exile 
and imprisonment in Germany. 
The Szalasi government had "good will" but functioned only as the 
military situation permitted, which was now nearly hopeless; all that happened 
was "purely relative". Indeed, it was like a pot with twelve holes, Veesenmayer 
explained, with only ten fingers to stop the leaks. Szalasi tried to do his best, 
and insisted on acting "constitutionally". Not until November, for example, was 
he chosen as Regent in succession to Horthy. At about the same time a new 
Regency Council was chosen, composed of Raynics, Beragffy [General Karoly 
Beregfy], and a jurist. 
About December 4 or 5, 1944, Szalasi went to Berlin in the company of 
Veesenmayer and General von Greiffenberg, who met Szalasi at Hag[y]eshalom, 
on the German-Hungarian frontier. Shortly after their arrival Szalasi paid a 
courtesy call in Ribbentrop and then talked with the Fuehrer about the military 
situation in the presence of Greiffenberg and [Field Marshal Wilhelm] Keitel 
[Chief of Staff of the OKW], Nothing of any significance took place at this 
meeting. 
After the visit, the party returned to Hungary. The Hungarian Govern-
ment, meanwhile, had been evacuated from Budapest, and the German legation 
was scattered about in order to keep in contact with the various agencies it had 
to deal with.... But it was impossible to carry on consistently or intelligently — 
there was no gasoline, no train service, no telephone or telegraph communi-
cations. Veesenmayer's intelligence agent, Haller, was in the hospital, but in any 
case there was nothing for him to do. It was now purely a military, not a politi-
cal problem. 
At the end of March 1945 Veesenmayer left Hungary and went to 
Semmering for two or three days; then, because the Russians were coming 
closer, to Salzburg, where Szalasi also remained for a while.... In his last discus-
sion with Veesenmayer, Szalasi informed him that he proposed to go to Werten 
to surrender to the British. Warned, however, that he might fall into the hands 
of the Russians, he remained at Werten, and was married in the interval! 
Veesenmayer finally surrendered to the American forces about sixty kilometres 
from Salzburg, on May 14, 1945. 
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Miklos Horthy aud the Allies, 1945-1946: 
Two Documents 
Thomas Sakmyster 
Few personal letters of Admiral Miklos Horthy, the Regent of Hungary from 
1920 to 1944, have survived as historical evidence. Horthy was apparently not 
in the habit of writing personal letters, and such letters of this type that he did 
write did not survive the chaotic conditions in Budapest at the end of World War 
II. Yet, curiously, Admiral Horthy was a very prolific contributor to a more 
formal kind of correspondence: private letters addressed to heads of state, 
statesmen, and other prominent leaders. During his twenty-four year tenure as 
Regent, Miklds Horthy addressed such letters, which typically expressed his 
strongly held and often idiosyncratic views on Hungarian and world problems, to 
Benito Mussolini, King Edward VIII of England, Neville Chamberlain, Pope Pius 
XII, Joseph Stalin, Adolf Hitler, and others.1 From 1936 to 1944 he dispatched 
numerous such letters to the Fiihrer, most of them handwritten and composed in 
a quaint, somewhat archaic German. Certainly no other European statesman 
deemed it proper or desirable to address Hitler in such a direct, personal way, 
even offering him advice on strategic issues and chiding him for his policy 
errors.2 
Admiral Horthy's predilection for such letters persisted after his forced 
resignation in October, 1944 and the devastating defeat of Hungary in the war. 
Just before his resignation, Horthy yielded to strong German pressure and 
appointed as Prime Minister Ferenc Szalasi, the leader of the radical right-wing 
Hungarist movement. Horthy regarded Szalasi as a vulgar demagogue and a 
completely muddled thinker, and had until the German occupation of Hungary in 
March, 1944 refused numerous requests of Szalasi for an audience. As late as 
October 16 Horthy told Szalasi to his face that he was the last man in Hungary 
he would wish to appoint as prime minister. Horthy yielded to the Germans on 
October 16 only when the life of his only son, Miklos Jr., was threatened. Even 
then he signed the proclamation under protest, observing that the action was 
illegal and unconstitutional. 
Admiral Horthy spent the last months of World War II in German 
custody in Bavaria, where, in April, 1945, he was liberated by American troops.3 
To his chagrin, however, Miklos Horthy remained a prisoner of the American 
Army at various locations in Europe for more than a year, as the question was 
debated whether he was to be put on trial as a war criminal. The new Yugoslav 
government under Marshal Tito was vigorously pressing the case against the 
Hungarian Regent, arguing that he had been an accomplice of Hitler in the 
unprovoked attack on Yugoslavia in April, 1941, and was responsible for 
atrocities committed by Hungarian troops near Ujvidek (Novisad) in 1942. 
Reunited with his family, Admiral Horthy argued his case in a series of 
letters written between April, 1945 and May, 1946. His wife, daughter-in-law, 
and son (who returned from the concentration camp in Mauthausen only in 1946) 
no doubt assisted the 77 year old Horthy, but the sentiments expressed in these 
letters are clearly those of the former Regent, for they echo ideas and arguments 
to be found frequently in his pre-1945 conversations and correspondence. All 
the letters were written in English, a language Horthy had learned as a young 
naval officer but used only rarely during his regency. He had a good command 
of the language, but his style at times is somewhat awkward and his choice of 
words sometimes confusing. Short letters were sent to Winston Churchill, King 
George VI, and, perhaps, Stalin.4 More substantial letters, in which Horthy tried 
to exonerate himself from charges of war crimes and to plead Hungary's case at 
the planned peace conference, are those of May 19, 1945 to President Harry 
Truman,5 and of April 19, 1946 to Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary of the 
British government.6 These are published here for the first time. 
What is perhaps most striking about these letters is the apparent sincerity 
with which Admiral Horthy disclaimed all personal responsibility for Hungary's 
cooperation with Nazi Germany and for any atrocities committed by Hungarian 
troops or gendarmerie during World War II. Contemporary observers and many 
later historians branded Hungary as Hitler's "last ally" and ascribed a good deal 
of the responsibility for the spread of anti-Semitism to Admiral Horthy, who 
after all had served as head of state right up to October, 1944. In these letters, 
however, Horthy insists that he writes with a "clear conscience" because he had 
never sympathized with the "German party-system" and had always favoured 
close ties with the Anglo-Saxon world. He insists that he was literally forced to 
cooperate in a reluctant way with Nazi Germany because the West had failed to 
see the importance of reconstituting Hungary in its historic frontiers. Even so, 
that Hungary ended up as Hitler's ally Horthy attributes to the evil machinations 
of men like Laszlo Bardossy and the "Schwabian" (or German-Hungarian) 
generals, who were dazzled by Nazi Germany and thwarted his policies. 
Horthy offers (especially in the letter to Truman) a long but one-sided 
account of the German occupation of Hungary in March, 1944. He glosses over 
the deportation of Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz, mentioning only his last-minute 
success in protecting the Jewish community of Budapest. Indeed, one of the 
major omissions in both letters is a recognition of the anti-Semitism that 
pervaded society and government in the Horthy era. Horthy had often privately 
boasted that he had been the first European statesman to take action against the 
Jews (a reference to the numerus clausus of 1920), but in 1945 and 1946 he 
wisely refrained from reminding others of the less praiseworthy elements of his 
tenure as Regent. 
One of Horthy's major objectives in writing these letters was clearly to 
present his country's case at the peace conference that everyone assumed was 
imminent. Remarkably, Horthy asserts that he is still Hungary's legal head of 
state, because his resignation had occurred under German pressure and in 
violation of Hungarian law. He casts aspersions on the post-war government in 
Hungary, suggesting that "some of its members are not even Hungarian but 
Soviet subjects." Above all, Horthy was intent on persuading the British and 
American governments that Hungary had been unfairly treated after World War 
I and that it would be foolish, even criminal, to restore the provisions of the 
hated Treaty of Trianon. 
Horthy repeats here all the myths and familiar arguments that had been 
mainstays of the interwar campaign intended to gain "Justice for Hungary." The 
old Hungary, with its "1000 year frontiers," had protected Western civilization 
against the Mongols and Turks. Contrary to those who tried to defame his 
country, Hungary had never mistreated its national minorities: Slovaks, Germans, 
and others could rise to the highest positions of the land. Just as Count Tisza 
had opposed Austria-Hungary's entry into World War I, he as Regent had not 
favoured Hungary's declaration of war on Soviet Russia in 1941, but was tricked 
into it by Bardossy. 
A major thrust of both letters is the argument that Hungary represented 
the most trustworthy ally of the Anglo-Saxon powers in East Central Europe. 
Horthy attempts to play on anti-Communist sentiments by asserting that the 
"ideas and methods of bolshevism are just as strange to the Hungarian people as 
those of National Socialism have been." He makes disparaging comments about 
Hungary's neighbours. Romania, he suggests, has no historical claim to 
Transylvania (he claims to own a map from 1696 proving this) and is a back-
stabbing, opportunistic country, witness the last-minute defection of Romania in 
the closing days of the war. The West, by contrast, could rely completely on 
Hungary. Once it had been restored to its traditional frontiers, with a common 
frontier with Poland in the North and access to the sea in the South, Hungary 
would be a force for stability in Europe. 
No where in these letters does Admiral Horthy show any awareness of 
the forces that had already swept away the traditional order in Hungary. He 
seemed unaware of the sharp move to the Left that was occurring throughout 
Europe. Thus, he does not try to win the favour of the Anglo-Saxon powers by 
extolling democratic procedures or acknowledging any weaknesses of the 
interwar Hungarian social system or government. He fails to see that advocacy 
of certain progressive measures (such as land reform or cooperation with peasant 
and workers parties) might have been a useful tactic when pleading his case with 
the Western Democracies. 
None of the letters Admiral Horthy wrote to various officials in 1945 and 
1946 had any effect on the subsequent course of events. There is no evidence 
that anyone on the American side, including President Truman, even read 
Horthy's letter. The same could be said on the British side, where the only 
serious consideration of the letter to Bevin was that given by C. A. Macartney, 
who at the time was the Hungarian specialist in the Foreign Office. But 
Macartney, who in general had analyzed Hungarian affairs in a balanced and 
even somewhat sympathetic manner,7 concluded, with a bit of understatement, 
that the "Regent seems to be somewhat out of touch with modern develop-
ments...."8 
Admiral Horthy was not, in the end, brought to trial as a war criminal, 
although he was called as a witness to the Nuremberg Trials. The decision not 
to prosecute Horthy was made by the Allies independently of any arguments 
presented by Horthy. Ironically, the balance was tipped by Joseph Stalin, who 
advised against prosecution of the man who had been one of Europe 's most 
adamant and passionate anti-Communists. Horthy, Stalin suggested, was an "old 
man" who had at least tried, albeit clumsily, to make an armistice with Russia. 
He should not be considered a war criminal and should be allowed to live in 
peace in the West.9 
Thus, as historical evidence, these two documents represent Miklos 
Horthy's last, somewhat pathetic, intervention in European affairs. What is 
perhaps most notable about the contents of the letters is that the views he 
expresses and the arguments he employs arc virtually unchanged from those to 
be found in his conversations and memorandums as far back as 1920. The 
myths that he so fervently embraced about Hungarian history and the role of his 
country in European affairs were not altered by the traumatic events of his 
twenty-four year long regency. 
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Horthy's Letters 
NOTE: The documents have been edited to correct typographical, but not 
grammatical, errors. 
A. Miklos Horthy's letter to President Harry Truman dated May 19, 1945. 
Horthy prefaced the typed part of the letter with a brief handwritten note in two 
parts in which he complained that he was being treated like a "common crimi-
nal" and that he was unable to exercise his leadership "when the future of my 
country will be decided for centuries." 
Excellency! 
I beg to grant me a short half an hour of your very precious time in reading the 
following lines. As the fate of many generations has to be decided now and 
everybody's ardent desire is a longlasting and just peace. I take the liberty to 
tell your excellency the truth and only the truth about what hard and unfortunate 
circumstances our nation had to deal with. I feel this being my duty because in 
my opinion the reason of Hungary's catastrophe at the peace treaty of 1919 was 
that our situation has been falsely exhibited, without giving us a chance to 
remonstrate and to prove the truth. Quoting Poincare's memoirs: "Clemenceau 
who hated the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (without knowing our country or 
nation) was most willing to please the claims of Serbia, Bohemia and Rumania." 
After the first world war it was much discussed who was guilty of its 
outbreak. It is proven that the Hungarian Prime Minister Count Tisza opposed 
war in the Crown Council. Nevertheless our nation has percentually the heaviest 
losses and our country lost two thirds of its over a thousand year old territorial 
possessions. There is not a single nation in this part of Europe that did not fight 
out of geographical reasons in one or both wars against the Entente. Czechs, 
Slovaks, Roumanians, Bulgars, Serbs, Austrians. And Hungary, who did 
absolutely the same, lost territory to them and this without plebiscite. An armed 
Austro-Hungary, with Switzerland, and if possible a trustworthy Rumania on its 
flank, would have been strong enough to declare a line of neutrality along 
Middle Europe. Mr. Clemenceau's disarmed and one-third Hungary surrounded 
by enemies was absolutely unable to do this. 
Our ancestors were liberal enough not to oppose any immigration and 
strange nationalities entered because they found more safety, better administra-
tion, and better conditions of life. If it had not been so, they would have 
returned. It is not true that they were oppressed, which is proven by the fact that 
they kept their mother language throughout centuries, even in villages few miles 
from the capital. Every subject had the same right to achieve any position, if 
qualified for. Wekerle, of German origin was three times Prime Minister, 
Roeder Minister of War, Werth Chief of Staff and during the first World War 
the highest rank in the State, the Prince Primate was occupied by Cardinal 
Czernoch, son of a poor Slovak peasant. To a thousand families of Serbs we 
gave permission around 1400 to enter the country evading Turkish terror. We 
had most of the Germans settled by the absolutist Austrian government on 
Hungarian Crown Territory, most fertile ground. 
The Rumanian infiltration was a slow one. Their propaganda wants to 
make the world believe that they were aborigin[al]s of Transylvania, but the 
truth is that before occupation of the country by Hungarians, the Rumanian Race 
was nonexistent. There is a map in my possession of the year 1696 drawn up by 
a deputy sent by the King of France to the Prince-Regent of Transylvania. On 
this map is written: "En des Saxons, des Moldaves et des Valaques, dont les 
deux derniers possedent la moindre partie et sont peux connus." 
In the last 50 years the Rumanian government opened a branch of the 
Albina bank in the capital of Transylvania with the instruction to buy all 
available land in the country and settle Rumanian peasants on it. The Rumanian 
State in its 80 year existence betrayed all its allies. They spread the tale that 
half of Transylvania was returned to Hungary as a gift of Hitler, whereas the 
truth is that not being able to stand any longer the lasting official provocations, 
as well as the ill treatment and ruin of our Transylvanian compatriots, we made 
arrangements to enter the country. As the majority of their troops were deep in 
Russian territory engaged in a war of conquest, they repeatedly asked Hitler for 
arbitration, to divide Transylvania. We consented unwillingly but only to spare 
blood and to save at least part of our compatriots as soon as possible of further 
ill treatment. 
At the end of the year 1918 all troops returning from the front were 
disarmed on orders of the revolutionary government. The Peace Treaty of 
Trianon forbade us to hold an army, to produce armament, to drill officers and 
soldiers. The Little Entente, that kept an army of about 3 million well armed 
men, took good care to keep us in this state, to be able to enjoy the possession 
of its newly acquired territories without trouble. In this second World War, 
unarmed, we did not have the possibility to remain neutral, because of our 
geographical position and on account of Hungary being of great importance to 
Germany. All transport of troops and war material to Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, 
and Greece, and all the very important transports of Rumanian oil had to pass 
our country. There is no question about it, that we would have been immedi-
ately invaded, had we declared neutrality with not a single gun in our possession. 
Partisan fighting was absolutely impossible on a dead flat and treeless country. 
We did not have any aspirations outside our old borders, even when Austria-
Hungary annexed Bosnia, we refused to accept it as part of Hungary. Our only 
ambitions were to keep the penetration of Bolshevism out of our country whose 
doctrines are rejected by our population. All armament we got from Germany 
were conscientiously paid, whereas most products delivered by us remained 
unpaid, so that their debts amounted to several millions. 
Under the pretext to discuss the possibilities of recalling our four 
divisions standing in Russia, which I during many months urgently claimed by 
letters and through sending to Headquarters by turns the Minister of War and the 
Chief of Staff in vain, I was invited to Hitler, which invitation I accepted for this 
important reason. On my arrival, Hungary was unexpectedly invaded and 
occupied by German troops under the pretext that our intention was to join the 
enemy. As I was told this I protested against this unheard of action and wanted 
to leave at once, but they prevented my returning home to have time to finish 
the occupation. We hardly had any troops at home and so they could not think 
of resistance, especially because of my absence. Our most valuable leading men 
were arrested, they collected the Jews of the country and transported them under 
most inhuman conditions to Germany, requisitioned everything, bought up all the 
stocks with our money and took all our animals for breeding. I kept my position 
only on Hitler's binding promise that if I nominate a government he can trust, all 
troops will be withdrawn from Hungary and so our sovereignty restored. I 
appointed our Minister in Berlin who was officer as Prime Minister and though 
they declared themselves satisfied, never kept their promise. 
Besides my remaining made the keeping of parliamentary form possible. 
As the Germans kept strong forces in and around our capitals to control us and 
not on the Carpathians, belonging to the Rumanians, the Russian and Rumanian 
army invaded Transylvania. Seeing the total annihilation of my country inevita-
ble I asked for the German Minister and told him my decision to request 
armistice. At the same time I published an explaining manifesto, through 
wireless to the nation. I was convinced that this action meant my arrest sooner 
or later. The Germans were too ready to act and got immediately hold of the 
radio and telephone central, so that I was incapable of giving further orders. The 
Germans had about 600 tanks in town and as resistance was hopeless, I did not 
want to sacrifice the bodyguards. So the Royal Palace was occupied and 
plundered. I was taken to Bavaria, where I was in captivity till the American 
troops came. Hitler gave orders to shoot my whole family. My only remaining 
son was lured into a trap and taken to Germany on a plane. He was carried to 
the concentration camp of Mauthausen near Linz (a camp of the worst reputa-
tion, where numbers of Hungarians were kept), and I still do not know if he is 
dead or alive. The only reason they had against him was his Nazi hatred, that he 
never had intercourse with any of them and foresaw the result of this war at its 
beginning. The man who was appointed Prime Minister by the German Minister 
immediately after my arrest, called Szalasi, an Armenian who as major lost his 
rank and was later sentenced by court of Justice for 4 years imprisonment. He 
was a National Socialist who founded a small party of the worst elements, 
mostly of strange origin, with the help of German funds. Getting to power with 
German help, his unwholesome function luckily did not last long. 
Only a just peace can be of duration. Therefore I urgently ask to be 
listened to at the Peace Conference. We will answer all questions correctly, as 
we always did. Our ardent desire would be to get rid of the Hungarian subjects 
of German nationality, who behaved most ungratefully. All other nationalities 
(with the exception of the Slovaks) could also be exchanged with Hungarians. 
Never could there be a better opportunity for this, because all the neighbouring 
countries had severe losses and have need of their own people. For instance 
there were in 1919, 378,000 Serbian minorities living on the part of Hungary 
given to them and they lost throughout the last war manifold of this number. 
This would also help to accomplish friendly terms between us, which has always 
been my sincere and often officially expressed desire. Despair was great after 
Trianon, because not only had we lost two thirds of our country, everywhere 
with Hungarian majority, with historical towns where universities, theatres, etc. 
were all Hungarian culture, where minorities were mostly peasants on low 
standard of life, but the main reason of despair was that the remaining country 
was incapable of living, having lost all mines and woods and left without a grain 
of salt. We also lost our only port Fiume and it is impossible for a nation to 
live without being able to reach the sea. If all the forests of our lost mountains, 
sources of our rivers, would have been cut down (which devastation the new 
proprietors against the prohibition of the international Danube-Committee already 
begun) nothing would have been left but stony hills, with yearly inundation of 
our agricultural country in consequence. This nation left alone in defense of 
European culture, fought throughout centuries its wars against Mongols, Tartars, 
Turks, always weakened and nevertheless not giving up its duty, deserves a 
better lot. Everybody who knows our nation can see that a Hungarian as 
Minister never enriched himself. Corrupt people cannot get along in our 
atmosphere. I beg to lend an ear to our destiny and excuse my long letter. 
Wishing your country lasting happiness and success in its great work for 
the world's welfare, I am yours sincerely 
Adm. Horthy 
Belgium, 19 /V 1945 
[handwritten postscript] Excuse the form! 
B. Horthy's letter to Ernest Bevin, April 14, 1946 
Your Excellency, 
The preparations for the Peace Treaties having begun and the date of the 
Peace Conference approaching, I have to call the attention of your Excellency to 
Hungary and to a few problems concerning our country. 
I feel it my duty to do this as I still have to consider myself the Regent 
of Hungary, having been unanimously elected in 1920 by the Hungarian Parlia-
ment the members of which were called together on basis of a democratic 
election representing the free will of the nation. 
In order to refute such opinions that I, having resigned have not the right 
to appeal in the name of my nation anymore, I have to declare that in spite of 
the fact — when after the German occupation and my arrest by the Germans in 
middle of October 1944, after Ferenc Szalasi and his Government was nominated 
by the Germans, my resignation was proclaimed by way of advertisements, the 
press and the radio — I legally did not resign. My so called resignation was the 
result of a physical and moral pressure. I was forced to sign the document put 
before me facing the tommy-guns of SS soldiers and the German Minister in the 
presence of Prime Minister Lakatos giving me his word of honour, that in case 1 
sign the resignation my only living child Nicholas Horthy, Jr. will avoid execu-
tion. I gave my signature fully conscious of all these circumstances and decid-
edly declaring its invalidity. According to the Hungarian Law then in force my 
resignation would have been valid only in case it had taken place according to 
the formalities prescribed by the Law. My signature therefore was invalid in any 
case, even if I had not been forced to give it. 
What makes it all the more my duty to explain the situation of Hungary 
is that in consequence of the occupation the present government does not 
represent the will of the nation, and is not master of its decisions and acts. So at 
the coming Peace Conference it is hindered in the uninfluenced and free repre-
sentation of the interests of the country for — as far as I know — some of its 
members are not even Hungarian but Soviet subjects. 
And finally it is my rightful duty to raise my word in the interest of my 
country now, for I may state before the tribunal of history with a quiet con-
science that I am one of the majority of those Hungarians who never sided with 
the German party-system, with its aims and methods, have done everything in 
my power to save my people from the horrors of this war and tried even during 
the war to get into contact with the Anglo-Saxon powers and to make the 
difficult situation of Hungary clear to them. I may declare with a clear con-
science that Hungary was dragged into the war under the irresistible pressure of 
the Germans and in consequence of the activity of a responsible statesman who 
has since then been executed as a war-criminal. I firmly protested against the 
German occupation of our country and qualified it before Hitler and his states-
men as an unheard of atrocity and did all in my power to have the German 
troops withdrawn from the country as it had been promised. In most respects 
my endeavors remained unsuccessful. So, e.g. troops sent out to the Russian 
front with the purpose to defend the frontier or maintain order were also used by 
the German High Command — in opposition to our agreement — in the front-
lines. 
The final demarcation of the Hungarian frontiers is a problem of great 
significance and importance from the point of view of World-Peace and the great 
principles that are to secure this Peace. Should the Peace Treaties decide the 
frontiers of Hungary to be the same as what the Peace Treaty of Trianon had 
decided upon — inspite of the fact that according to the opinion of distin-
guished Anglo-Saxon circles that was wrong and unjust, and was the source of 
newer frictions and troubles — it would again be the hothouse of possibilities 
extremely threatening a lasting World-Peace. 
I would shortly like to deal with the question, whether — as a retaliation, 
or a punishment or on the basis of the principle of equal treatment — the 
dispositions concerning Hungary are to be stricter than those concerning the 
other neighbouring countries. 
I should like to point to the fact, that with the exception of Yugoslavia, 
all our other neighbors who demand territory and partly even recompensation 
from us, have, as may be proved, more help to their German friends against the 
Allied Nations, than we did. In order to prove this I will relate the following 
facts: 
Slovakia took part in the war against the Allied Nations with a relatively 
uncomparably larger force and to a much greater extent then we did. Her 
territory, her material and morale, military and financial, economical and 
political values were entirely in the service of the German interests. German 
troops drew up through Slovakia in the warfare against the Russians. 
Bohemia surrendered to Hitler completely. Her factories and workmen 
worked for the Germans, her economy served the German war-interests and 
what 's more she even increased the German's war industry by new factories. 
There was peace and order in the country all the time, there were no signs of 
any serious oppositions. Her army which had been made large and strong by the 
Allies let the German troops of occupation in without resistance. 
Roumania was among the so called satellites the country which turned 
into the most complete Fascistic and Nazi state. Her significant forces were 
entirely drawn up and cast in against the Soviet. She incorporated large Russian 
territories and immediately introduced Roumanian administration. She gave her 
entire petroleum production as well as her agricultural products to the Germans. 
And all this was done by the Roumania which ever since the last War has been 
materially and morally supported by America, England, and France. And 
Roumania was not in the mouth of Hitler's empire, as we were, they had no 
common frontiers. 
Yugoslavia, her army being well equipped by the Allies and the country 
being in a firstrate strategical situation, was in the position to fight a partisan 
war against the Germans. In spite of the strong German pressure I was not 
willing to give Hungarian troops in the war against Yugoslavia and even after 
the towns of Szeged and Pecs had been bombed by them and the numerous 
Hungarian population of the Bacska had been molested by the Yugoslavs we 
occupied only the former Hungarian territory. On the basis of our historical 
rights, the majority of the Hungarian population, this territory may rightfully be 
claimed as ours. 
It was an unprecedented injustice to give Burgenland to Austria after the 
last war. A conquered nation had been given a piece of land — and what ' s 
more, a piece of land which it had never claimed. As Austria joined Germany 
with great enthusiasm during this War fought with all her political and military 
strength for Nazism, I cannot understand, why and for what reason Hungary 
should be more guilty in the eyes of the Allies. 
I have to call your Excellency's attention to the fact that Hungary is in a 
key position in the South-Eastern part of Europe. Hungary is wedged in between 
the mass of Germans breaking forth from the West towards the East and the 
Slavs breaking forth from the East to the South-West, and at the same time 
forms a wedge between the Northern and Southern Slavs. Hungary shuts down 
the Balkan peninsula to the North. The best passable continental roads and 
navigable rivers in this direction lead through Hungarian territory. Consequently 
Hungary is the defending bulwark of the Eastern part of the Mediterranean, that 
part which from the point of view of world economy is of great importance. For 
this reason she falls in the way of conquering nations who endeavour to expand 
their power towards the South-East and the West. It was Hungary who in the 
XIII. century held up the Mongols who broke into Europe and it was Hungary 
who in the XV. century defended the West against the plundering of the Turks 
with her own body. This is just how she fell into the line of expansion of some 
nations of our present age and it was for this reason that she was compelled to 
become a battlefield. 
Hungary is in no racial or linguistic relationship either with the German 
or Slav people. The Hungarian folk does not understand their languages; its 
morals, customs, and culture are radically different. Hungary has for many 
centuries firmly withstood the endeavours for being conquered or incorporated 
by these nations. 
Hungary, but especially the old Hungary with its 1000 years old frontiers, 
encircled by the Carpathians is exceedingly rich in agricultural products, 
minerals, and raw material, and these values are far from being completely used 
up. The up-to-date improvement of Hungarian economical life and the excava-
tion of her treasures will be the task of that great power which draws Hungary 
into its sphere of interest. And this has got to be a Western great power, for the 
geographical position of the country, the vast chain of mountains forming a 
barrier towards the North and the East, the psychological structure of the people, 
as well as its cultural endeavours of the past centuries necessitate our orientation 
towards the West. 
On deciding the problem as to which great power Hungary should turn to 
for support and friendship, there is but one logical solution. Hungary has none 
else but the Anglo-Saxon powers to turn to. This would be of political and 
economical advantage to the Anglo-Saxon powers, as in this way they could 
secure peace on the Balkan peninsula and the Eastern basin of the Mediterra-
nean. 
A Polish-Hungarian bloc with a common frontier would secure the peace 
in this part of Europe. Hungary has lived in close friendship with Poland for 
centuries and the two states have never fought a war with each other. We gave 
evidence of this friendly feeling at the beginning of the War, when we denied 
the Germans the permission to pass through our country against Poland, and an 
order was given for the bridges to be blown up in case the Germans tried 
carrying through their intention by force. During the war we gave large masses 
of Polish refugees a hearty welcome, helped and supported them in their further 
flight towards the West. 
Besides the territories that had belonged to us for over a thousand years, 
Hungary has no other territorial aspirations. Could Hungary find support with a 
great power, which has no intention of oppressing her, she would become 
released of the immediate pressure of her political problems and could produce 
great results in economical life. 
In the twenties of this century many efforts were made to gain the 
friendship of Britain and these efforts did not remain resultless as quite a number 
of the members of the English Parliament raised their word in the interest of 
Hungary. But British official circles — probably under the influence of the loud 
propaganda of the Small Entente based often on fictive facts — did not welcome 
our approaches and this is how our unfortunate country came to get under 
German influence again. Germany was only too happy to grasp the opportunity 
of making this valuable territory one of the bases of her political and economical 
aspirations. W e were not able to defend ourselves against these endeavours, as 
according to the Peace Treaty of Trianon we were allowed only an army of 
30,000 men for the purpose of maintaining order, and this an army lacking 
modem artillery, airforce, and armoured divisions. 
The ideas and methods of bolshevism are just as strange to the Hungarian 
people as those of National Socialism have been. 
Should my word be granted understanding and should the Anglo-Saxon 
powers draw Hungary into their sphere of interest, it is for the good of both 
parties for Hungary to become politically and economically as strong as possible. 
The interests of the Anglo-Saxon powers demand therefore, that Hungary 
should not remain the mutilated country it was made by Trianon, but that it 
should regain its 1000 years old boundaries which alone form a natural line of 
defence towards the North and the East. In the interest of a strong Hungary and 
a healthy Hungarian economical life it is of essential importance to give her back 
Fiume, the port of which was built by our country at a great expense. 
Firmly convinced that the above mentioned facts hold ground not only 
from the point of view of a sovereign who has ruled for 24 years and who is 
anxious about his country, but also from the point of view of right and justice 
which are to maintain World Peace, I repeatedly ask your Excellency and your 
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Thomas Sakmyster, Hungary's Admiral on Horseback: Miklos Horthy, 1918-
1944 (Boulder, CO: Eastern European Monographs; dist., New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994). Pp. x, 476, illustrations. Price: US $59.00. 
Although I learnt long ago that there is no such thing as the definitive work, on 
any subject, Sakmyster's prize-winning biography of Admiral Miklos Horthy 
comes close to being just that. 
Hungary's regent — the admiral without a navy, head of a monarchy 
without a ruler — has not been totally overlooked. Apart from his own memoirs 
(originally published as Ein Leben fiir Ungarn), the regent (or governor) of 
Hungary has been the subject of a number of works, ranging from eulogies 
published in Hungary and Germany while Horthy was still in power, to several 
shorter or longer denunciations of his regime and himself published during the 
next regime, and even a short biography by Peter Gosztony. But, as Istvan Deak 
noted not long ago, there has been "an astounding lack of [comprehensive] 
biographies" of Hungary's admiral on horseback.1 
Sakmyster's biography is comprehensive and authoritative. It is compre-
hensive, since it describes and analyzes the actions taken by Horthy when these 
actions really mattered, that is, as a leader of the counter-revolution in 1918-
1920, and while he held office, between 1920 and 1944. To what extent holding 
office meant taking matters in charge is one of the basic issues the author 
tackles; the answer, of course, varies from decade to decade, from year to year. 
Generally, we are told, Horthy remained a ceremonial head of state between 
1920-1931, more "pro-active" thereafter. 
Sakmyster's treatment of his subject appears authoritative because it is 
utterly objective. Indeed, it is rather doubtful that anyone could have come up 
with a more objective treatment. Hungarian historians, sophisticated as they may 
be, cannot dodge the fact that sympathy or antipathy toward Admiral Horthy is 
still, even today, a litmus test of political allegiance. Sakmyster, however, is not 
a person born in Hungary, and is not a native speaker of Magyar but is among a 
handful of scholars who have attempted to and succeeded in mastering the 
intricacies of this most daunting language. The only historian with similar 
qualifications who has written about the period in detail was the Scotsman 
Carlyle Aylmer Macartney whose work, however, falls short of being impartial: 
while he wrote contemporary oral history, largely on the basis of interviews, 
almost all his informants happened to be royalists or members of the Hungarian 
establishment during the Horthy regime. 
Moreover, as far as I know, the author is not a native of, or spokesman 
for, some other East-Central European land. After all, among the most negative 
assessments of Horthy and his regime we find the works of those scholars, and 
others, who have adopted a Czech, Slovak, Serbian, or Romanian point of view. 
Perhaps their bias is excusable, for they have responded to Horthy in kind; he 
was, indeed, a biased person in many ways, something of an upper-class (actu-
ally, gentry class) Archie Bunker. Once the Treaty of Trianon went into effect, 
depriving historic Hungary of two-thirds of its territory and half of its popula-
tion, he did not hesitate to voice his hatred toward Hungary's neighbours, albeit 
reserving his strongest contempt for Communists and "Galician" (i.e., poor) 
Jews. While we must understand why the assessment of Horthy by some of 
Hungary's neighbours is biased, the fact of bias remains. 
How do I know that Sakmyster's work is "objective?" For one thing, his 
biography gives Horthy credit where credit is due, yet does not mince word in 
denouncing the man for his many weaknesses, beginning with the fact that he 
was not the right person to head a small countiy, wedged between two aggres-
sive great powers and surrounded by smaller foes. For another thing, Sakmyst-
er's assessment pretty much jibes with what one may read in my father's diary 
f rom 1944, the year of the German occupation, which the author has not read, or 
at least does not refer to. From his place of hiding, my father described Horthy, 
with unconcealed bitterness, as the wrong man at the wrong time: "chance has 
placed into the hands of this intellectually and morally mediocre person the fate 
of a country." 
Although this work will most likely prove the definitive biography, this is 
not to say that Sakmyster has told us everything we may wish to know about 
Horthy. Some personal, non-political details might have been added to clarify 
the contradictions. For instance, was Horthy a man of "sterling honesty" as the 
British ambassador believed (p. 152), agreeing with what seems to be Horthy's 
image of himself, or a "cunning rogue" as Hitler stated at one point (p. 309)? 
Sakmyster own assessment seems to be that Horthy was "never an adroit liar" (p. 
299). In fact, he refers to "Horthy's prevarications" (p. 54) at an early stage in 
his regency, good enough to pull the wool over the eyes of Western diplomats. 
Was Horthy a persecutor or a protector of the Jewish population of his 
country? Indeed, Horthy's ambiguous (to put it kindly) attitude towards Jews is 
a central theme of Sakmyster's work. Sakmyster gives us one side of this 
attitude when discussing the mass deportations during the first two months of the 
German occupation: "like Pontius Pilate, Horthy ... hoped to wash his hands of 
this distasteful matter" (p. 342). But then, as the author does not fail to note, 
Horthy did finally put his foot down. Having received information that the 
deportations were not for the sake of supplying Germany with needed manpower, 
Horthy did decide to challenge the occupation force. As the Einsatzkommandos, 
and especially their extreme right-wing Hungarian assistants, were all set to 
deport the Jews from the ghetto and "yellow-houses" of Budapest, he ordered 
loyal troops to surround and occupy his own capital city. It was an opportune 
moment, for the Nazi German leadership had its hands full with the Allies, who 
had just landed in Normandy. Perhaps to his own surprise, Horthy's sudden 
determination had the intended effect, the Jewish population of Budapest was 
saved by the counter-coup — at least for the time being. 
Did Miklos Horthy have the intellectual qualifications to lead a nation? 
According to the British ambassador, he was of "no great cleverness" (p. 152). 
According to Sakmyster himself, although he spoke several languages, Horthy 
lacked "clarity of vision," "political acumen" (p. 60). According to Deak, 
however, he was no less intelligent than Marechal Petain of Vichy-France, or 
Generalissimo Francisco Franco. Clearly, there were instances when Horthy's 
moves may even be viewed as shrewd. In October 1921 (in the Eastern regions 
of Europe October is when momentous events take place) Charles Habsburg, the 
pretendant to the thrones of Hungary and Austria, attempted a second comeback 
to Hungary, this time backed by a military force. Horthy's troops fought a 
pitched battle on the outskirts of Budapest and the pretendant was forced to give 
up. Thus Horthy was able to hold on to his regency, yet somehow managed to 
project the image of one who is not power-hungry, but willing to give up power 
when the interests of the country demand it; in fact, he continued to appear as 
even "Kaisertreu," that is, loyal to the Habsburg family. 
It may be irrelevant, but since there are a number of cryptic references to 
Horthy as a bridge-player and to his partners as being Jewish industrialists I, for 
one, would be curious to know, how good a player was he? How did the 
players interact around the bridge table? 
A description of other traits of Horthy's character might have been 
helpful. Was he a man of moral and physical courage? Was he the brave man 
who, once wounded, remained on the deck of his flagship to direct the naval 
battle at Otranto? Or, do we get a more accurate impression of his character 
when, on the eve of the German invasion of Hungary, brow-beaten by Hitler at 
their last meeting in Klessheim, he was cowed into submission; and again, on 
October 16, 1944, when he was cowed into appointing Ferenc Szalasi, the leader 
of the right-wing extremist Arrow-Cross movement whom he despised, as 
Hungary's next prime-minister? 
There were extenuating circumstances; indeed, it is hard to blame Horthy 
for acting like a family man and a father. Already in 1942 he had lost his older 
son, who had volunteered as a pilot on the Eastern Front. At dawn on October 
15th, when Horthy was on the verge of proclaiming the armistice he had 
negotiated with the Soviet Union, his remaining son, Miklos, was lured into a 
trap by the SS — by Otto Skorzeny, the selfsame officer who a year earlier had 
led a paratrooper detachment to free Mussolini — and was kidnapped (he was 
rolled into an oriental rug and loaded onto an awaiting German truck which sped 
away with him and his kidnappers). 
Indeed, some of the contradictions in Horthy's actions may be explained 
by circumstances of his private and family life, about which the reader might 
wish to know more. Circumstantial evidence suggests that some of his more 
admirable deeds must be credited, at least in part, to the influence and good 
sense of his wife and two sons. 
Furthermore, it might be worth the reader's while, in order to receive a 
more complete picture of Hungarian history of the period, to read Horthy's 
biography along with the equally excellent biography of one of his prime 
ministers, Istvan Bethlen, by Ignac Romsics.3 
My final question to Thomas Sakmyster is: what prompted him to write 
the biography of Horthy? Would he not have derived greater satisfaction from 
writing the biography of someone truly admirable? 
NOTES 
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Jutka Devenyi 
The emergence of the grotesque on the Hungarian theatrical scene in the 1960's 
and 1970's could easily be seen as an aesthetic manifestation of a strategy. As 
Hungarian literature gradually incorporates elements of the absurd of the European 
avant-garde, by way of transformation, it congeals these very elements into an 
aesthetic coating on bad medicine. The technique, constituting an an/aesthetic for 
the provocation and the eventual pacification of intense and often very complex 
emotions, is a survival aid for the past and the present: used to help erase 
memories of the horrors of the war, or, under the neo-Stalinist regime, to 
comfortably numb the sensory system. However, in the long run, the side-effects 
carry serious implications. As we shall see, the grotesque transforms the desire 
for living into death itself. 
Western audiences are usually not familiar with this typically East 
European anomaly.1 Particularly in Hungary, the Magyar language's resistance to 
translation aggravates the basic non-convertibility of feeling and form. The most 
widely per-formed Hungarian playwright of the grotesque, Istvan Orkeny remains 
relatively unknown in the West, although Pisti a verzivatarban (Pisti in the Blood 
Bath) was performed at the Seattle Annex Theatre in 1990. (The play focuses on 
Pisti, "Everyman", who is allowed to take on a series of identities in the time of 
an undefined political crisis only to realize that these identities have been 
prescribed for him in the first place.) In addition, Macskajdtek (Catsplay) was 
first presented in 1976 in Minneapolis by the Guthrie Theater, prefaced by 
Orkeny's own lecture addressing the issue of this uneasy mixture of Hungarian 
pleasure and pain. 
The ironic disjuncture between style and subject matter, as we might define 
the grotesque, could equally characterize absurdism as a dramatic style, since in 
its essence the absurd also positions perfectly normal characters in an abnormal 
situation, or, vice versa, abnormal characters in a normal situation. Both styles 
have their own inherent principles, which are imposed on the participating 
characters with unrelenting rigor. Thus the rules of the resulting dis/order might 
not resemble those of the world outside the stage, but they operate with the same 
consistency and cruelty. Aesthetically speaking, in both the grotesque and the 
absurd the contrast emerges between the horrible and the comic, stimulating 
intuitive rather than intellectual faculties. Moreover, both are strategic theatrical 
devices containing a host of components intended to achieve a certain end. The 
absurd, a dramatic form that abandons traditional devices of drama — such as 
meaningful dialogue, and normal characterization — aspires to awaken feelings 
of ambivalence and unease by frustrating the expectations of dramatic logic. The 
grotesque, although it also challenges traditional dramatic structures, has a 
different impact on its audience: it facilitates psychological release. The release 
is pleasant — albeit strictly temporary — as symptoms of devastating pain 
disappear into the rhapsody of what Charles Baudelaire, the French symbolist poet 
calls "absolute laughter," 
From now on onwards I shall call the grotesque 'the absolute comic' in 
antithesis to the ordinary comic, which I shall call 'the significative 
comic'. The latter is a clearer language, and one easier for the man in 
the street to understand, and above all easier to analyze, its element being 
visibly double — art and the moral idea. But the absolute comic, which 
comes much closer to nature, emerges as a unity which calls for the 
intuition to grasp it. There is but one criterion of the grotesque, and that 
is laughter, immediate laughter. Whereas with the significative comic it 
is quite permissible to laugh a moment late — there is no argument 
against its validity; it all depends upon one's quickness of analysis.2 
What seems unusual when one tries to apply Baudelaire's description to the 
post-war East European theatrical grotesque is that in this case, the intuition 
implied in the "absolute laughter" is a socially developed one. Therefore when 
we examine the relationship between the emergence of an aesthetic and a specific 
socio-political framework, fundamental dissimilarities appear between the absurd 
and the grotesque not merely with respect to the laughter they solicit but also in 
regards the context of such laughter. We can quite easily explore this context if 
we compare the plot structure of The Birthday Party (1958) by the British 
playwright Harold Pinter, and that of one of Orkeny's most popular plays in 
Hungary, Totek (The Toth Family, 1969).3 We may recapitulate the rather well 
known series of events in Pinter's The Birthday Party along the following lines: 
Two unexpected visitors arrive in the perfectly normal life of Petey and Meg, who 
for some time have been providing board for Stanley, a middle age man with a 
somewhat ambiguous past. They intend to take Stanley away and Stanley is afraid 
of them. Nobody understands the situation, and Stanley is apparently terrified but 
never makes any physical effort to escape the visitors, so finally they carry him 
away. Stanley is quite obviously broken yet shows no signs of resistance. 
Now let's summarize the plot of Orkeny's play, Totek. Toth and his wife 
live a quiet life in the countryside during the time of World War II. Their son is 
away in the army and they are worried about him. One day the Toths receive a 
letter from their son informing them about his Major's visit to the region. They 
decide to offer the Major their hospitality for their son's benefit. The Major takes 
a keen interest in Toth's occupation "dobozolas", the art of making boxes out of 
cardboard paper. However, the\Major's initial interest soon turns into an oppres-
sive nightmare: he insists on spending every single minute of his time making 
boxes, constantly harassing Toth. In an attempt to escape him Toth hides in the 
toilet. Yet even there the Major finds him, and the Toths can hardly wait for their 
"guest's" departure. The day arrives and the Major leaves to catch his train at the 
station. The Toths are about to settle back into their lives when the Major shows 
up at the door and announces that he has decided to stay on for a while. Mrs. 
Toth takes him to the second floor and kills him. 
The two situations are structurally similar. An alien visitor(s) enter into 
a normal situation but as the plot unfolds the arrival transforms the normalcy of 
the original set-up into absurdity. The character of the outsider is never revealed 
or framed in psychological terms (we will never know what exactly motivates the 
two strangers to take Stanley away, or why the Major becomes obsessed with the 
boxes). In fact, psychological motivations behind the force that disrupts the initial 
situation are left ambiguous intentionally. The difference between the two situ-
ations lies outside of the dramaturgical structure, in the definition of details and 
the concretization of nuances. 
Time and space are left undefined in The Birthday Party. The identity of 
the organization which sent the visitors is not clarified, neither is the nature of 
Stanley's association with it. The circumstances are too general to locate the plot 
in England if we disregard the obviously Anglo-Saxon names of the characters. 
The play sends out signs of undefined menace, guttural fear and general unease, 
but the relationship between these emotions and the current socio-economic 
situation is at best abstract. The play thus addresses the public on an existential 
level, where the aforementioned qualities (worry, horror and intimidation) are 
universalized and treated without specifics. 
In Totek careful attention is paid to contextualized details. The son is con-
scripted into the army, that of the Hungarian military of the Second World War. 
Relationships are perfectly clear: Toth's son is the Major's subordinate. The 
reason for the Major's visit is equally obvious — he is on leave. The parents wish 
to please the Major because their son's fate is in his hands, and finally kill him 
because, despite all this, they can no longer tolerate his imposition on their lives. 
The situation is quite evidently based on the Hungarian context, making the 
identification process relatively easy for the audience. Thus, the domestication of 
the details of a potentially absurd plot creates the Eastern European version of the 
grotesque. Orkeny himself addresses this point in his 1976 lecture, delivered on 
the occasion of the Guthrie Theater's performance of Catsplciy, from the point of 
view of a working playwright: 
W e prefer to locate our dramas in time and space concretely and 
precisely, and start the action from the past, either from an episode taken 
f rom our history, or with a typical situation of the present. We don't feel 
comfortable in a vacuum, we have to touch the ground in order to gain 
our energies from it. I believe this is the case because — as opposed to 
the French and British playwrights of the absurd — we haven't lost our 
interest in the present and the past.4 
On the basis of this comparison, we could say that Orkeny historicizes the 
absurd by way of specification and contextualization. While the absurd operates 
on an existential level without any particularly defined framework (see for 
instance, Harold Pinter's The Dumbwaiter, Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot, 
or Eugene Ionesco's The Bald Soprano), the same plays if presented in Hungary 
and adapted to the Hungarian situation, will create an altogether different mode. 
The new aesthetic is not the consequence of fundamental changes in tone or 
structure but that of "domestication" by members of the audience. In semiotic 
terms, receivers of the code define the style of the play: a particular community 
makes it or breaks it. In other words, the Hungarian audience (or in fact any East 
European audience) will create the grotesque out of the absurd by putting it into 
the context of their own situation. The spectators' identifications will be based on 
crossing the line between horrifying vision and menacing reality. 
Although both the grotesque and the absurd address "the existential tragic," 
i.e. suffering induced by being cast into the world, the grotesque as an aesthetic 
framework suggests that the imbalance between man and the world stems from 
social problems. This doesn't imply that the dark humour of the play is lessened 
in any way but, paradoxically, that it will produce a healing effect, rather than that 
of incomprehension or discomfort. Most Hungarian plays composed in the vein 
of the grotesque (Csurka: Doglott Aknak, 1971; Hazmestersirato, 1978; Orkeny: 
Verrokonok, 1974; etc.,) simultaneously foreground and ridicule the predicament 
of having to live a primarily "social existence" amidst the political and economic 
upheavals of Hungary. The political impetus and the resulting aesthetics converge 
in the use of a black humour that constantly pervades the main theme: the 
presentation of the common man against the monolithical State. This produces the 
East European equivalent of Arthur Miller's Willy Loman in Death of a Salesman, 
offering an altogether new kind of dramatic hero. The Hungarian drama critic, 
Erzsebet Ezsias sees the forces behind this phenomenon in the larger context of 
East European drama, but her point of view is closely related to Miller's argument 
that the common man has replaced the traditional tragic hero. As she points out: 
The Hungarian grotesque is the necessary consequence of changes in 
life-style and perspective: the traditional types of literary heroes seem 
outdated and devalued, while the life and problems of the common man 
are foregrounded. What characterizes its East European variants is valid 
for the Hungarian grotesque as well: the desire to amend through 
reprobation, to provide a "critique of the mundane."5 
Viewed from this perspective, the "devaluation" of the traditional hero 
affirms rather than eliminates some psychological responses traditionally 
associated with the tragic/comic dichotomy. By providing avenues for 
identification with the hero through laughter and pity, the grotesque produces a 
cathartic effect both in terms of rehearsing emotions in preparation for real life 
situations and by supplying a space for relief and recuperation. The plays are 
therapeutic in that they liberate the spectators of their fears and urge them to 
participate in a strategy of survival. The result is the formation of a community 
that "understands"; in fact, the public feels privileged, assuming that the play is 
particularly addressed to them as insiders. Members of the audience will deny 
that an outsider is capable of deciphering the message, thereby making their 
socio-aesthetic experiences an entitlement. This implies only one way of truly 
enjoying the play, in which the prerequisite of pleasure is thorough familiarity 
with the political context surrounding the piece. Initiation to such entitlement is 
only by fire, that is by living under the neo-Stalinist regime of Hungary. The 
"absolute laughter" thus becomes a social privilege. 
Hence the political and the aesthetic join forces in creating ties between 
members of the theatrical community. The psychology of laughter supports their 
sense of uniqueness: a rather poignant illustration of Freud's interpretation of the 
joke based on the dynamics of inferiority and superiority. As opposed to a typical 
audience response to the absurd, which includes feelings of bemused incompre-
hension and alienation, spectators of the grotesque gain a sense of superiority by 
resolving the inherent ambivalence in the tone through recourse to immediate, 
social experience. 
The potential for creating a community through the appropriation of a 
certain aesthetic is echoed through Orkeny's lecture, in which he points out the 
following differences between the absurd and the grotesque: 
...the western absurd is based upon the complete negation of com-
munication. We (Hungarians) also see humanity aimlessly roaming 
around in the age of the atomic bomb, but as individuals living in our 
uncomfortable situation at the border of two worlds, we have not lost our 
relationships. ...we go on understanding each other in our private lives 
as well as on the stage.6 
Orkeny assumes certain basic differences between the communication 
patterns of Western and Eastern European individuals, and typically addresses the 
Eastern European perspective only from a social point of view. Nonetheless, 
given the political climate in Hungary in the 1960's and 1970's, he is voicing an 
opinion shared by most writers of the period. As Orkeny's comments reveal, the 
East European grotesque distinguishes itself by responding to social rather than 
metaphysical paradoxes, with the implication that for most Hungarians 
metaphysical dilemmas would be considered a luxury in a pressing social 
situation. 
Orkeny continues to detail the differences between the absurd and the 
grotesque, yet again contextualizing them socially, this time focusing on dramatic 
action. He remarks on the main characters of Beckett's play, Waiting for Godot 
that, 
Vladimir and Estragon don't act, because waiting is a passive form of 
behavior. Vladimir and Estragon have neither a reason nor a goal to 
prompt them to act. In contrast, our characters —just like the ordinary 
and simple people in our countries — are active. This is not a question 
of temperament, but of experience. We have preserved our capacity for 
action, because more than once we have managed to change our lives 
through action.7 
In the lecture Orkeny doesn't examine the concept of action when he 
extends the theatrical to the world outside the stage. Inaction as the only possible 
response to a rapidly changing and completely irrational social reality doesn't 
emerge as a dramaturgical possibility from the East European point of view. The 
same attitude is evident in drama critic Erzsebet Ezsias's characterization of the 
absurd, which she contrasts to the grotesque on the basis of content. While 
maintaining that the grotesque attempts a social analysis, that it implies a complete 
action and provides venues for identification between hero and audience, she 
claims that the absurd, 
...does not contain a specific action that starts and ends at a definite 
point. In the absurd dramas there are only fragments of an action, which, 
however, don't possess any organic significance, as there is nothing in the 
plot they could propel. Time marking the invisible coordinates of life 
has disappeared, and as the vision has no time dimension, the duration 
of the play becomes accidental. The characters are not socially and 
psychologically distinguished representatives of humanity; mostly they 
are mere indications, abstractions, or bipedal symbols. Their dialogue is 
often limited to empty cliches and impersonal commonplaces. No change 
whatsoever occurs in their situation. Identification with these characters 
is not an imperative.8 
The comparison between the absurd and the grotesque reveals that in its 
East European version the grotesque becomes a perspective rather than a style. 
The perspective is the result of a particular geographical location as much as that 
of a shared historical past. The common experience creates a phenomenological 
sensitivity for both the playwright and his audience, who find their channel of 
communication in the grotesque, in the curious mixture of dark humour, 
alienation, melodrama and irony. Thus besides its ability to shape a theatrical 
community, the grotesque provides a framework which facilitates the 
transformation of a potentially subversive theme into laughter. 
The State understands the disarming qualities imbedded in the act of 
displacement, therefore the grotesque is frequently staged. Despite the inherent 
mobilizing capacity of the theatrical grotesque, its audience appears merely 
potentially, rather than actually subversive. Ties formed within the entitled group 
are emotional, intellectual, and above all ideological, but because the State's 
license to provide a new space for bondage is inherently deceptive, the 
revolutionary potential is suppressed by its very masquerade, as subversion is 
dispersed immediately after the spectators have left the auditorium. 
It is because of its impact on the Hungarian audiences and the resulting 
reconfirmation of the power of the State that the grotesque eventually turns into 
"bad medicine" failing to adequately address social problems. The treatment is 
symptomatic, which aggravates rather than eliminates suffering. The latent call 
for action in the final analysis of the grotesque, which Orkeny celebrates 
enthusiastically, dissipates through laughter. Thus the playwright, by allowing the 
audience to "blow o f f ' steam, involuntarily becomes an agent of the political 
status quo. Reinforcing the idea of uniqueness in the "insiders", the plays 
themselves support the containment of subversive energies. Audiences leave the 
theatre with a sense of relief and satisfaction and work out the ramifications of the 
tension created by the piece through discussing it in terms of its bravery or veiled 
subversion. 
NOTES 
'The grotesque doesn't emerge in isolation in Hungary; in fact, the analysis that 
follows is in part applicable to the plays of Tadeusz Rozewicz, Slawomir Mrozek, Vaclav 
Havel, and Marin Sorescu, written in neighbouring socialist countries and displaying quite 
similar ideological and aesthetic components. Because this essay looks at Totek in detail, 
I am focusing on the Hungarian variant of the East European grotesque. 
2Charles Baudelaire, "On the Essence of Laughter" [1855], in The Mirror of Art, 
trans, and ed. Jonathan Mayne (New York: Phaidon Press Ltd., 1955), pp. 131-153. 
3Robert Sarl6s's unpublished translation of Istvan Orkeny's play is the property of 
the University of California, Davis. For a published translation of Orkeny's novel based 
on his paly see: The Flower Show; The Toth Family, translators M.H. Hein and Clara 
Gyorgyey (New York: New Directions, 1982). 
4Istvan Ork6ny, "A kozep-eur6pai groteszk" [The Grotesque of Central Europe] 
Magyar Nemzet, April 4, 1992. p. 10. The following quotes are my translations from the 
Hungarian original. 
5Erzsebet Ezsids, Mai magyar drama [The Hungarian Drama of Today] (Budapest: 
Kossuth konyvkiado, 1986) pp. 16-17. The text appears in my translation. 
5Orkeny, "A kozep-europai groteszk," p. 10. 
7Ibid. 
8Ezsias, Mai magyar drama, pp. 14-15. 
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The Social Opposition: 
Labour in Post-Communist Hungary 
Sandor Agocs 
This essay aims to re-examine the development of the labour movement in post-
Communist Hungary from 1990 to 1994. In contrast to the rather narrow 
source-base of most work on the subject published in English, this study draws 
upon a full range of Hungarian sources: on newspaper reports and commentaries, 
as well as on interviews with union leaders, activists and Hungarian social 
scientists. It also relies on personal observations that the author made during 
extended stays in Hungary. Since the collapse of the Communist regime in 1990 
left virtually all of Hungary's industrial enterprises in state hands, the role, as 
earlier studies appearing in English have observed, government played in labour-
relations was overwhelming. The government was then the nation's chief 
employer. The state was also responsible for universal health care and old age 
pensions. Since labour committed itself to maintain these benefits, our descrip-
tion of the fate of the labour movement in post-Communist Hungary must 
necessarily present — unlike the bargaining process that takes place in the West 
— a confrontation between government and labour that involves larger issues 
than the interests of union members (i.e. wages and working conditions), issues 
that affect the wellbeing of the entire population. 
After 1989 unemployment fast became one of labour's greatest concerns. 
Virtually unknown under Communist rule, it began to grow by leaps and bounds 
after the change of regime and had risen to nearly 14% of the active labour force 
by January 1993.1 This development created very serious problems for the 
government. The sudden need to build a social safety net for the newly unem-
ployed more or less from scratch caused massive hemorrhaging in a state budget 
already burdened by huge deficits. As for the workers, the impact of the 
avalanche of unemployment was devastating. In a remarkable series of articles 
published in the daily Pesti Hirlap during the Spring of 1991, Andras Rozsa 
surveyed the workers' attitudes. The refrain of their statements was fear. They 
feared losing their jobs and were worried about not being able to support their 
families. They were reluctant to talk to journalists. "If you open your mouth 
you'll find yourself on the street." And after "they" kick you out, you had still 
better be quiet if you. don't want "the relatives who work in the plant to get into 
trouble." This mind-numbing, totalitarianoid fear appeared to be the basic 
determinant of the labour-management relationship in democratic Hungary. The 
perception of "us" (the workers) and "them" (the managers) whose interests were 
in conflict had existed already in the Communist era. But now the managers 
acquired even greater power of intimidation as they implemented the drastic 
reduction of the labour force.2 
A public opinion survey revealed that by the end of 1992 unemployment was 
generally considered the country's most important social problem. What made 
the situation especially aggravating for people was that they felt they could not 
depend on the organizations of labour to protect their interests. When asked by 
Rozsa and other journalists about the unions, the workers gave responses like 
"they do nothing but collect dues," and "they don't care about us." This popular 
mistrust was demonstrated by the fact that in a Gallup survey done in June 1991 
the unions came in last among the social and political institutions "that work for 
the people's well-being," scoring 35 out of a potential 100. The churches were 
judged the most useful, with a score of 60. Because of this crisis of reprosenta-
tive institutions — to quote Laszlo Lengyel, an economist and social commenta-
tor — "the worker was not in a bargaining position."3 
Labour leader Sandor Nagy complained of fragmentation. "There is no 
solidarity among the workers," he said, "only individual survival strategies; yet 
only through joint action can the employees hope to defend their interests." This 
indifference toward "joint action" and the unions was in part a residue of the 
Hungarian workers' experience with the labour movement under the Communist 
regime. The union had then been a tool of the Party's policies; a "transmission 
belt" of its power. When the Communist era ended, Nagy was the head of the 
National Council of Trade LTnions (Szakszervezetek Orszagos Tanacsa, SZOT), 
the monolithic organization into which the regime had herded all the unions. 
SZOT's real purpose was clearly shown by the fact that Nagy was also a member 
of the Party's Central Committee. The organizations of labour served the Party 
more than they served the workers. Rudolf L. Tokes was not far from the truth 
when he wrote that while the Communists were in power, the unions "did many 
things, but failed to represent their members' interests at the places of work." 
But those "many things" — subsidized cultural activities, organized 
holidays and mortgages at low rates of interest — were fast becoming things of 
the past by 1991. The unions tried to ease the pain caused by runaway inflation 
by buying consumer goods, from panty-hose to milk and meat, wholesale and 
reselling them to members at cost. But labour now faced massive, permanent 
layoffs, something they had never experienced during the Communist regime, 
when a job had been everybody's for the taking. And the unions seemed unable 
to do anything about this crisis.4 
Labour's Fragmentation and Infighting Draws Public Anger 
The collapse of the Communist system left the Hungarian labour movement 
divided against itself. In 1991 there were seven major union groupings in the 
country: 
1. Magyar Szakszervezetek Orszagos Szdvetsege: Hungarian Confederation 
of Trade Unions (MSZOSZ). 
2. Autonom Szakszervezetek Orszagos Koordinacioja: National Coordina-
tion of Autonomous Trade Unions (AUTONOMOK). 
3. Szakszervezetek Egyiittmukodesi Foruma: Trade Union Cooperation 
Forum (SZEF). 
4. Ertelmisegi Szakszervezeti Tomoriiles: Intellectual Workers' Alliance 
(ESZT). 
5. Munkastandcsok Orszagos Szdvetsege: National Federation of Wor-
kers' Councils (MOSZ). 
6. Szolidaritas Szakszervezeti Munkasszovetseg: Solidarity Workers' Trade 
Union Federation (SZOLIDARITAS). 
7. Fiiggetlen Szakszervezetek Demokratikus Ligaja: Democratic League of 
Independent Trade Unions (LIGA). 
This division was rooted in the conditions of the waning years of 
Communist rule. During the late 1980s "alternative," dissident organizations 
increasingly challenged the monopoly position of SZOT. By 1988, since it could 
not successfully fight them, SZOT had joined the alternative unions in attacking 
the Communist Party and the government, and thus became instrumental in the 
regime's collapse. In March 1990 SZOT held its 26th and last Congress, which 
declared itself the "founding congress" of MSZOSZ. The election of Sandor 
Nagy as the president of the new organization was met with thundering applause 
by the delegates. He had made himself popular among union members by 
standing up to the Communist government. Nagy eventually resigned from the 
Party's Central Committee and attempted to turn the unions into real advocates 
of the workers' interests. In doing so he drew upon himself the ire of conserva-
tives within the Party. But these actions did not save MSZOSZ from being 
labelled "Communist" later on, and attacked on the grounds of its questionable 
legitimacy. 
MSZOSZ, facing intense competition from the other unions, looked like 
a wounded giant in 1990. The organization still claimed 2.5 million members, 
about half the country's labour force. Its members were spread over the occupa-
tional spectrum, but in certain occupational areas MSZOSZ faced extinction. 
Some of the old SZOT's branches refused to join its successor and established 
themselves as separate federations. AUTONOMOK, one such organization, 
claimed a membership of 350,000. Employees of the various lines of the 
chemical industry provided the largest part of its membership, but AUTONOM-
OK had branch organizations in the public services as well, such as transporta-
tion and energy. SZEF, another federation that was born out of the breakup of 
SZOT, in 1990 claimed 708,000 members. Almost all of them were public 
sector employees, such as educators, administrative, health and social care 
employees. ESZT, with a membership of 100,000, gathered together those 
working in higher education and scientific research. 
Three other union groupings had emerged as "alternative" organizations of 
labour during the waning days of the Communist regime. M O S Z was at first the 
factory extension of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), the party that 
became the leading force of the first democratic government. After the 1990 
elections, MOSZ declared itself independent, but the attempt to break out of the 
MDF's orbit was never fully successful and became a source of conflict within 
the federation's leadership. MOSZ's membership, about 100,000, came chiefly 
from among factory workers. SZOLIDARITAS, another new union, also carried 
the word "worker" in its name, claiming that its 230,000 members included not 
only industrial, but also agricultural and intellectual "workers." LIGA, the 
seventh of the union configurations, was born and remained a die-hard opponent 
of SZOT and its successor MSZOSZ, advertising itself as "the other union." 
LIGA claimed that two-thirds of its 100,000 members came from blue-collar 
occupations. In its locals and regional organizations, however, intellectuals, 
especially teachers, played an important role.5 
The need for coordination among these ideologically diverse and competing 
federations of labour was obvious. However, an important and widely-publicized 
attempt to bring them together in "round table" talks collapsed in January 1991. 
Commentaries in the newspapers and especially union members' "letters to the 
editor" sized up the situation as a clear sign of the unions' inability to come to 
terms with a situation that demanded joint action. To these critical voices the 
President of the Republic Arpad Goncz added his. The grandfatherly President 
— Uncle Arpi, as he was nicknamed — who consistently showed up first among 
public figures in popularity polls, offered to mediate in the "suicidal" conflict 
among the federations. If it continued, he said, it would lead not only to the 
disintegration of the labour movement, but would threaten even the country's 
political stability. President Goncz received delegations from the various 
federations. Aware of a growing "existential fear" among the population, he was 
to remind the congress of LIGA that the unions have to be "instruments of social 
conscience."6 
MSZOSZ Takes on the Government 
In line with the President's perception of the role that the unions should play, 
MSZOSZ increasingly adopted a militant stance, assuming the role of a "social 
opposition" and challenging "the current power structure," which according to 
the union, was carrying out policies "contrary to the interests of working 
people." On June 3, 1991 MSZOSZ initiated a discussion with the government 
in order to "reduce social tensions." Its delegation, led by Sandor Nagy, brought 
a nine-point program to the table. Aside from guaranteeing jobs to young people 
at the beginning of their working careers, the union demanded that the govern-
ment deal with several aspects of unemployment and job security, that a voice be 
given to employees and their organizations in the privatization process, shares 
for them in the privatized enterprises, and severance pay if they should lose their 
jobs. The union also demanded that the government work out a "social package" 
addressing the problems of low-income families, and that it raise minimum 
wages across the country.7 
After the first discussions, the union omitted demands such as a govern-
ment guarantee of jobs for young people and the shortening of the work week, 
which the government proved unwilling to consider. As for the remaining six 
demands, Gyula Kiss, the Labour Minister, and Gyorgy Schamschula, the State 
Secretary of the Ministry, played out something of a "good cop-bad cop" routine. 
The Minister said that MSZOSZ was "banging on open doors" with its demands; 
that there was an "agreement of intentions" between the government and the 
union. The only disagreement was about timing. But when the union pressed 
for a schedule of the measures to be introduced, and also for details, Scham-
schula snapped that in "high-level negotiations like these, it is not appropriate to 
work out the details." MSZOSZ, he said, did not want an agreement, "but a 
confrontation" between its members and the power of the state, "and that will 
end with the little guys losing."8 The conflict continued to escalate. On June 8, 
MSZOSZ declared that the government had offered nothing but obscure prom-
ises, and organized a strike committee. It called for a two-hour nation-wide 
"warning strike" on June 13 if an agreement had not been reached by then.9 
The First Trial of Strength: A Call for a General Strike 
The threat of a general strike brought on an angry reaction from the government. 
Its spokesmen cried "blackmail" and they repeated the government's position 
over and over again: "Steps which will create social tension, and which lead to 
organizing strikes and demonstrations endanger the country's stability as well as 
investments both of internal and foreign origin, thereby threatening the living 
standards of the population. Especially now, at the beginning of the tourist 
season, it is important that Hungary appear an attractive and safe country to the 
world." To this Mihaly Kupa, the Minister of Finance, added a strong warning 
about the dire consequences of further deficits. Yet in the next breath he 
contradicted himself and made it known that 15 billion forints (about US $200 
million) would be allocated for social projects over and above the sums origi-
nally planned. One hand waving the stick and the other holding out the carrot? 
The government announced its willingness to continue negotiating, and suggested 
in fact that it was carrying on parallel negotiations with the two "alternative" 
federations: LIGA and MOSZ.10 
The government's success in playing up one segment of the labour move-
ment against another was strongly suggested by these two federations' rejection 
of the MSZOSZ strike call. The central leadership of MOSZ condemned the 
call, suggesting that MSZOSZ was attempting to get a "separate deal." This 
accusation was not without irony given the fact that MOSZ apparently agreed to 
participate in separate negotiations with the government at the time. In fact, this 
federation assumed positions almost identical to those of the government. In 
rejecting the strike call, their communique talked of "blackmail" and the "danger 
to social peace," as well as the economic damage caused by the strike threat, 
since it would scare away foreign investment." 
LIGA also announced that it would conduct separate negotiations with the 
government and presented a list of "themes." These gave the impression of an 
essentially watered-down, less costly version of the MSZOSZ demands. LIGA 
called for a meeting of all the federations to reconcile their positions. At the 
same time it condemned the strike call, since it broke up the "unity of the labour 
movement." Csaba Ory, one of LIGA's leaders, said that the strike call had 
created a dangerous situation, bringing a "hysterical union" into conflict with "a 
government policy very insensitive to social issues." "The country is not in the 
mood for a strike," he declared.12 
The leadership of MSZOSZ was claiming just the opposite, arguing that 
their membership supported the use of the strike weapon. "We have surveyed 
the mood carefully" said Sandor Nagy after touring union locals across the 
country. But on June 10, when he announced this, he conceded that only 220 of 
his 400 construction industry locals had responded so far to the strike call, and 
only 170 of them had approved it. Nagy presented the 170 approving votes as a 
positive sign: but they clearly showed that the support among the locals was 
much less than total. 
The Union Locals Cooperate 
The strike call went out in the West Hungarian town of Szekesfehervar. How 
poignant all this was: spokesmen outlining the government's position about the 
strike also announced that the last Soviet soldier would leave the country within 
a month. In Szekesfehervar, where a Soviet armoured division had been based 
square in the middle of town since 1945, this newly-won freedom had to be 
demonstrated. On June 6 people carrying large placards and chanting anti-
government slogans marched across town and held a protest meeting. It was 
significant that the call for the demonstration had been issued by the local 
leadership of both MSZOSZ and LIGA, usually bitter opponents. A letter sent 
to Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, complaining about rising unemployment, carried 
the signatures of both of these organizations. Even the Szekesfehervar locals of 
MOSZ signed it, although they later announced that they would not support the 
strike.13 
The strike call, once set in motion, created a dynamism of its own, which did 
not necessarily coincide with the aims of the central union leadership. One 
cannot say that the eventual coming together of labour was a direct result of 
what happened in places like Szekesfehervar; yet these events, showing the 
members' inclination toward coordinated action, pushed the leaders of the 
federations toward cooperation. On June 12, the day before the MSZOSZ strike 
date, the government spokesmen were still speaking of holding separate talks 
with the "independents" MOSZ and LIGA. But on the same day six of the 
federations — with SZOLEDARITAS absent — worked out and signed a joint 
statement which was not far in content from MSZOSZ's six-point list of de-
mands. President Goncz, who had invited the labour leaders for a talk the 
previous day, might have had something to do with the surprise agreement. At 
the same time, the National Association of Entrepreneurs issued a statement 
urging a "much greater willingness to negotiate" not only on the part of the 
unions, but the government as well.14 
The government did indeed show "much greater willingness to negotiate" 
when it faced a united front of six labour federations. As a result, an agreement 
was reached on the evening of June 12, just about twelve hours before the strike 
was to begin. LIGA made what looked like a last attempt to steal MSZOSZ's 
show, by inviting the other federations to a meeting with the government to be 
held the following day. The government, which delegated a deputy secretary of 
state to conclude and sign the agreement with MSZOSZ, sent Laszlo Surjan, the 
Welfare Minister, to the meeting with LIGA. But by an ironic turn of events, 
what Surjan did was to announce the agreement signed by MSZOSZ in the name 
of six federations, including LIGA. In the deal the government promised action 
aimed at giving a say to the employees' organizations in the privatization 
process; to use some of the money gained from privatization for job creation; to 
secure severance pay to those who lost their jobs; and to address other issues 
involving the minimum wage and the living conditions of low-income families. 
The MSZOSZ strike committee, claiming victory, thanked the other federations 
for their support and goodwill. Even so, Csaba Ory, the Vice President of 
LIGA, showed everything but goodwill. On the day the agreement was signed, 
he declared it MSZOSZ's "attempt to escape" the problem of its illegitimacy. 
The strike call, he said, "had done more damage than good."15 
The Conflict among Labour Federations Continues 
The June 12 agreement, which, according to MSZOSZ added 5 billion forints to 
the employees' incomes in one way or another, brought the federations together 
but did not bridge the differences between them. Continuing internal struggles 
within the leadership of MOSZ led to the disengagement of this federation from 
another agreement reached on June 25 about the division of the old SZOT 
patrimony among the federations. Imre Palkovics, the President of MOSZ, 
declared that the union's Vice President (who had signed the deal) had not been 
authorized to do so. Palkovics announced that he intended to propose legislation 
in Parliament (he was a Member in the ranks of the MDF) to solve the problem 
of the division of SZOT property. The other federations protested, saying that 
this was an internal matter for the labour movement to resolve. LIGA at first 
walked out of the negotiations, but after asking for the tape of the discussions, 
decided to sign the final agreement. And so it went: the unions coming together 
and dividing again. The infighting within the labour movement, often triggered 
by politicking inside given federations, continued. The first serious test of 
strength between the government and the unions in June settled the question of 
whether labour would be a factor in the life of democratic Hungary. But it also 
confirmed, even dramatized the conflicts among the unions.16 
As for the government, which the unions accused of being "anti-labour," 
the shadow-boxing involved in the June strike-call and the subsequent compro-
mise did involve some loss of face. In attempting damage control, its communi-
que pointed out that it had not really given in under pressure, since "the demands 
drawn up by MSZOSZ coincided with the steps the government had planned in 
order to solve the very same problems ." In mentioning ways of resolving these 
problems, the communique also suggested that the government had not really 
assumed concrete obligations. Many, if not most of the issues involved in the 
agreement would have to go to Parliament, where even the opposition parties —-
except the Socialists, who, as "ex-Communists," faced like MSZOSZ continuous 
questioning of their legitimacy — had condemned the strike call. Or else they 
would end up in the Conciliation Council (Erdekegyezteto Tanacs) a triangular 
organization which included representatives of the government, the employers, 
and the employees, but which had no legislative power and could only recom-
mend action. But to say that all labour got were promises would be misrepre-
senting the situation. The events of the hot and tense June days forced the 
government to confront social problems and to revise its social agenda; or, as 
most labour spokesmen, even those who represented "independent" unions, 
repeatedly pointed out, come up with the social policy that it did not have before 
the June strike call.17 
MSZOSZ had won a victory of a kind at the expense of its opponents 
and tormentors, LIGA and MOSZ. These had shown themselves inconsistent, 
hesitant, and on occasion, subservient to the government. MSZOSZ had fought 
for improvements in pensions and the minimum wage, issues involving, in one 
way or another, almost the whole population of the country, and not just the 
interests of its members or organized labour as a whole. The question of 
MSZOSZ's legitimacy — that perennial argument of the "independent" unions 
and spokesmen for the coalition parties — had become rather meaningless. Yet 
the celebratory announcement of MSZOSZ's strike committee at the end of June 
that "several points of the agreement have already been fulfilled" was countered 
by union President Nagy's warning that the attainment of some parts of the 
agreement, like the provision for severance pay, would take a long time, since 
they required parliamentary action. He could have added the need for eventual 
enforcement by the courts, since some of the employers would obviously simply 
ignore the provisions even if they became law. The MSZOSZ victory celebra-
tions were somewhat premature, in fact self-defeating. As the editorial writer of 
the daily Magyar Hirlap pointed out, if indeed the government met some of the 
union's demands with promises that they did not intend to fulfill, this "success 
propaganda" would almost certainly backfire: the newly-gained credibility of the 
union's leadership would be diminished among the members and future strike 
calls might go unanswered.18 
The General Strike Fails as Labour's Weapon 
This indeed happened later the same year. To back its demands — which to a 
large extent suggested that the union was refighting the June battle — MSZOSZ 
called a two-hour general strike on December 17, 1991. The strike, when it 
came, was anything but general: on the morning of December 17 the strike 
committee conceded that only 28 of MSZOSZ's 69 member organizations had 
walked out, the others having reported that they would support the union's 
demands "by other means," such as signing solidarity declarations or hoisting 
blue flags at the plants' entrances. At the VIDEOTON factory in Szekesfehervar, 
where eventually the labour force was reduced by 80%, only a few workers went 
on strike. The rest signed protest declarations. Janos Feher, secretary of 
MSZOSZ's VIDEOTON local, talked of the employees' "fear" of losing their 
jobs as an explanation for their lack of support. He was not alone in pointing to 
this factor in the virtual collapse of the strike, in which no more than 5-10% of 
the labour force appears to have participated. Newspapers reported managers 
threatening would-be strikers with firing. The failure of the strike was in part 
caused by division within the labour movement. After some talk of support, the 
"independent" federations failed to heed the strike call. This time it was LIGA 
that came to the defense of the government, asserting that MSZOSZ's demands, 
if conceded, would sink the budget. Sandor Nagy argued in vain that his union's 
demands would cost the Treasury only 40 billion forints (about US $ 3 0 0 
million) and not the 100 billion (about US $ 8 0 0 million) that LIGA claimed. 
But the strike attempt was a clear failure, showing that labour would have to 
give up the general strike as its weapon.19 
In calling for general strikes the leadership of MSZOSZ acted out a condi-
tioning acquired during the years of Communist domination when, as western 
observers like Richard B. Freeman, Derek C. Jones, and others rightly pointed 
out, the central leadership of labour dealt with the centre of political power, the 
Party and the government. The end of what Jones called "centralized wage 
determination" and Freeman "state wage and price setting," obviously would 
bring about a decentralization of bargaining. This change was not immediate, 
however, because the state had retained a strong presence in the economy. State 
ownership was rapidly diminishing — it had reportedly fallen by about 50% by 
1993 — but in April 1994 the State Property Agency still controlled 1,100 of the 
1,800 enterprises that it had held at the time of the old regime's collapse. Thus 
bargaining would still have to involve the government. Unfortunately many of 
the enterprises remaining in the agency's hands were hopeless cases, and had no 
chance of survival in the new market economy. The government and Parliament, 
struggling with huge budget deficits — in part because they tried to maintain 
jobs at these enterprises — were very resentful and uncompromising targets for 
the general strike. Furthermore the uncertainty and fear related to job losses 
made the workers reluctant to take part in general strikes: they had their hands 
full with pressing local issues such as saving their jobs, issues that brought them 
into conflict with the managements of their workplaces. Labour's struggle had 
begun to turn f rom centralized negotiations to local, plant-by-plant confronta-
tions. The leadership of MSZOSZ had to come to terms with the fact that the 
labour's efforts would increasingly evolve on the local level, in bargaining 
conducted, as the "alternative" unions would have it, with the owners of particu-
lar enterprises.20 The "alternative" unions had in fact emerged during the waning 
years of the Communist regime, because — unlike the official union, SZOT — 
they had addressed local problems. Their links to western organizations, 
especially the help — in the form of advice and funds — offered LIGA by the 
AFL-CIO, also directed their attention towards local bargaining. Thus LIGA 
Vice-President Csaba Ory urged a turn toward "workplace-level" (munkahelyi 
szintii) action as early as 1991.21 
During the early autumn of 1993 reports about a wave of local strikes 
began to appear in the newspapers, a fact suggesting that Ory might indeed have 
had a point. In October 1993 MSZOSZ invited labour leaders f rom Austria, 
Holland, and Germany to serve as the main speakers at a conference on collec-
tive bargaining. President Nagy, addressing the meeting, spoke of the Hungari-
ans' lack of expertise and experience in such negotiations. He also expressed 
alarm about the increasing splintering of MSZOSZ. At the time of SZOT's 
disintegration over 100 of these organizations were attached to SZOT, but by the 
Fall of 1993 only 59 remained. This splintering, Nagy argued, had left labour 
impotent and unable to conclude collective agreements, and weak because of the 
lack of strike funds. It was in such condition that Hungarian labour was 
apparently heading toward a "westernization": workplace-level bargaining, a new 
phenomenon, was becoming more frequent. This offered advantages, including 
the fact that such agreements had much better chance of being carried out since 
they were "owned" by the contracting parties. This system of bargaining brought 
an increasing localization of labour's efforts, which in turn generated a pressure 
toward uniting labour — a tendency prevailing currently in the West — since 
only large organizations could provide the sophisticated and costly research and 
legal facilities and, what's more important, the strike funds needed to make the 
workers' interests prevail. The persistence of industry-wide bargaining pointed to 
the growing importance of the MSZOSZ, which, because it was large, had more 
resources, both organizational and financial, than the "alternative unions." But it 
also suggested that the need for cooperation among the ideologically diverse 
federations of labour would become more and more acute as time passed.22 
The Conciliation Council Brings the Labour Federations Together 
After the failure of the December 1991 general strike attempt, Hungarian labour 
increasingly resorted to another means, negotiations within the Conciliation 
Council. This organization brought together the government, the employers — 
represented by organizations like the National Association of Entrepreneurs — 
and the unions. Labour's turn toward the Conciliation Council coincided with 
the government's recognition of the necessity for dialogue with a society that 
was becoming increasingly hostile. The Council had been created in 1988, 
during the last full year of Communist rule, by a government encountering 
massive popular hostility. It was to be used for dialogue carried on outside the 
political framework, which was discredited and on the verge of collapse. The 
new democratic government first tended to ignore the Council because it was a 
creature of the Communists. But increasing labour troubles, culminating during 
late October 1990 in a taxi strike that paralyzed traffic in Budapest, drove home 
the point that contact with society between elections was needed. From 1991 the 
Conciliation Council became active, dealing with an increasing number of issues. 
This was in the government's interest in more than one way. By discussing 
pressing budgetary and social issues as well as legislative proposals in the 
Council, the government gathered information about the temper of the country. 
Furthermore, since the Council had no legislative but only an advisory function, 
the government gained time. The discussions in the Council also promised 
compromise solutions, a chance to avert explosions such as calls for general 
strikes, which even if eventually recalled were nerve-racking for the politicians.23 
As for labour, the hope for carrying on negotiations without strike action 
was not the only motivation in accepting the Council as a way of dealing with 
problems. Participation also brought the ideologically diverse federations 
together.24 It took the government six weeks to become resigned to the division 
of SZOT property agreed upon by the labour federations. The final treaty 
became part of a larger agreement reached in the Conciliation Council during 
late November 1992. Labour, presenting a united front, gained concessions that, 
if carried out, would add 36 billion forints (about US$ 300 million) to the 
budget. The government promised an increase in the minimum wage; reductions 
in some of the new sales taxes that it had planned to introduce (medicines and 
household electricity were now to be exempted); increases in family allowances; 
and a commitment that the age of retirement would not be increased for women 
until 1995. Furthermore, public service employees would get a pay raise, instead 
of having their wages frozen as the government had originally planned. These 
concessions followed the pattern of the agreement reached in June 1991: they 
involved the interests of a broad spectrum of society and not only those of union 
members. However, at this time the nation's jobless came out losers: the 
duration of unemployment compensation was reduced from 18 months to 12.25 
Was this agreement one more move by the government to appear willing 
to respond to problems while really "passing the buck"? Mihaly Kupa, the 
Finance Minister resorted to tautology when justifying "why the government's 
concessions went to the extreme limit": he spoke of "serious societal and social 
tensions." Even so, other members of the government openly attacked Kupa for 
having been "too accommodating" in his negotiations. In doing so, they ignored 
the real social tensions abroad in the country: railroad workers and coal miners 
talked of strikes; the elderly and retired were up in arms and organizing; and the 
actions of a grassroots coalition of the poor occupied the front pages of the 
newspapers. Soon Kupa was to be dismissed as Finance Minister altogether. 
Gyula Kiss, the Labour Minister, still showing hostility toward the unions instead 
of the protective goodwill labour ministers in western countries demonstrate, 
spoke of union "blackmail." Yet in spite of the disagreement within the govern-
ment, Hungarians noticed that something truly new had occurred in the Concilia-
tion Council. Laszlo Lengyel, a consistent critic of the government, praised it 
for once: "For the first time in Hungary and Eastern Europe a government has 
managed to come to an agreement with employers and employees about the next 
year's budget." The history-making first was recognized abroad too. Sandor 
Nagy, returning from a visit to Brussels in January, 1993, announced that the 
European Community — shocked at that time by the Danish rejection of the 
Maastricht Treaty and recognizing the need for dialogue between government 
and society — would give Hungary one million ECU to foster such dialogue. 
Most of the money was to be used in support of the Conciliation Council.26 
Things looked good, but many expected that the government would 
eventually back out of the agreement reached in the Council. Some questioned 
for instance whether the government could deliver at all on its promises. The 
MDF-led coalition held, of course, a majority in Parliament, but it was falling 
into disarray by the summer of 1993. Internal struggles within the two parties 
that constituted the main Parliamentary base of the government, the MDF and 
the Smallholder Party, undermined its ability to pass legislation. Furthermore, 
the Conciliation Council agreement represented a challenge to the authority of 
Parliament as the arbiter of the country's affairs by facing it with something of a 
fait accompli, reviving the old antipathy toward labour even among the opposi-
tion parties. Under tremendous pressure not only from within its own coalition 
parties, but also because of a growing deficit, the government presented budget 
proposals during the summer of 1993 that withdrew some of the concessions of 
the November 1992 agreement. They increased the sales tax, for instance, and 
froze the salaries of public service employees, including teachers, for 1994.27 
The teachers were not alone in facing the new regime with a growing 
mistrust. Many Hungarians were asking whether the coming of democracy 
meant that agreements between major representative institutions and the govern-
ment had no real meaning; that concessions granted could be taken back, gains 
won in hard bargaining lost, and labour's wars fought again and again over the 
same terrain. The Conciliation Council was apparently caught up in such a 
situation, but this was not necessarily permanent. During the last months of 
1993, the government again proceeded to "throw money at the people," as one 
sarcastically-inclined commentator put it, describing the promises then made in 
the Council. The parties that constituted the government were disastrously low 
in the polls and elections were scheduled for the Spring of 1994. Typically one 
of the last agreements negotiated in the Council in 1993 offered a tax-break to 
virtually the entire population by making the payments due to Social Security -—-
10% of one's salary — tax-deductible. This promised to leave large sums in the 
pay-packets of employees. The show went on: the unions demanded, and the 
government gave in to the "blackmail."28 
Postscript 
The concessions made in the Conciliation Council did not save the government. 
It suffered a disastrous defeat in the 1994 elections. The Socialists, who 
presented an essentially social-democratic program, won a 52% majority. During 
the electoral campaign they talked of a "social contract," an economic and wage 
program to be worked out in the Conciliation Council. A number of labour 
leaders, including Sandor Nagy, who eventually resigned his union leadership, 
ran and won a socialist parliamentary seat. Yet the new government did not 
succeed in bringing the "social contract" together. The explanation for this 
failure was primarily the constraint in wages and social benefits that the govern-
ment, facing huge budget-deficits, had to impose. Negotiations in Council, often 
deadlocked, tend to deal nowadays with the specific demands of the public 
service unions, and rarely with national issues. This is in part due to the fact 
that the MSZOSZ, which used to bring to the Council issues that went beyond 
the sphere of industrial relations and involved the interests of large segments of 
the population, such as the rising cost of medicines and the diminishing value of 
pensions, or the living conditions of low-income families, had become much 
weaker by the middle of the 1990s. Once it had claimed 2.5 million members, 
but by the summer of 1996 it reportedly had only 500.000. In contrast to the 
public service unions, like the teachers', which retained substantial memberships, 
the unions that belong to the MSZOSZ lost members rapidly as the old flagships 
of socialist industry were privatized. They shrank if they did not disappear 
altogether. Thus the issue is not anymore whether the union born out of the 
Communist era SZOT is legitimate: nationwide elections held in 1993 for the 
Workplace Councils and the Social Security and Pension Boards — uniquely 
Hungarian events — gave MSZOSZ a comfortable primacy among the organiza-
tions of labour. As time passes not the legitimacy of MSZOSZ but the very 
existence of its locals seems to be in question. 
In fact, this applies to some extent to the whole union movement. While 
the Communists were in power, with all the unions herded into the official 
SZOT, this claimed to represent almost the entire labour force. By the summer 
of 1995 only about 30% of the 4 million employees were reportedly members of 
a union.29 During the summer of 1996 when this essay was completed there 
were signs of an increasing ferment in labour activism across the nation, suggest-
ing that the budget restraints imposed by the government and its financial 
policies designed to reduce consumption had gone beyond the limits people were 
willing to tolerate. In response to threats of large-scale strikes by health 
workers, teachers and others, there were promises of wage-concessions, and 
members of the government talked of finally negotiating the "social pact," and 
thereby revitalizing the Conciliation Council. 
It remains to be seen whether this will really happen, and if it does, what 
the much weakened six labour federations — SZOLDDARITAS had dropped out 
of the Council — can win in negotiating with a Socialist-led government that by 
a supreme historical irony is working hard to stabilize a capitalist system. 
Members of the government often claim that it is pro-labour, but on national 
television one labour-leader after another questions this. 
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Hungarians and Americans or, at least, Hungarians and Americans who were 
knowledgeable about the world, have known about each other ever since the 
birth of the American Republic. However, the awareness about Amerika by the 
less then highly-educated members of the Hungarian public did not start to 
emerge until the 1840s, while a similar knowledge about Hungary in the US was 
not born until the visit of Louis Kossuth to the American Republic in 1851. 
Thereafter, certain historical developments tended to rekindle the mutual interest 
of these two nations in each other. In Hungary, the great expansion of economic 
opportunities in the United States during the last decades of the 19th century 
attracted attention, as did America's gradual rise to great power status in the first 
half of the 20th century. In the United States, the coming of thousands of the 
refugees of the 1848-1849 Hungarian War of Independence, the participation of 
many of these ex-soldiers in the American Civil War and, in the three-and-a-half 
decades before 1914, the arrival of over a million economic migrants from 
Hungary, contributed to a greater interest in, and knowledge of, things Hungar-
ian. In the twentieth century, Hungary's role in the international arena also 
attracted the attention of America's diplomats and statesmen, and after the 
Revolution of 1956 in Hungary, of the wider American masses as well. Further 
increasing American awareness of Hungary and Hungarians was the influx of 
two new waves of Hungarian newcomers, after the Second World War and, more 
importantly, in the wake of the 1956 uprising, respectively. 
Despite these historical contacts and interactions, the images Hungarians 
and Americans had of each other were often imperfect and incomplete. They 
were in many cases mere stereotypes. Little attention has been paid by histori-
ans to the evolution of the mutual views or, more precisely, of the mutual 
stereotypes that Magyars and Americans held of each other through the ages. 
The works reviewed here each contribute, to a greater or lesser extent, to the 
historiography of this subject and are therefore worth examining. 
* * * 
Geza Zavodszky's American Effects on Hungarian Imagination and Political 
Thought documents the fact that interaction between Hungarians and Americans 
existed even before 1848, in particular, that the United States had an important 
impact on the evolution of Hungarian political ideas and public beliefs from the 
time of the Republic's birth to the eve of the 1848 Revolution. To prove this, 
Zavodszky has examined the echoes that political, economic and social develop-
ments and trends in the United States had evoked in Hungary's press and in the 
writings of her political and literary elites. He demonstrates that "Amerika" had 
a profound impact on Hungarian political ideas and provided an impetus toward 
demands for changes in public life, first and foremost in the realm of penal 
reforms. 
In those times Hungarians received information about the United States 
through French, German and other intermediaries, from Hungarian citizens who 
had travelled there (or who corresponded with Americans), and above all, f rom 
travelogues about America written by Hungarians themselves. In this category, 
the most important work was Alexander Boloni Farkas's Utazas Eszak-Amerika-
ban [Journey in North America] (1834), a book which achieved unprecedented 
popularity in Hungary until its further reprinting was banned by Habsburg 
authorities fearful of its pro-republican and pro-democratic sentiments. The 
United States depicted in Boloni Farkas's book became the model that the great 
majority of Hungarian reformers wished to emulate. The impact of a later work, 
Agoston Haraszthy's similarly entitled Utazas Ejszak-Amerikdban [Journey in 
North America] (1844), was less pervasive, although this account alerted some of 
its readers to the economic opportunities provided by the United States, mainly 
because of the keen interest its author seems to have had in making profit while 
touring and learning about America. 
Zavodszky's monograph fills a large gap in the English-language literature 
of the story of Hungary's Americanization, and a smaller one in the history of 
that mega-trend which the author sees as the Americanization of the whole 
world, a process that had started in the eighteenth century and has been acceler-
ating ever since. His book is extensively researched and contains a useful 
bibliography as well as biographical notes (pp. 297-313). It will undoubtedly 
serve a generation of students of the American impact on Hungary of the pre-
1848 era. One can only hope that in the not too distant future, works of this 
nature will emerge also on some of the lesser documented phases of the post-
1848 age. 
* * * 
Professor Wandycz's paper, given as a keynote address in the conference from 
which issued the volume of essays Vampires Unstaked, does not say much 
about American images of Hungary, as he deals with the larger subject of 
French, British and American attitudes to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, 
but what he says is often interesting. His first conclusion is that "the ignorance 
of East European matters in the West... has not appreciably diminished in spite 
of the emergence of groups of well qualified regional experts." (p. 18). Sec-
ondly, Wandycz argues, the images of East Europe in the West have been, in 
recent decades, more negative than positive." He also suggests, in particular 
reference to the image of Hungarians, that whether their reputation was positive 
or negative, depended in large part on the ideological outlook of the Westerners 
who were passing judgement, (p. 18). 
* * * 
In Vampires Unstaked, Wandycz's paper is followed by Laszlo Maracz's study of 
the Western images and stereotypes of the Magyars. This work suggests that 
Western images of Hungarians through the ages remained rather consistent and 
contained both "positive and negative values," and that shifts between these were 
"triggered" by "political decisions" and changing "attitudes in the West" (p. 26). 
Indeed, it seems that Western opinions about Hungary, from the time of the 
Hungarian "plundering forays" into Western Europe in the ninth century to our 
age, were more the result of deliberately orchestrated propaganda than of actual 
realities. During the 9th century such propaganda was inspired by Holy Roman 
Emperors whose princely rivals had recruited the Hungarians to ravage the 
emperors' lands. In the 17th and 18th centuries, negative images of Hungarians 
were propagated by the House of Habsburg as well as Germans living in 
Hungary, in order to discredit the Magyars' demands for more autonomy within 
the Habsburg realm. Conversely, positive images of Hungarians were promoted 
by popes who wanted their non-Hungarian subjects to follow the example of 
certain particularly pious Magyar rulers, or much later by Western liberals who 
wished to inspire their countries' peoples with the examples set by Hungarians 
struggling for modernization and independence. Later, in the 20th century, the 
image of Hungarians underwent drastic gyrations. English propaganda against 
Hungary started in 1908, at the time when the United Kingdom sought rap-
prochement with Germany's enemies. The war of words began with R.W. Seton-
Watson's Racial Problems in Hungary (1908), which strove to demolish the 
"Kossuth myth" of a liberal Hungary and replace it with an image of Magyars as 
obstacles to progress and oppressors of minorities. This propaganda offensive 
only intensified during the First World War, especially in 1917 when the aim of 
British (and Allied) diplomacy became the destruction of Austria-Hungary and 
the Western public had to be prepared for this event. Negative images of the 
Magyars persisted until the events in Budapest of 1956, after which Hungarians 
became once again positively regarded in the West. After all, they had joined 
the West's struggle against Soviet expansionism. 
In his brief introduction to Vampires Unstaked Andre Gerrits identified 
the volume's first aim as outlining the images that nations of East Central Europe 
have of each other, as well as those that the West has of them. The second goal 
was to determine to what extent these images affected political decisions in — or 
about — the region. The volume at hand has been more successful in accom-
plishing the first of these aims. Concerning the second one, only tentative, and 
not very convincing, answers have been given. Wandycz, for example, points 
out that the negative image of Poles that generally prevailed in early twentieth 
century United States, did not keep America's leaders from supporting the cause 
of Polish restoration in the wake of World War I (p. 11). On the other hand, he 
admits that a favourable public image of a country did not necessarily result in 
vigorous Western action on its behalf when it was threatened by an outside 
power, as had been demonstrated in the case of Czechoslovakia during the 
Munich crisis, and again during the Soviet occupation of Prague in 1968. When 
everything said is taken into consideration, the following query remains basically 
unanswered: would the tens of millions of East Europeans who were left 
stateless by the post-World War I peace settlement — or found themselves living 
as minorities in the nation states of other peoples — have found better treatment 
had their image been a more favourable one in the West? 
* * * 
While Zavodszky's book dealt entirely with Hungarian images of America, John 
F. Montgomery's book (originally published in 1947 by the Devin-Adair publish-
ing company of New York) offers an example of an American's image of 
Hungary. And Montgomery's view is an unusual, almost unique one, offering a 
favourable portrait of both interwar Hungary and, what is more remarkable, of 
her elite, at a time when Western images of Hungary were generally negative. 
It is well-known from about 1910 to 1956, that Hungary did not enjoy a 
favourable image in the West, a circumstance that must have had a very damag-
ing impact on the country's evolution given the fact that it was precisely in this 
period that two peace settlements were imposed on the Hungarian nation. How 
Hungary had lost its previously good reputation in the decade leading up to the 
outbreak of World War I is explained in part by Geza Jeszenszky's excellent 
monograph, Az elvesztett presztizs [The lost prestige].' The decline of Hun-
gary's reputation in Great Britain contributed to a similar decline in the United 
States, especially during the Great War. During the this conflict English propa-
ganda against Hungary reached the United States and was supplemented by local 
anti-Magyar propaganda after the US entered the war against the Central Powers 
in 1917.2 Anti-Hungarian sentiments persisted throughout the post-war years and 
into the 1920s and 1930s. They were reinforced by the propaganda that was 
being spread by former members of the post-war revolutionary regime of Count 
Mihaly Karolyi, as well as spokesmen of the Little Entente countries (the newly-
established Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and the greatly enlarged Rumania) 
who wanted to make sure that Hungary's reputation in North America and 
elsewhere stayed negative, while those of their own nations continued to be 
favourable. 
With the outbreak of the World War II in 1939, the situation further 
deteriorated, as the American public came to associate Hungary with the coun-
tries that had aligned their policies with those of Nazi Germany. In December 
of 1941 Hungary's reputation in North America reached its nadir when the 
American Republic became involved in the world conflict after the attack on 
Pearl Harbor by Japan, and after Hungary's government — imitating the example 
of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy — declared war on the United States. During 
the three years that followed, Hungary was seen as Hitler's ally, and greater 
credibility was gained by those who wished to condemn Hungary or, at least, her 
ruling elite. The Hungarian emigre left went into high gear with its anti-Horthy 
propaganda, lead by such publicists as Oscar Jaszi and Rusztem Vambery.3 
These voices were echoed by Little Entente spokesmen, in particular by Eduard 
Benes during his tour of the United States and Canada in 1943. 
Fortunately for the people of Hungary and Hungarian immigrants in 
America, the leadership of the US was not uniformly anti-Hungarian in senti-
ment. In Washington in particular, some sympathy remained throughout the war, 
if not for the Hungarian government then for the people of Hungary and 
Hungarians in general. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, despite his unde-
served reputation among Hungarians as a Hungarophobe, was not antagonistic to 
the Hungarian nation. When Hungary's government declared war on the United 
States in December of 1941, he was instrumental in delaying a US declaration of 
war on Hungary, saying that the people of that country had nothing to do with 
the government that allied itself with Nazi Germany. The US declaration of war 
was only issued half-a-year later. It should also be added that Roosevelt 
supported the idea of restoring the Austro-Hungarian empire in one form or 
another after the war 4 
While the US President was not entirely unsympathetic to Hungary and 
Hungarians, many of his officials were. Among these were Sumner Welles, the 
Under-Secretary of State; Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the editor of the State 
Department's journal Foreign Affairs', and Alan Cranston who worked in the 
Foreign Newspapers section of the Office of Wartime Information for a better 
part of the war. One fairly influential American who was an exception in this 
respect, and was an avowed supporter of Hungary throughout these years, was 
J.F. Montgomery. 
John Flournoy Montgomery was born in 1878 into an "old-stock" 
American family. He started his career in sales and business management and, 
for much of his early adult life, was an executive with various subsidiaries of 
what later became the giant Nestle Food Company. Throughout the years, he 
was a supporter of the Democratic Party. In fact, soon after the Democratic 
electoral victory in 1933, Montgomery resigned from most of his business direc-
torships and accepted President Roosevelt's offer to become the American envoy 
to Hungary.'' 
From 1933 to 1941, when he was recalled from Budapest, Montgomery 
kept sending reports to Washington that revealed his sympathies for Hungary and 
most of her leaders. In fact, for Montgomery, the popular practice in English-
speaking countries of labelling Hungary a "backward, feudal" land, was a 
convenient ex-post-facto justification for the ill-treatment which that country had 
received in the post-World War I peace settlement. And, he continued to express 
these views, both in newspaper articles and in State Department circles, after his 
departure from Budapest. On one occasion at least, Montgomery took on the 
task of defending Hungary's leaders against allegations made against them by 
members of the Hungarian emigre left in the American English-language press. 
His most important act in support of Hungary and its pre-1944 regime, however, 
was the writing of the book: Hungary, the Unwilling Satellite. Unfortunately for 
Hungarians, the book did not appear in print until after the war's conclusion. 
Accordingly, it could not make an impact on American public opinion during the 
negotiations in 1945 concerning a post-war settlement in East Central Europe.6 
In his book, Montgomery denied that Hungary was a "feudal" and 
"fascist" state, as her detractors would have had the American public believe. 
He argued that, for much of the time he had been in Budapest, the Hungarian 
regime strove to maintain a free hand in foreign policy. "Up to the time when 
Germany and Italy were pushed together by force of events, Hungary could and 
did balance between the two.... This policy... gave Hungary... considerable liberty 
of action...." (p. 18). But Montgomery reserved most of his persuasive skills for 
a condemnation of the treatment that Hungary had received at the end of World 
War I: 
[In 1919-1920] [w]e Americans were ordered to love Czechoslovakia, 
Rumania and Yugoslavia and to applaud the ill-treatment meted out to 
Hungarians... We did. We bowed reverently to the fact that one 
[ethnically] mixed community, Austria-Hungary, was replaced and ab-
sorbed by a number of states, three of which,... were no less mixed than 
the dissected empire had been.... [W]e bowed to this settlement. To be 
quite exact, we did not care.... If it suited the British and French to put 
millions of German-Austrians and Hungarians under Czech rule, Hunga-
rians under Rumanian, and Croats under Serbian domination, why 
should we be squeamish? But having helped our allies to win, we had 
our share of responsibility in the results of victory. We should not have 
washed our hands of all the injustice committed.... 
Even before Hitler shocked us into realizing our blunders, the truth 
had dawned upon some Americans... Businessmen, having visited first 
Croatia and then Serbia, or first Transylvania and then old Rumania, 
would ask... why advanced races had been put under the rule of [rela-
tively] backward ones.... 
People deprived of their livelihood by their neighbors never even had 
a hearing. At the same time, those who profited by the victors' arbit-
rary discrimination showered us with an unceasing flow of propa-
ganda.... the object of which was to keep what had been seized.... 
Having been American Minister to Hungary from 1933 to 1941, my 
regular post of observation... was Budapest. It was a unique post 
because the Magyars,... were always aware of being between the two 
fires of German and Russian imperialism. During those years, most of 
us saw only one fire, the German one. Hungary's vision was far ahead 
of ours. Had we listened to Hungarian statesmen, we should perhaps 
have been able to limit Stalin's triumph in the hour of Hitler's fall. 
[B]etween the two wars,... from my watchtower on the Danube... 
what I witnessed was a tragic and insoluble conflict between fear and 
honor, in which fear was bound to win. It is an undeniable fact that on 
many occasions those who had been treated as stepchildren by the 
Western powers in 1919 showed more loyalty to the Allied cause than 
their spoiled favorites did.7 
In his final condemnation of the post-World War I peace settlement with 
Hungary, Montgomery asks the pertinent question: "Would it not have been 
better if we had opposed the arbitrary discrimination indulged in by the surgeons 
of 1919, who thereby afforded Hitler his most powerful arguments?"8 
As has been mentioned above, Montgomery's view were rare if not 
unique among American officials during and immediately after the Second 
World War. The general attitude to Hungary, and especially to her interwar and 
wartime regime, was one of hostility and derision. It had to be the outbreak of 
an anti-Soviet revolution in Hungary in 1956 that would alter American attitudes 
to the country and its people. 
The re-publication of Montgomery's little-known 1947 book will be 
welcome news for those who feel that Hungary had too much negative publicity 
as a result of her participation in the Second World War. 
The works reviewed here, despite their varying lengths and differing 
scholarly qualities, are useful contributions to the subject of the images — and 
stereotypes — that Hungarians and Americans have of each other. While they 
close some of the gaps in the literature of this subject, they leave ample room 
for further research. 
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Book Reviews 
István Nemeskürty. Nous, les Hongrois. Budapest: Akadémiai Kfadó, 1994. 
382 p. 
Traduit du hongrois, le livre retrace l'histoire des Hongrois dès le IXe s. jusqu'à 
la prise du pouvoir des communistes, imposés par l 'URSS après la Deuxième 
Guerre mondiale. Dans l'avant-propos, l'auteur spécifie ses intentions: "Le 
présent ouvrage est, de par son intention, un récit littéraire, une esquisse de 
l'évolution de notre essence hongroise", (p. 7) Tout comme la France, la 
Hongrie est habitée par une nation de penchant littéraire. 
Dans l'ordre chronologique, les nombreux chapitres brefs évoquent, à la 
lumière de témoignages historiques tumultueux et percutants, les grandes 
périodes de l'histoire hongroise. En outre, au-delà de l'histoire connue, l'auteur 
renseigne le lecteur sur les faits historiques moins bien connus mais parfois 
révélateurs. Ainsi, même la plupart des lecteurs hongrois, ignoraient dans ses 
détails, que János Hunyadi, durant la décennie 1430, avait été un "condottiere" 
en Italie au service de l'empereur ou de Philippo Visconti, duc de Milan. Tout 
en accumulant les dignités et honneurs, en 1446 il était déjà propriétaire de 4 
millions 130 mille arpents! Au total 28 forteresses, 57 villes, 1 000 villages, (p. 
113) Toute cette fortune avait été acquise en une décennie. 
À côté de ce chef de guerre, dont la victoire sur les Turcs à Belgrade, en 
1456, est à l'origine de l'angelus de midi, il est intéressant d'évoquer la famille 
Zrínyi, défenseurs, elle aussi de l'Europe chrétienne. Suite à la catastrophe de 
Mohács, en 1526, les XVIe et XVIIe s. seraient marqués, entre autres, par la 
lutte contre l'occupant turc, ensuite, les autrichiens. 
Le comte Miklós Zrínyi, qui maniait le sabre et la plume, incarnait le 
patriote héroïque, qui était prêt, comme ses ancêtres, à sacrifier tout pour la 
patrie. La Hongrie, coincée entre l'Empire ottomane et l'Autriche, ne pouvait 
compter que sur elle-même. En regardant les nations européennes "chrétiennes" 
Zrínyi conclut qu'aucune d'entre elles ne ferait de sacrifices pour libérer la 
Hongrie, "bouclier" de l'Europe. Honoré par le toison d'or espagnole, aristocrate 
cultivé et renseigné, il émettait cette opinion au milieu du XVIIe sur la France: 
"La nation française, lorsqu'elle n'est pas en guerre pour elle-même, on ne peut 
pas en attendre grand chose. Les Français, lorsqu'ils sont victorieux, sont 
insupportables, lorsqu'ils sont misérables, ne valent rien", (p. 185) 
Suite à l'expulsion des Turcs en 1686, vient une autre période, celle de 
Rákóczi, la guerre d'indépendance contre l'Autriche, soutenue par la France. Un 
siècle et demi plus tard, la révolution de 1848 et la guerre d'indépendance qui 
suivra, mettra la Hongrie à l'épreuve en affrontant à la fois les armées russe et 
autrichienne. Le général Lajos Aulich, avait mis l'ordre que voici: "Notre lutte, 
que nous menons contre deux puissances présomptueuses d'Europe, n'est pas 
celle de la nationalité, mais celle de la liberté générale contre l'absolutisme", (p. 
250) 
Le lecteur dirait qu'il s'agit d'une histoire triste de ce peuple dont le 
territoire de la patrie et de ses membres ont été traités comme une vulgaire 
marchandise et distribués par les puissances victorieuses de la Première Guerre 
mondiale à ses voisins par le tristement célèbre traité de Trianon... 
Le livre est complété par des renseignements ponctuels et précis sur 
l'histoire de la Hongrie. Il s'agit d'un livre facile à lire et le lecteur francophone 
en Europe ou en Amérique du Nord pourrait s'initier ou compléter ses connais-
sances sur le Hongrois. 
Paul Pilisi 
Université du Québec à Chicoutimi 
György Fehér, rédacteur. Yves de Daruvár. Budapest: Lakitelek Alapítvány et 
Antológia Kiadó, 1992. 137 p. 
Qu'il soit permis au recenseur de rendre hommage à celui pour qui le destin a 
donné deux patries à servir: la France et la Hongrie. Sándor Lezsák, directeur 
de la Fondation Lakitelek a voulu honorer l'engagement infaillible de Yves de 
Daruvár pour la Hongrie. Ernő Raffay termine l'avant-propos en ces termes: 
"Chaque ligne d'Yves de Daruvár est imprégné par son engagement envers la 
cause magyare... et celui qui le lira, l 'enfermera dans son coeur." György Fehér, 
à titre de rédacteur, propose au lecteur la biographie familiale des Daruvár 
Kacskovich, illustrée par les portraits des ancêtres. Viennent ensuite les extraits 
de discours, des publications de l'auteur, notamment de son livre intitulé "Le 
destin dramatique de la Hongrie" (1971), entrecoupés de photos illustrant sa 
brillante carrière. Les extraits de ses mémoires de guerre, "De Londre à la 
Tunisie, carnet de route de la France Libre" (1995), retracent l'itinéraire suivi de 
celui qui deviendra commandeur de la Légion d'honneur, compagnon de la 
libération et administrateur en chef des affaires d'outre-mer. Le livre, présenté 
sous un format soigné, se termine par la chronologie d'activités d'Yves de 
Daruvár au service de la cause magyare. 
La personnalité de Daruvár a été bien connue par l'émigration hongroise. 
À l'automne 1981, ses organisations en Amérique du Nord lui réservaient 
honneurs, reconnaissances et distinctions. Quel agréable surprise m'attendait à 
Chicoutimi, quand le regretté Miklós Zay, ami et condisciple de lycée à Paris 
m'a appris, qu'ils viendront, après presque quarante années de retrouvailles, nous 
rendre visite. C'est à Chicoutimi qu'Yves de Daruvár m'a dédicacé son livre sur 
"Le destin dramatique de la Hongrie" ..., en souvenir de sa conférence au 
Collège du Cardinal Mindszenty de Louvain (Leuven) (de 1972) en Belgique. 
C'est dans la revue, "Documentation sur l'Europe centrale" de l'Institut de 
recherche synonyme, fondé par le père István Muzslay S.J., que les nombreuses 
études d'Yves de Daruvár ont été publiées. Le père Muzslay, qui a tant fait pour 
la jeunesse estudiantine hongroise de l'Université Catholique de Louvain ainsi 
que pour la cause hongroise, a été décoré par le gouvernement de Hongrie en 
1991. Yves de Daruvár, né à Constantinople d'un père hongrois et d'une mère 
française, ne sachant pas le hongrois, mais comprenant mieux que quiconque le 
destin dramatique de ce peuple, a donné un service inestimable au peuple 
Magyare. 
De la Fondation Lakitelek vient cet hommage solennel et le témoignage 
de vive reconnaissance d'une autre patrie à la fois proche et lointaine... 
Paul Pilisi 
Université du Québec à Chicoutimi 
A „Jelcin-dosszié": Szovjet dokumentumok 1956-ról [The Yeltsin File: Soviet 
Documents on 1956]. Éva Gál, B.A. Hegedűs, György Litván, and János M. 
Rainer, eds. Budapest: Századvég kiadó and the 56-os Intézet, 1993. 424 pages. 
For almost three-and-a-half decades after the Revolution in Hungary in 1956, 
few people suspected that top secret Soviet documents will be made public in 
their lifetime concerning this fateful event in the evolution of the Soviet Empire. 
Then came Gorbachev, glasnost, and the collapse of the Soviet system. These 
developments made possible the release of Soviet documents concerning 
Hungary in 1956. In fact, in November of 1992 Russian President Boris Yeltsin 
delivered to Árpád Göncz, his Hungarian counterpart, a file containing nearly 
300 pages of such documents. 
The "Yeltsin file," as this collection of documents has become known, 
covers the period from April 1956 to June of 1958. That is, it deals with events 
in Hungary during the gestation of the revolutionary outbreak, the uprising itself, 
and the trial and execution of Imre Nagy in 1958 which can be seen as the final 
act of the drama that had unfolded in Budapest in two years earlier. The file 
contains a variety of documents. There are diplomatic and party reports on the 
situation in Hungary, intelligence and military assessments, memoranda of 
discussions with Hungarian communist officials, submissions from members of 
the Hungarian party elite, as well as directives from the powers-to-be in Moscow 
to Soviet officials dealing with the Hungarian situation. The documents them-
selves seem to have originated from two archival collections. One of these is 
the Presidential Archives of the Soviet Union, a repository of historical records 
that apparently had been established by Gorbachev. This collection housed 
transcripts of decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, as well as those of the Party's Presidium — earlier known as the 
Politburo. It also contained the diplomatic, military and intelligence reports that 
had been directed to these Party organs during 1956-1958. The rest of the 
documents have come from the archives of the Soviet Union's Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. This archival collection housed the reports that the then Soviet 
Ambassador to Hungary, Yuri Andropov had sent to Moscow, as well as 
Marshall Zhukov's reports on the military aspects of the Hungarian situation. 
Even though before the disintegration of the Soviet Union historians had 
no access to top secret Soviet archival collections, much of the history of the 
1956 Revolution in Hungary was well known. Hundreds of books and thousands 
of shorter works have been written on the subject. Much has been written on 
the impact of the Revolution on other countries, including the leadership of the 
Western powers. If there was one aspect of the topic which has not been known 
extensively before, it has been the deliberations and actions of the Soviet leader-
ship. The documents in the Yeltsin file have helped to clarify to a degree this 
aspect of the Revolution's history. They do more than this however. They 
throw considerable light on the issue of Yugoslav-Soviet relations. They 
indicate, for example, that before the outbreak of trouble in Budapest, the 
Soviets were suspicious of anti-Soviet activities by the staff of the Yugoslav 
embassy in the Hungarian capital. And, the documents also show that as soon as 
the Revolution was crushed by Soviet troops, Yugoslav-Soviet relations once 
again deteriorated, mainly over the issue of the treatment meted out by the 
Soviets and their Hungarian quislings to Imre Nagy and his "accomplices." Only 
at the moment of danger to all communist regimes, at the very end of October 
and the first days of November, did the Yugoslav and Soviet leadership see eye 
to eye on the need to reign in the Hungarian experiment in democracy and 
pluralism as it seemed to pose a great danger to both Soviet and Yugoslav com-
munism. 
The documents also reveal that, in most cases and most of the time, the 
Soviet leadership was not receiving accurate information on the situation in 
Hungary. Soviet decisions then, were made on the basis of misinformation. No 
one can answer the question what the Soviet reaction might have been, if it had 
been based on more accurate assessments of the situation in Hungary. Perhaps 
there would not have been a second intervention by Soviet troops, and the go-
vernment of Imre Nagy would have been allowed to go on with its experiment in 
political pluralism and neutrality. This in turn might have changed the whole 
history of the Soviet Empire. W e will never know. However, the fact that the 
Soviet leadership was not getting — in fact, could not obtain — accurate 
information on developments in Hungary, reveals one of the great weaknesses of 
the Soviet system. 
Evidently, the Yeltsin file is an incomplete one. It is a selection of docu-
ments, prepared in haste, from a much larger body of Soviet party and govern-
mental records. It is no more than a sampling of the documentation that existed 
in two of the archives of the Russian Republic in 1992. Especially regrettable 
are the gaps in the documentation of the events in Moscow during the end of 
October, when the momentous decision was taken to crush the revolution in 
Hungary. The actual document, recording the October 31st decision of the 
Presidium to send in the Red Army, is there, but not any memoranda that would 
explain the circumstances of that fateful deed. Nor are there documents in the 
collection that would throw much additional light on the processes which saw 
Janos Kadar selected as Hungary's new communist leader. Very few of the 
documents reveal much about the Soviet Union's dealings with other great 
powers concerning the problems in Hungary. On the other hand, the Yeltsin file 
confirms many historical conjectures regarding the role of the Soviets in control-
ling or trying to control developments in Hungary before, during, and after the 
uprising. It also underlines the role that Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia and his 
advisers had played in the decision to crush the revolution. And the file clarifies 
the aggressive role that the Soviets assumed in the process of exacting retribution 
from the Hungarian people for participating in an anti-communist (and, anti-
Soviet) uprising. 
Almost as fast as the collection had been selected in Moscow, the 
Hungarians — in particular the staff of the Institute for the Study of 1956 — 
translated and prepared the documents for publication. Fortunately, they had 
done a credible job. The documents are amply annotated, and errors or misinfor-
mation in them are set right in the footnotes. And the collection is supplied with 
a comprehensive and informative introduction by historian Gyorgy Litvan, the 
Institute's director. 
N.F. Dreisziger 
Royal Military College of Canada 
NOTES 
A few of the documents that appear in A "Jelcin-dosszie" have been published in 
English, in Janos M. Rainer, ed., "1956 — The Other Side of the Story, Five Documents 
from the Yeltsin File" The Hungarian Quarterly, Vol. 34 (Spring 1993), pp. 100-114. 
The literature of the 1956 revolution in Hungary is enormous. One standard treat-
ment of it in Hungarian is Peter Gosztonyi, 1956: A Magyar forradalom tortenete [1956: 
The History of the Hungarian Revolution] (Munich: Griff, 1981). A monograph that 
covers most of the "age of communism" in Hungary is Bennett Kovrig, Communism in 
Hungary: From Kun to Kadar (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1979). A 
massive collection of papers dealing with the impact of the revolution on the world is 
The First War between Socialist States: The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and its 
Impact B.K. Kiraly, B. Lotze and N.F. Dreisziger, eds. (New York: Social Science 
Monographs, Brooklyn College Press, Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1984). 
A collection of essays that deals with one of the impact of the Revolution on Canada — 
the coming of the 1956 refugees — is the book Breaking Ground: The 1956 Hungarian 
Refugee Movement to Canada, Robert H. Keyserlingk, ed. (Toronto: York Lane Press, 
1993). 
An earlier collection of papers dealing with the revolution in Hungary — its origins, 
events and aftermath — is still available: The Hungarian Revolution Twenty Years After: 
Selected Papers and Perspectives (Ottawa, 1976). To order this 140-page paperback 
volume, send a cheque for $10.00 (payable to the Hungarian Studies Review) to N.F. 
Dreisziger, Department of History, ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE OF CANADA, PO 
BOX 17000 STN FORCES, KINGSTON ON K7K 7B4 CANADA. (Please print the 
last three lines of the address in capital letters, as given here). 
For historian Andras D. Ban's informal review of Gyula Juhasz's book, A 
tortenesz jozansaga [The soberness of the historian] (Budapest: Orszagos 
Szechenyi Konyvtar, 1993), see the section "In Place of an Obituary," pp. I26f. 
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In Place of Obituaries: 
Remembering Robert Blumstock, Gyula Juhasz, 
arid Andrea Horvath. 
In the 1970s and the 1980s occasionally obituaries appeared in our journal, 
marking the passing of one or another member of our editorial advisory board, 
or a stalwart contributor. We have not published such notices in the past several 
years. The reason for this was not the absence of death in the HSR1 s circle of 
friends and associates. In fact, in the period in question, we lost three people 
who have had an impact on our journal in one way or another. These were 
sociologist Robert Blumstock, historian Gyula Juhasz, and linguist Andrea 
Horvath. 
When Robert Blumstock died in April of 1995, the HSR lost a friend and 
editorial colleague who had cooperated with the journal's principal editors for 
nearly two decades. He had come to Canada from his native United States in 
1964 to teach sociology at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario. It was 
Professor Blumstock's interest in Hungary, the birthplace of his mother, that 
brought him in contact with our journal. He also took a leading role in the 
establishment and early work of the Hungarian Studies Association of Canada, 
and served as President of that organization for a term. His publications also 
tended to deal with Hungarian or Hungarian-Canadian topics. One of the latter 
was his edited volume: Rekevar: Working Papers on a Canadian Prairie 
Community (Ottawa: National Museum of Man, 1979). Among his other publi-
cations were a half-dozen chapters in books, a dozen articles in scholarly 
journals, and a great many conference papers and short, popular writings. He 
would often appear in print in the local newspapers, commenting on some public 
controversy. On one occasion, he had half-seriously recommended, in one of the 
Hamilton dailies, that Canada adopt Hungarian as its official language. He 
argued that this would make Canada less vulnerable to the impact of American 
mass culture and would also solve the problem of linguistic sexism: as is well-
known, Magyar is gender-neutral. The suggestion was a reflection of Bob 
Blumstock's sense of humour. 
Robert Blumstock had fought a long battle with cancer. Even though he 
was ill during the last several years of his life, he continued to teach, to partici-
pate in academic life — he had planned to attend a Hungarian studies conference 
in Rome during the last days of his life — and to research and write. His book 
on the Jewish Question in Hungary, 1848-1948 was accepted for publication not 
long before his untimely passing. 
* * * 
Gyula Juhasz was a prominent historian and academic administrator in the 
Hungary of the 1960s to the early 1990s. He had not participated in our jour-
nal's editorial work, nevertheless he contributed to the HSR's well-being nearly a 
decade ago when, as chief executive officer of the Orszagos Szechenyi Konyvtar 
or National Szechenyi Library of Hungary, he had helped to cement the link 
between the HSR and his institution. Because Gyula Juhasz's list of publications 
would take pages to reproduce, it will have to suffice to enumerate only his most 
prominent books: A Teleki-kormany kiilpolitikaja, 1939-1941 [The Foreign 
Policies of the Teleki Government, 1939-1941] (1964); Hungarian Foreign 
Policy, 1919-1945 (1979); Magyarorszag kiilpolitikaja a nyugati hadjdrattol a 
Szovjetunio megtamadasaig, 1940-1941 [Hungary's foreign policy from the time 
of the Western Campaign to the invasion of the Soviet Union], vol. V of the 
series Diplomaciai iratok Magyarorszag kiilpolitikdjdhoz, 1936-1945) [Diplo-
matic documents on Hungary's foreign policy, 1936-1945] (1982); A haboru es 
Magyarorszag, 1938-1945 [The War and Hungary, 1938-1945] (1986). His last 
book, A tortenesz joz.ansdga [The soberness of the historian] (1994), was pub-
lished posthumously. (For comments on this book, see below, pp. 127-128.) 
* * * 
Andrea Horvath's passing is perhaps the most difficult for us to accept and 
report. The reason for this is not the fact that she had been a long-term associ-
ate of the journal. Indeed, fate had prevented Andrea from having a chance to 
offer such help to the HSR. She had hardly passed her final doctoral examina-
tion when the diagnosis of a potentially incurable disease was made. For some 
time before then she had participated in our work, the work of the Hungarian 
Studies Association of Canada, and had been close to the journal, both in the 
figurative and literal sense of that word: she often used the HSR's office at the 
University of Toronto to study or to receive her students. Her passing is' 
particularly painful because it comes at a time when scholars in the field of 
Hungarian studies — many of whom are contemplating retirement within a 
decade — often lament that there are very few young people to follow in their 
academic footsteps. 
N.F. Dreisziger 
Others remember Robert Blumstock: 
Bob Blumstock came to McMaster in 1964. His special fields of sociology — 
ethnicity, ideology, and religion — enriched the Department's course offerings. 
From the beginning, he showed a strong interest in the development of the 
Department and played a key role in the evolution of the undergraduate and 
graduate programmes. By 1968, he had become the Department Chair, and 
during this time he saw the Ph.D. programme approved and the first of a long 
line of students accepted into the. programme. He was instrumental in attracting 
foreign students to McMaster, especially from Hungary, and he contributed to 
the study of comparative industrial studies. 
The only child of Jewish immigrants to New York from Hungary, he 
attended City College of New York for his B.A. and M.A. (1957), then the 
University of Oregon... When he obtained his doctorate in 1964, he had already 
been teaching for two years at the University of Connecticut; from there, he 
came to McMaster. The culture of civility which he saw here, and which he 
believed to be quintessentially Canadian, suited him just fine; so he became a 
citizen and remained at McMaster for the rest of his career. 
During the first third of his tenure at McMaster, Bob enjoyed informal 
contacts with students and colleagues. He talked to people in the hall, at lunch, 
wherever. He and his wife, Ruth, were generous hosts for parties in their home 
for students, colleagues, friends, and visitors to the Department.... 
He was a contributing author and editor of two books, a half-dozen book 
chapters, a dozen articles in refereed journals, and innumerable works in the 
popular press. He was past Vice-President and President of the Hungarian 
Studies Association... He was visiting professor at Attila Jozsef University in 
Szeged in 1990; visiting lecturer at Karl Marx University in Budapest in 1972; 
and at the University of Lethbridge in 1988. 
He was a neo-liberal long before it became fashionable to be one. He 
knew about Marxism, not just as a field of study, but as only someone who has 
lived in a Marxist state can know it; for years before the implosion of socialism 
in Eastern Europe, he had been commenting on the "irrelevance of ideology" for 
that region in both English-language and Magyar scholarly journals and books. 
His ongoing work on civil religion, on ideology, and on contemporary trends in 
Eastern Europe reflected that knowledge; so did the countless Hungarian refu-
gees who were welcomed, given practical aid, and offered friendship. 
During the latter part of his career, his substantive interests shifted 
somewhat and focused on Hungarian-Jewish intellectuals in the interwar pe-
riod,... Although very ill for many years, he continued working on his research 
projects: a paper on values in post-communist Europe...; another, on Herzl and 
Heltai before Zionism, was to be presented at a conference in Rome just days 
after he died... 
He had a gift for satire, an unerring eye for sacred cows, a fine sense of 
the ridiculous. He was a respected lecturer and supervisor. "His" graduate 
students and others who worked with him or knew him will remember a man 
who took pains to see them through, who acted like a catharine-wheel of 
sparking ideas, who brought humour and friendship to the academic environ-
ment. We have lost the wit, the insights and the advice that were his hallmarks. 
Frank E. Jones, Roy W. Hornosty, and David Lewis 
Department of Sociology, McMaster University 
And Gyula Juhasz: 
The book, A tortenesz jozansaga [The soberness of the historian], is a mirror 
image of Professor Juhasz's work of a lifetime, it is a brief and somewhat 
incomplete summary of his career. It consists of three parts: the first contains 
scholarly studies, the second popular articles, and the third, interviews that he 
had given. If we had to categorize his writings by subject, three groupings 
would emerge as well: the development of Hungarian diplomacy between the 
two world wars and particularly during the second and, within this theme, 
especially Anglo-Hungarian relations; national self-awareness, the knowledge of 
things Hungarian, and the question of "who is a Hungarian?"; and last, the 
related issue of intellectual and cultural life between the wars and during World 
War II. The book at hand contains first rate studies relating to all three of these 
themes. And in every one of these there is revealed Gyula Juhasz's basic 
approach as a historian: one that is free of emotionalism, that places emphasis on 
archival sources, and an approach that is strictly scholarly.... 
For me, the most exciting writings [in this book] were those that explored 
the evolution of Anglo-Hungarian relations. These relations became most 
serious during the Second World War, especially after 1943 when through 
diplomatic and other channels secret negotiations started between the two 
countries. The theme of these discussions was exploring the possibility of 
Hungary's departure from the war and the avoidance of a German and, in time 
the increasingly obvious prosect of a Russian occupation. We know the out-
come: we were not able to avoid either a German or a Russian occupation. 
The question why we were unsuccessful in this finds possible answers in 
several of Juhasz's studies. I will mention only three, the one about the foreign 1 
policy of Count Teleki, the other about the Second Vienna Award, and the third 
about Hungarian revisionism. These writings depict Hungary's most important 
statesmen: P31 Teleki, whose diplomatic orientation and efforts to keep Hungary 
neutral in the war] proved bankrupt [in the spring of 1941], and who — no 
longer able to shoulder the pressure brought upon him by the Germans — 
committed suicide.... But beyond Teleki, these writings trace the politics of 
Laszlo Bardossy. Yes, Bardossy, who, contrary to papular belief, was not a pro-
German politician from the beginning. And, of course, there is Miklos Kallay 
and his increasingly desperate efforts to get out of the war.... And, above all, 
there is Miklos Horthy. The very Horthy whose politics are subject of lively 
debate in the media of our days, and whose image often f inds overly favourable 
or excessively unfavourable depiction depending on the political tastes of his 
advocates or critics. A real historian, however, cannot be partial.... He or she 
can like or dislike the dramatis personae [of his works], he or she must judge 
them with unclouded intellect, and on the basis of the facts. What also emerges 
from Gyula Juhasz's book, is an estimate of in what way and to what extent 
Horthy was responsible for what happened in Hungary between 1920 and 1945. 
In the interview entitled "the need for accounting," which appeared originally on 
the 40th anniversary of the Holocaust, deals with the question how it was 
possible that in May and the early summer of 1944 the Germans were able to 
deport in short order the majority of rural Hungary's Jews, some 435,000 people. 
That Horthy shouldered a great deal of the responsibility for this tragedy, we 
know and cannot disregard. But before we look for scapegoats, it does not hurt 
to look at the facts and the archival and other sources. What had transpired 
during the discussions between Hitler and Horthy at Klessheim on March 18, 
19447 What is it that we know for sure about these discussions, and what is it 
that we still don't? What prompted Horthy to stop the deportation of the Jews of 
Budapest in July of 1944?... 
These are some of the questions to which Juhasz had sought answers in 
his works. What we can also learn from the papers in this volume is... that we 
must take care to examine historical events from various points of view, and that 
we must travel a long road before we can come to the drawing of conclusions.... 
Excerpts from a speech by Andras D. Ban, made on the occasion of the launch-
ing of Gyula Juhasz's posthumous book: A tortenesz jozansaga [The soberness of 
the historian] (Budapest: Orszagos Szechenyi Konyvtar, 1993), 17 Feb. 1994. 
Translation by N.F. Dreisziger. An abbreviated version of Ban's speech was 
published in Magyar Nemzet [The Hungarian Nation] on 11 Jan. 1994. 



